


GOVERNMENT ORIENTAL SERIES

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PREPARED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
THE PUBLICATION DEPARTMENT OF
THE BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL
RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
POONA.



POONA
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

1926

Government Oriental Series—Class C, No. 1.

THE VEDĀNTA

A STUDY OF
THE BRAHMA-SŪTRAS WITH THE BHĀSYAS
of Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhvā and Vallabha

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PUBLISHED BY
The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.

1926
Dec 20

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Printed from type set up at the Bhandarkar Institute Press,
Anandashram, Budhwar Peth, Poona and published by
V. G. PARANJPE, M. A., LL. B., D. Litt., Secretary,
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, POONA.

First Edition, One Thousand Copies.

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PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.

The literary career of the late Dr. Ghate was cut short by a premature death which belied all expectations. The present work was offered by him in 1918 as a thesis for the Doctorate of the Paris University. Being written in French, it was inaccessible to most Indian readers and therefore the authorities of the Bhandarkar Institute were very glad to accept the offer of the heirs and executors of the late Dr. Ghate to transfer to the Institute the copyright of what appeared to be a complete English translation of the work. I undertook most willingly to see the work through the press on behalf of the heirs of the late Dr. Ghate, whom I owed a debt of gratitude as his pupil at the Deccan College. On examination, however, I found that the copy entrusted to me was not a translation of the French work; but the original draft of it in English, which was changed occasionally while it was being translated. I had therefore to take some liberties with the text of Dr. Ghate's manuscript, although I have tried to make them as few as possible consistently with the desire to give an unambiguous text, which was also in conformity with its French version. There are a few inconsistencies that still remain and there must be typographical imperfections also in the present edition, for which I ought to take my full share of responsibility. I can only say that I have given it all my energy and vigilance, of which unfortunately I have not the full measure, and I hope that the reader will accept this circumstance as some extenuation of all my faults.

V. G. PARANJPE.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

The problem as to what is the doctrine contained in the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyana or, in other words, which among the five well-known commentaries gives the most faithful interpretation of them has occupied my mind since long. I was therefore very glad to have the permission of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris to offer to it in the form of a thesis the results of my study of the subject and my reflections on it. I leave it to the reader to decide if the conclusions at which I have arrived are or are not satisfactory. I only hope that the method followed in the treatment of the subject would appear to be reasonable and in strict conformity with the rules of western criticism. If this venture of mine succeeds in arousing some interest in Sanskrit philosophy, and more particularly in removing the idea which is now current in Europe that the sum of the Vedānta is to be found in the system of Śāmkara, I shall consider that my labour will not have been in vain.

I have to thank Dr. F. W. Thomas for the kindness which he has shown me in placing at my disposal books and manuscripts from the library of the India Office and in giving me his valuable advice whenever it was needed. The untiring co-operation of M. P. Masson-Oursel has likewise been of the greatest help to me, especially on account of his unrivalled knowledge of philosophic terminology, oriental as well as occidental.

The library of M. E. Senart has been of great use to me and I insist on giving an expression here to my sense of gratitude to him.

But above all things, I owe a debt of gratitude to M. Sylvain Lévi and to M. A. Foucher. It is thanks to their guidance and their encouragement that this humble attempt has seen the light of day. I have not words with which to express all that I feel when I think of all the precious time that these savants have spared for me and of the affectionate sympathy which they have shown

for me during my stay in Paris. I need not say what a source of information and of inspiration has been to me their heart-to-heart talk, in the course of which they gave freely of their treasures of erudition and of the finesse of their critical mind. I shall ever carry with me an imperishable memory of the hours which it was my privilege to spend in their company.

INTRODUCTION.

I.—GENERALITIES

A Maratha who was both a poet and a saint has said in a very well known line, जगी सर्व सुखी असा कोण आहे ?—‘Who is there, in this world, who is perfectly happy?’. The reply is, of course, no one. Not only is no one perfectly happy, but no one, is happy even. For, as we see, no happiness is unmixed. And even in the midst of the highest happiness, the thought or rather the fear of losing it half mars the enjoyment. Hence it is that thinkers have always sought to find out something which would secure eternal happiness, something which you can never lose, that is to say, something which would ever remain with you. A slight consideration will show that nothing in this world can fulfil this test unless it forms part and parcel of you, or in other words, it is yourself; for whatever is outside you, can never remain eternally with you. It is yourself alone which you can depend upon as something that is never to leave you. Hence the search after eternal happiness led, in its turn, to the search after the self, to philosophy. ‘Who am I?’ (कोऱ्ह) is the chief question with which all philosophy is in the first place concerned. ‘Whence do I come?’, ‘Where do I go?’ are questions which naturally follow in its train. It is these questions to which every school of philosophy attempts to furnish a reply; and it is these questions which have always occupied the seers of ancient India, her prophets and teachers, her saints and poets; and if I may say so, it is not the search after truth by itself, but the search after truth as actuated by the search after eternal beatitude, that is at the root of all Sanskrit philosophy, howsoever that beatitude may be called, by the name of ‘*Mokṣa*’ (deliverance), or *ānanda* (jouissance), or *nirvāṇa* (complete extinction), or any other name. And I believe that this is more natural, as it is more human, in accordance with the saying प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते, ‘even a fool does not proceed without having some object in view.’

The consideration of the main questions stated above cannot be satisfactorily carried on without at the same time taking note of many other side-questions, *e. g.* those about the means of knowlege (*pramāṇas*), the nature of heaven and hell, the nature of God, the practices to be observed in order to arrive at the right knowlege, the different paths leading to beatitude, etc. Thus there are more aspects or disciplines of philosophy than one, amongst which may be mentioned the following which are principal :—(1) Metaphysics, (2) Natural Philosophy, (3) Psychology, to which may be added, (4) Eschatology.

(1) There are two ways of looking at the universe with all its manifestations,—one is to investigate the forms in which the universe appears to us ; *i. e.* to our senses, which is the domain of the so-called science ; the other is to consider the very essence of the phenomena, independently of how they affect our senses, leading thus to the science of Metaphysics.—This latter sets before itself the task of knowing what is behind or beyond the universe which is both in us and around us. It endeavours to grasp the hidden springs that move the world, it longs to enter into the mysteries of ‘the great unknown.’ Metaphysics thus inquires into the last or first cause, and is the science of the Really Existent. Thus questions about Brahman, its nature, its relation to the universe,—all fall under the discipline of Metaphysics or the doctrine of the philosophical principle. Metaphysics becomes theology when the philosophical principle becomes less abstract and is endowed with personal attributes, so as to suit better the longings and the limited powers of the human mind, *in other words*, is turned into God. Thus Theology is the doctrine of God, or Metaphysics made concrete, whereas Metaphysics is Theology made abstract.

(2) On the other hand, when we deal with the phenomena themselves, their plurality, the order of creation and destruction of the different forms of existence that surround us, *in brief*, when we concern ourselves with the *Cosmos* as opposed to the underlying principle of unity, we enter the domain of Natural Philosophy, better known in modern times by the name Cosmology. Thus questions regarding the creation of the elements like ether,

air, light etc., their order of creation and destruction, the classification of living beings etc., fall under the discipline of cosmology.

(3) Apart from the outer world, there is the inner world, which is in ourselves, the world of thoughts and emotions, wishes and cognitions, the subtle vital airs all having at their head the soul or the ego. An investigation into this inner world forms the subject of the third discipline, viz. Psychology. Thus the theory of the subtle body and the gross body, the sense-organs as the means of cognition, internal and external, the vital airs,—all these belong to Psychology. Allied to this, or forming a sub-section of this, is Logic which deals with the more concrete instruments of thought and the laws of valid reasoning, which department has been the special pre-occupation of the Nyāya School of philosophy.

(4) To these we may add a fourth discipline, which is much less important and which is called Eschatology, dealing with things after death, with heaven and hell, the course followed by the jiva (life) after its departure from the body, the theory of manes, etc.

These are the four chief parts which every philosophical system must contain. In the present place, however, we shall be mainly concerned with the first or metaphysical aspect and with the rest, only occasionally.

II.—THE THREE PERIODS OF SANSKRIT PHILOSOPHY.

Ancient Sanskrit Philosophy divides itself, broadly speaking, into three periods :—(1) the Vedic, (2) the Upanisadic and (3) the post-vedic,—which may be also called (1) the cosmological, (2) the metaphysical and (3) the systematic,—representing three stages in the gradual intellectual evolution of the Indian thought.

1 *The Vedic Period.*—By the Vedic, we mean the period of the *samhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas*, especially of the *Rgveda Samhitā*. The philosophy of the Veda is rather a loose term, inasmuch as there is no philosophy proper in the Veda. The first philosophy of a people is its religion. And the *Rgvedic* religion is quite transparent, though developed, chiefly consisting of the personification of natural forces and natural phenomena. The most striking features of the Vedic religion are :—

Firstly—It is practical and utilitarian in nature, in that the hymns, though highly poetic and inspired in character, are most of them at the same time incidental to the sacrifice. 'Give and take' is the simple law which is applicable to the dealings between men and gods; and 'reciprocity, frank unconditional reciprocity becomes an accepted motive.'*

Secondly—As a consequence, it is essentially a religion of priests, a hieratic religion.

Thirdly—It is a religion of the upper classes who are well-to-do, presupposing an established household of considerable extent, a wealthy and liberal householder, elaborate and expensive materials, and many priests.

Fourthly—It is essentially optimistic. It is not immortality or heaven, but a long life for full hundred years, prosperity, warlike offspring, in short all the blessings of this life, that the worshipper or the householder asks for. It is a spirit of healthy joy in the life we live that dominates; while such pessimistic

* Bloomfield, Religion of the Veda, p. 184.

ideas as that life is uncertain and unsubstantial, that death is nature while life is only an accident, are conspicuous by their absence.

Fifthly—It is characterised by what may be described as *Arrested Personification*. The Vedic poets while personifying the power of nature into gods, never allow this nature worship to be stiffened into mere admiration, fear and adulation of personal gods, and never become forgetful of the origin from which sprang the gods.

Sixthly—It shows a tendency to raise the particular god to whom the worshipper is addressing prayers for the time being, to the most exalted position, so that all other gods are subordinated to him for the moment,—a form of religion which has been called *Kathenotheism*.

Notwithstanding the religious character of the Vedic thought in general, there are frequently found references to ideas more abstract and philosophical, which may be regarded as the germs of the later Upanisad-thoughts. As in the Vedic religion the mythological element prevailed, and the moral element,—the personified natural forces being considered as the power that creates, maintains and controls what man feels in himself as constituting the moral law, opposed to the egoistic tendencies natural to man,—though present, was not sufficiently assertive and the way was gradually paved for doubt and contempt of gods (see for instance Rg. II.125, IX. 112, VII. 103, X. 119. etc.). Besides, the mere technique of the sacrificial ritual, in the course of time, must have ceased to satisfy the minds both of the patron and the priest, so that more philosophic food was required, and questions and answers regarding the origin of the world and similar topics must have been discussed, giving rise to what are called *Brahmodyas*. So also the old mythological gods in strong flesh tints must have begun to disconcert them and faith must have been gradually lost; so that abstract and symbolic embodiments of the divine idea then took the place of the gods of nature. And just as the Rsis thought that the several natural phenomena had some divine forces behind them which were personified into so many

gods, in the same way they advanced one step further and came to think that all three were aspects of one and the same all-pervading divine force which manifested itself in the different phenomena. Thus the thought gradually progressed from many gods to one being and from the simple give-and-take religion to abstruse speculations regarding the beginning and origin of all things.

Thus Rg. I. 164-46 declares, "They call it Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa and Agni, or the heavenly bird Garutmat (the sun). The sages call the one being in many ways, they call it Agni, Yama, Mātaris'van." This whole hymn (I. 164) consisting of 52 verses, is nothing but a collection of riddles to which no answers are given. "The subjects of these riddles are cosmic, that is, pertaining to the nature-phenomena of the Universe; "mythological, that is, referring to the accepted legends about gods; psychological, that is, pertaining to the human organs and sensations; or finally crude and tentative philosophy or theosophy. Heaven and Earth, Sun and Moon, air, clouds, and rain; the course of the sun, the year, the seasons, months, days and nights; human voice, self-consciousness, life and death, the origin of the first creature, and the originator of the universe:—such are the abrupt and bold themes."*

Thus already in certain hymns of the Rgveda, there emerges the thought with which philosophy begins,—the conception of the unity of the world,—which later rose up to Monism, perceiving through the veil of the manifold, the unity which underlies it. In this connection may be particularly noticed the hymn X. 121, where the *Hiranya-garbha* is described as existing in the beginning of the creation, the sole lord of beings, supporting heaven and earth; X. 90 where the whole world is conceived as one being, the *Virat-purusa* who having pervaded it from all sides, still remained over and above it; X. 82 where the waters are spoken of as being the first substance or prime cause; X. 81, addressed to *Vis'vākarma* who combines in his person the characters of a primeval divine sacrificer and of a creator, in which the cosmol-

* Bloomfield, Religion of the Veda, p. 218.

ogical significance of the divine sacrifice finds particular expression, and question like 'What was the place whereon he took his station ? what was it that supported him ? How was it ? (Verse 2),' are boldly asked ; X. 125 where Vāk is represented as the companion and upholder of the gods and as the foundation of all religious activity and its attendant boons ; and X. 129, which is quite typical in character and remains unsurpassed in its noble simplicity and in the loftiness of its philosophical vision, as it attempts to explain the presence of the world and its contents, beyond the point of mere individual experience or analysis through empirical knowledge, by putting forth a fundamental principle without personality.

A cursory glance at these hymns will show that the general trend of thought is principally cosmological rather than metaphysical in the proper sense of the word, and hence we may call this period *cosmological*. One thing to be noticed in connection with this early philosophy of the Vedas, however, is the absence of pessimism and metempsychosis, which are the distinguishing traits of later Indian philosophy.

(2) *The Upaniṣadic Period.*—The second period of Indian Philosophy, that of the Upaniṣads, is quite distinct in character from the first, though it is but the natural result of it. If the thought during the first period was mainly religious and cosmological, with only a trace here and there of philosophy proper, the second period was mainly philosophical, though not in the narrow sense of the word, i. e. having a cut and dry-system of philosophy. The elaborate and mechanical system of worship that had grown up round the Vedic gods, and the speculations as regards the appropriateness of the rules and modes of worship and their efficacy for man's good in this world and the next, which prevailed in the Brāhmaṇas, no longer satisfied the religious spirit of the people. The overdoing of the sacrificial cult brought on its own downfall ; and people's thoughts were naturally drawn to subjects of a more spiritual character, such as problems about God, man and the world, and a variety of solutions was arrived at. 'Knowledge and not mere ceremonial is the way to happiness,'—that is the key-note of

the literature of this period. The Upanisads, unsurpassed in their freedom and comprehensiveness and grandeur of thought, are simply marvellous, and nowhere else can we find such a simplicity and naïvété of style combined with profundity and depth of idea,—a circumstance which makes them untranslatable.

On the question as to what the Upanisads teach (or in other words what is the nature of the philosophy of this period), there are, so to speak, two views, though one of them is gradually becoming the more prevalent one. Many eminent scholars, along with the orthodox people especially about the Mahārāstra, hold that the Vedānta of Sāṅkara represents the true teaching of the Upanisads ; and that the other so-called orthodox systems as well as the other schools of Vedānta, while they lay claim to be based on the Upanisads, are all so many developments by a kind of degeneration of the original doctrine (of the Upanisads). Thus, according to these people, the main idea of at least the oldest of the Upanisads (i. e. the Brhadāraṇyaka, the Chāndogya, the Mundaka and the Kātha) can be summed up in the equation, Brahman=Ātman=the world, taken in the strictest and most literal sense, (see especially Brhad. Upa. 1-4); from which it follows that the Ātman is the only reality,* that it is the metaphysical unity which is manifested in all the empirical plurality, all plurality thus by implication reducing itself to Māyā, that it is the knowing subject within us § and, as the knowing subject, is itself unknowable. † Thus though the expression 'Māyā,' in the strict sense of ignorance, or Avidyā or illusion, may be of a later date, still the doctrine that the universe is illusory was taught by the Upanisads, and the older the texts of the Upanisads are, the more uncompromisingly and expressly do they maintain this illusory character of the world of experience. The exponents of this view further add, that this bold and absolute idealism (as

* Brhad. 2. 4. 5 “Ātmano vā are dars'ānena s'ravaṇena matyā vijñānenāṁ sarvāṁ viditam bhavati ”.

§ Brhad. 3. 8. 11—“ Nānyadato'sti draṣṭṛ nānyadato'sti s'rotṛ nānyadato'sti mantṛ nānyadato'sti vijñātṛ. ”

† Brhad. 3.4.2—“ Na drṣṭer draṣṭāram pas'yer na s'ruteḥ s'rotāram sṛṇuyā na mater mantāram manvītha na vijñāter vijñātāram vijñāniyāḥ. ”

taught, for instance, in the so-called Yājñavalkya chapters of the Br̥had. Upa.) later degenerated first into pantheism, then into theism and last into materialism. For, the denial of the existence of the world as it appears to us, implied by the idealism of the old Upaniṣads, could not be maintained in the face of the reality of the world, which forced itself upon people's minds. Thus the attempt to reconcile the two, i. e. the bold idealism and the reality of the world, led to Pantheism, according to which the world is real and yet the Ātman is the only reality, for the world is Ātman (cf. *Chānd.* 3,14). Thus the equation that the world is equal to Ātman led to the theory of causality,—to cosmogonism, according to which, the Brahman itself entered into the creation as the individual soul. This Pantheism has to be distinguished from Theism which is the characteristic feature of certain later Upaniṣads like the Śvetāśvatara. The absolute identity of Brahman and Ātman, though perfectly true from the metaphysical standpoint, remains incomprehensible for the empirical view of things, which distinguishes a plurality of souls different from each other and from the Highest Spirit, the creative power of the Universe. This is theism. According to it there are three entities, a real world (*acid*), ātman (*cid*) and Brahman of which the *cid* and *acid* form the body. But in the course of time the necessity of Brahman apart from Ātman ceased to be felt and its creative power was attributed to Prakṛti, non-intelligent but at the same time independent of any intelligent being, which led to the materialistic dualism of the Sāṃkhya doctrine later on.

An impartial consideration of the Upaniṣads taken as a whole will, however, show that this view about the teaching of the Upaniṣads is not tenable; nor is the order in the evolution of thought satisfactorily demonstrable. The Upaniṣads are nothing but free and bold attempts to find out the truth without the slightest idea of a system; and to say that any one particular doctrine is taught in the Upaniṣads is unjustifiable in the face of the fact that in one and the same section of an Upaniṣad, we find passages one following the other, which are quite opposed in their purport. Bold realism, pantheism,

theism, materialism are all scattered about here and there, and the chronological order of the Upanisads has not been sufficiently established on independent grounds, so as to justify us in claiming that one particular view predominating in a certain number of Upanisads (granting that this is possible) represents the teaching of the Upanisads. And to say that idealism represents the real teaching of the Upanisads because it is contained in a certain Upanisad which is relatively old and that the Upanisad is relatively old because it contains a view of things with which philosophy should commence, is nothing but a logical see-saw. It may be true that if one insists on drawing a system from the Upanisads, replete as they are with contradictions and divergences, S'ankara has succeeded the best, because his distinction of esoteric and exoteric doctrines like a sword with two edges can easily reconcile all opposites such as unity and plurality, assertion of attributes and their negation, in connection with one and the same being; but this is one thing and to say that the Upanisads taught S'ankara's doctrine is quite another thing.

As regards the relative order of doctrines in the march of philosophic thought, we may as well say that the first stage is represented by materialism, which is innate in us, which is persistently forced on us by our daily experience, and which very few can get rid of in practice, though there may be a few more who deny it in theory. Thus we start with plurality, and difference, ascend through difference and non-difference and qualified unity until at last we reach the highest top, i. e. absolute unity.

Thus the other view regarding the teaching of the Upanisads according to which the Upanisads teach not one but many systems of doctrines regarding the nature of God, man and the world and the relations between them is more reasonable and is being more and more accepted. The germs of all the later systems, whether orthodox or heterodox, can be found in them, as is evident from the fact that all the religio-philosophic systems of later times can quote a certain number of passages from them in their support. But when the exponents of these

systems try to show that theirs is the only system taught by the Upanisads and attempt to explain passages, even when directly opposed in tenour to their doctrine, in a manner so as to favour their doctrine, the artificiality and the unsatisfactory character of the attempt is at once evident. For the Upanisads represent a large floating mass of speculations of old seers, clothed in words and handed down orally—speculations depending on the mood of the thinker and the point of view from which he looked at things.

In spite of this free and unfettered character of the Upanisads, however, it must be admitted that they are on the whole more favourable to the Uttara Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta (taken in its larger sense) than to any other system, and that we find there some ideas which stand out more conspicuously than others,—such as for instance the immortality of the soul, its metempsychosis and transmigration, including the 'way of the fathers' for the performers of sacrifices and virtuous actions, the 'way of the gods' for the possessors of knowledge, and the third place for the doers of evil deeds, the superiority of knowledge and meditation to action as means of attaining liberation, above all, a constant striving after the reconciliation of unity and plurality, of idealism and realism.

Such is, in general, the character of the second or Upaniṣad period of Indian philosophy, which we have also called metaphysical to distinguish it from the first, since it concerned itself also with speculations about man and his inner soul, his inner activities and the processes of his thought and will, and not merely with questions about nature, cosmic matter etc. (as was the case with the first period), in brief since it saw the beginnings of the psychological, ethical and metaphysical problems.

Next we come to the post-vedic or systematic period, which saw the development of the so called six darsānas or orthodox systems, as well as of the heterodox systems such as Buddhism, Jainism etc.. As said above, the germs of all these systems were already present in the Upaniṣads; and what these systems did was to take up particular parts of the Upaniṣads and deduce from them a cut-and-dry system, conniving at or explaining away in a far-fetched manner those parts

which did not suit the particular system. This systematic period may be supposed to have begun with the collections of sūtras which are regarded as the foundations of the several systems and the dates and authors of which have not yet been determined with precision and accuracy. The intervening stage between the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, on the one hand, and the sūtras, on the other, is represented by the philosophical portions in the Mahābhārata, as for instance, the Bhagavadgīta, the Sanatsujātiyaparvan, the Mokṣa-dharma etc., (portions of which have formed the common basis of Buddhism and Sāṃkhya), which were, however, as far from containing a systematic doctrine as the Upaniṣads themselves; and terms like Sāṃkhya and Yoga, frequently to be met with there, do not signify the names of the later systems called by those names, but mean merely 'reflection' and 'concentration,' in which sense they are used also when they first occur in the S'vet. Upa. 6.13.

As for what distinguishes the orthodox from the heterodox or Nāstika schools, it is generally believed to be the want of belief in God as the creator of the world; and in this sense the beginnings of Indian atheism can be traced back to the Vedic period even. In the Rgveda, the God Indra is derided in IV. 24.10, X. 119; and in II. 12.5, VIII. 100-3, we read of people who absolutely denied his existence even in these early days. We have here the first traces of that naïve atheism which is so far from indulging in any philosophic reflection that it simply refuses to believe what it cannot visualise, and which was later known as the Cārvāka or Lokāyatika system. As distinguished from it, there is the philosophical atheism of the Buddhas and the Jainas, according to whom there is no eternal, supreme God, creator and lord of all things, and the so-called gods are only more highly organised and happier beings than men,—an atheism which can go hand in hand with a religious system and cannot prevent it from being one of the most influential religions in the world.

But if the distinction be due merely to the negation of God, even the Sāṃkhya will cease to be orthodox; the Mīmāṃsakas of the

school of Kumārila bhāṭṭa also deny the existence of a supreme God. Even in the Vais'ēṣika and Nyāya systems, the theistic element, far from being a fundamental point in the doctrine, is nothing but a mere appendage. Buddhism and Jainism, moreover, though they deny God, raise the personalities of Buddha and Jina almost to the eminence of a god, as the teacher of the sacred law and as the object of the highest reverence, while admitting no doubt that the world is without beginning or end, and not produced by a god or ruled by one.

It is the want of faith in the Vedas as Revelation and as the highest authority, of 'prāmāṇya-buddhirvēdesu,' which, from the Brahmanical point of view, placed the so-called atheistic schools outside the pale of orthodoxy; thus the Sāṁkhya, the Vais'ēṣika and the Mīmāṁsā can call themselves orthodox or not un-atheistic, because they accepted the authority of the Vedas in theory, howsoever little they might use it in practice; at least they did not condemn it as did the Bauddhas and Jainas.

Of the six orthodox systems that developed during this third period the Sāṁkhya and the Vedānta are the only ones of strictly metaphysical importance. It is the Vedānta alone that has appropriated to itself the name 'Aupaniṣada' doctrine, since it is the only system which seriously concerns itself with explaining and reconciling the various divergent metaphysical portions of the Upanisads and since it alone regards the Upanisads as the highest authority, not only in theory but in practice. The metaphysical importance and the ancient character of the Sāṁkhya is proved by the fact that the Vedānta-sūtras take special pains to refute it. The other systems, with only a nominal metaphysical grounding, have specialised in other departments of knowledge and thus are of still greater importance for philosophy proper. Thus the Yoga, which is a sequel of the Sāṁkhya and which accepts the metaphysical doctrine of the Sāṁkhya entirely, with the only difference that it regards the īś'vara as a more important personality than the Sāṁkhya does, mainly concerns itself with the theory and practice of *Samādhi* or concentration of mind and the various physical and mental gymnastics related

to it, of course viewed as means of arriving at the knowledge of the essence of things, or, in other words, at the vision of the highest verity. The Vais'ēsika dealing with the categories of substance, quality, action, commonness, particularity, invariable concomitance, to which was later added non-existence or negation, elaborates the doctrine of the atoms and that of particularity or *Viśesa*, from which it derives its name. Symmetry and consistency of division and precision of thought and expression characterised this School; and they were further carried to perfection and emphasised by its sequel, the Nyāya, which concerned itself solely with logic or the theory and art of valid reasoning. Thus *nyāya* or syllogism was its special occupation and consequently, in the place of the six or seven objective categories of the Vais'ēsika, which were concerned more with the products of thought, the Nyāya had sixteen logical categories, which referred to the modes of, thought or the thoughts themselves and which are mainly related to controversial discussion or disputation, so necessary for the ascertainment of truth. They are:—proof (प्रमाण), object of knowledge (प्रमेय), doubt (संशय), purpose (प्रयोजन), instance (इष्टान्त), demonstrated truth (सिद्धान्त), member of a syllogism (अवयव), reasoning by reduction to absurdity (तत्त्व), determination or ascertainment (विर्णव), discussion leading to truth (वाद), wrangling (जत्प), cavilling (वित्पन्ना), fallacy (हैत्यास), perverseness (छल), futility (जाति), and unfitness to be argued with (निप्रहस्थान). The Pūrva-mīmāṁsā more generally called (Mīmāṁsā only) has for its special object the interpretation of the Vedas, or the determination of the sense of the Revelation, and its whole scope is the ascertainment of duty or Dharma, which signifies the sacrifices and other acts of religion, ordained by the Vedas. Thus it is practical as relating to works (*karma*) or religious observances to be undertaken for specific ends; and it is accordingly called *karma-mīmāṁsā* in contradiction to the Brahma-mīmāṁsā, which is theological. Thus this mīmāṁsā is not a philosophical system in the proper sense of the word. It touches upon philosophical topics only incidentally in the course of delivering canons of scriptural interpretation.

As regards the metaphysical part, the five systems, viz.

Sāṁkhyā and Yoga, Vais'ēṣīka and Nyāya, and Pūrva-mīmāṁsā may be distinguished from the sixth, the Uttar-mīmāṁsā or Vedānta, by the fact that the former take their stand on duality ; while the latter on unity (excepting, of course, the particular school of Vedānta represented by Madhvā). As a matter of fact, the first five systems are impossible without a belief in duality or plurality as being real. Thus according to the Sāṁkhyā, there are two entities independent and distinct, the pradhāna or prakṛti, consisting of the three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which is the prime cause of the whole material world, and the purusas or souls that are infinite in number. The pradhāna is eternal matter, indiscrete, undistinguishable as it is destitute of parts, inferrable from its effects, productive, without being itself a product. The Soul or Puruṣa is neither produced nor productive, multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, unalterable, immaterial. Besides these two, the Sāṁkhyā teaches twenty-three other principles (*tattvāni*)—Intelligence (*buddhi* or *mahat*), egotism (*ahāmkāra*), the five subtle elements (*tanmātrās*), the five organs of sense, the five organs of action, the internal organ (*manas*), and the five gross elements. The Puruṣa, absolutely inactive, is a witness of the active Prakṛti. It is the union of these two that leads to the creation and involves the puruṣa in the Saṁsāra. “ The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one unborn (prakṛti), which is red (activity or *rajas*), white (goodness or *sattva*), and black (darkness or *tamas*), and produces a manifold and similar offspring ; the other unborn abandons her when once she has been enjoyed ” (S'vetāśvatara IV. 5.). The non-intelligent Pradhāna, even without any other intelligent superintendent like Is'vara, acts for the good of the soul, just as the non-intelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf. And just as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Prakṛti in the proximity of the unmoved soul. This union of Prakṛti and Puruṣa is caused by mutual dependence. The lame man, mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path indicated by the lame man, both reach their goal, though either, by himself, is helpless ; so is the creation effected by Prakṛti and Puruṣa by their union. All this time the Puruṣa, though essentially *udāsīna* (indif-

ferent or passive), comes under the shadow of Buddhi through not recognising himself as distinct from it, and suffers from the pain which really belongs to Buddhi, but which owing to its being reflected upon him due to its extreme proximity, is regarded by the Purusa as belonging to himself; and he can throw it off and obtain final bliss only when he gets rid of the error of confounding himself with the prakrti. Thus it is the knowledge of the distinction or duality between the prakrti and the puruṣa that leads to Mokṣa. The Sāṃkhya is an exponent of the doctrine of *Parināma* or modification, or in other words, of the *Satkāryavāda* as regards the relation between cause and effect. The effect always is present in the cause, and is only a modification of it, without any distinction of essence. The Sāṃkhya also lays great stress on the efficacy of reasoning. It is, by inference or reasoning that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is attained; and it is only those truths which are neither to be directly perceived nor to be inferred by reasoning that are to be deduced from revelation. Thus here the scales are turned the opposite way, as compared with the Vedānta, where revelation comes first and reasoning second.

As regards the Yoga, there is nothing more to notice except the admission of an additional principle, the Is'vāsa, who is a soul or spirit, distinct from other souls, untouched by affliction, action, fruit and fancies or passing thoughts, who, of his own will assuming a body in order to create, originated all secular or Vedic traditions, and who is gracious towards the living beings, scorched as they are by the fire of worldly existence, himself infinite and omniscient.

According to the atomic system of the Vaiśeṣika and the dialectical system of the Nyāya, soul and matter are quite distinct entities, both equally real, and it is the confounding of the one with the other which causes all the misery of the worldly existence. The soul is the receptacle of knowledge, distinct from body and the senses, different for each individual person, omni-present, eternal, perceived by the mental organ, and demonstrated by its peculiar attributes, which are knowledge, desire, aversion, pain,

pleasure and effort or volition. The soul, though it animates the individual, cannot experience pain or pleasure in relation to itself, unless it is associated with the body. It is to be noted also that the soul is as much a substance as earth, water etc., being a substratum of qualities like them, and hence it is included in the list of the nine *dravyas* or substances. Besides these individual souls, which are infinite in number and are all equally omnipresent, there is the Supreme Soul (*Paramātman*) which is one, and the seat of eternal knowledge, and is known from valid proof as the maker of all things.

The material world is of four kinds, according as it is derived from the element of earth, water, light or air. All the gross products can be ultimately reduced to atoms, which are themselves incapable of further analysis, and hence, eternal and atomic in size. It is by the will of the paramātman that a movement is produced in these atoms which are thus brought together; and in this way the creation takes place.

Freedom from *Samsāra* or absolute negation of all pain is the highest goal; and the only means of attaining it is the right knowledge of the seven categories according to Kanāda or of the sixteen according to Gautama. A man is involved in *Samsāra* thus:—First he has false notions such as mistaking the body etc., which are not the soul, for the soul; these lead to faults, i. e. a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to it, though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable to the soul. Impelled by these faults, man does things which may be forbidden or laudable; both being however forms of activity, lead to a similar blamable or laudable birth or bodily manifestation; and while this birth lasts, there arises the impression of pain. Now this series beginning with false notions and ending with pain is continually going on and is what is called *Samsāra* or mundane existence, getting on ceaselessly like a water-wheel. When, however, a man has obtain the right knowledge of the categories, which enables him to distinguish one thing from another, and the soul from the body in particular, all false notions disappear; the faults thus pass away, with them ceases activity, with activity ceases birth and with cessation of birth

comes the complete abolition of pain ; and this absolute abolition of pain is the final bliss.

As opposed to the *pariṇāma* and the *satkārya* doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, the Vais'ēṣika and the Nyāya are exponents of the *ārambha* and the *asatkārya* doctrines, which maintain a creation, absolute and new. Thus, according to them the effect is absolutely different from the cause, is never present in the cause, but is newly created it and stands in invariable concomitance (*samavāya*) with it. The same is true about the relation between a qualified substance and its quality or the active object and its activity, which cannot be absolutely different according to the Sāṃkhya or the Vedānta. Thus a jar is absolutely different from the clay, though it cannot exist apart from the clay.

Thus both the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya-Vais'ēṣika systems are essentially dualistic and, we may also say, materialistic. They at the same admit of the eternal existence of matter, apart from the intelligent principle and as quite independent of it.

The Pūrva-mīmāṃsā being essentially ritualistic and practical in character, and concerning itself as it does with the determination of religious duty and the laying down of canons of interpretation of the sacred texts, it need not detain us here, though the principles of interpretation taught, by it, e.g. the relative importance of direct statement (*rule*), indicatory mark (*linga*), context (*prakarana*) etc. in determining the sense of a word or a passage are accepted by all.

The Uttaramīmāṃsā is so called to distinguish it from the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, since it is concerned with the interpretation of the portions of the Revelation relating to knowledge that come after Karman, while the other with that of the previous or old (Pūrva) portions of the Revelation. This system, more popularly known as the Vedānta, is the only system of philosophy properly so called, which has exercised the greatest influence over Hindu thought; and even at the present day, if it is possible to describe the philosophic thought of Hindus in general by one name, it is Vedānta. It is to be remembered, however, that the name Vedānta does not signify one system only, as is, for instance, the case with

the other orthodox systems considered above. It comprehends several systems differing from each other essentially in points of metaphysical doctrine, ranging from absolute idealism down to dualism, at the same time having some important features which are common and which may be the reason of their being designated by a common name, besides the fact of their professing to be based on the Vedānta or the Upaniṣads. Of these we may notice here only the five systems which are attributed to Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Vallabha and Madhva, and which are known respectively by the names of Kevalādvaita (absolute monism), Visiṣṭādvaita (qualified monism), Dvaitādvaita (dualism and monism), Śuddhādvaita (pure monism) and Dvaita (dualism). All of these profess alike to be derived more or less from the same collection of sūtras,— although it is impossible by the very nature of things, that the Sūtrakāra should have all these in view. It is however very probable that the germs of all the Vedānta systems existed long ago, although, as systems proper, attaining to a certain importance in the estimation of the people, they may be said to date from the times of the respective philosophers to whom they are generally attributed.

From this point of view, Śaṅkara's system may be called the oldest, since, by a general consent, Śaṅkarācārya is now placed in the latter half of the 8th century (788 A. D. to 820 A. D.). Telang's view putting Śaṅkara in the 7th century has been conclusively disproved by Prof. Pathak.* Without going into details, I shall content myself with the following question †—“The date of the death of Bhartr̥hari, the Buddhistic author of the Vākyapadiya is fixed by Prof. Pathak at 650 A. D., and in relation to him Kumārila is assigned to the first half and Śaṅkarācārya and Suresvarācārya to the latter half of the 8th century. Mr. Telang, however, contends that these last cannot be assigned to such a late date and he would place them in the 7th century. It may be men-

* For these two views regarding the date of Śaṅkara, the reader may be referred to the JBRAS. Vol. XVII. P. 63, ff: 'Pūrṇavarmā, and Śaṅkarācārya'; Vol. XVIII. p. 88 ff: 'Dharmakīrti and Śaṅkarācārya'; p. 147 ff: 'Subandhu and Kumārila'; p. 213 ff: Bhartr̥hari and Kumārila.

† JBRAS Centenary Memorial Volume. 1905 p. 51-52.

oned that Dharmakīrti is identified with the author of the Nyāya-bindu, which is commented upon by Dharmottarācārya, who belonged to the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism. This Dharmakīrti has been assigned by Prof. Pathak to the beginning of the 7th century, and it must be admitted, without opposition, that he was older than Śaṅkarācārya, as the latter criticises his views."

Thus Śaṅkarācārya appeared at a time when his presence was urgently required to put new life into Brahmanism and Hinduism as well as to counteract the influence of Buddhism, Jainism and other heterodox systems on the one hand, and the mīmāṃsakas on the other. The Hinayāna Buddhism had already made way for the Sanskrit mahāyānism and against this last, controversies were carried on by the school of nyāya and by the mīmāṃsakas, especially by Śabaravāmin and Kumārilabhaṭṭa. The latter maintained the efficacy of the sacrificial religion alone, and denied it even to the faith and practices of the Aupaniṣadas, whose doctrine, based as it was on the Upaniṣads, was in danger; when there appeared prominently on the scene, Gaudapādācārya and sometime after him the pupil of his pupil, Śaṅkarācārya. These propounded the doctrine of illusion or Māyā.

To overthrow this theory was the great object of the remaining four Vedāntic Schools which preached bhakti or devotion, as against Jñāna and Karman, as the means of deliverance and which insisted on the reality of the world, both intelligent and non-intelligent, basing their arguments on the same Upaniṣads on which Śaṅkara and his school took their stand.

The doctrine of Śaṅkara, though of great merit from the metaphysical point of view, was rather too elevated and too impersonal for the ordinary people, who wanted something more definite and personal. No doubt Śaṅkara in order to accommodate such people admitted of a personal God; and popular belief attributes to him the introduction of the worship of the Pañcāyatana or the five gods together, so as to displease no one. But a god was after all of an illusory and second-rate importance in his system.

Hence there arose Rāmānuja and the other Vaiṣṇavite leaders

who introduced the cult of a personal God and devotion to him or adoration of him, which gained great favour with the people.

These preachers of bhakti thought it impossible that Māyā and bhakti could go together, as the latter necessarily included love and as love can have place only if the lover and the beloved are real entities. Hence, Rāmānuja, Vallabha and Madhva all direct their efforts to the refutation of the Māyā doctrine and they sometimes go so far as to call Śāmkara a mere incarnation of the Mādhyamika or a disguised Baudhā.

But to account for bhakti, it is not always necessary to give up the doctrine of absolute unity and its sequel, the doctrine of Māyā; for we see that the santas of Māhārāstra have always taught bhakti and at the same time held the doctrine of Śāmkara; the well-known commentary of Jñānes'vara (about 1290 A. D.) on the Gitā is a striking illustration of this fact; and no one could have propounded the doctrine of Māyā more vehemently and more successfully than Jñānes'vara and at the same time, no one could have been a more staunch and popular representative of the bhakti cult. And this fact explains why the influence of Śāmkara's doctrine still holds great sway in the popular mind, in spite of the attacks made against it by the other Vedānta Schools.

Of the teachers of these four Vedānta schools, the first in chronological order is Rāmānuja born in Śaka 938, corresponding to 1016 or 1017 A.D. Rāmānuja in his youth lived in Kāñcipura or Conjeeveram and afterwards, when he became a successor of Yāmunācārya, he lived at S'rīraṅgam near Trichinopoli, where he did his life's work. He is supposed to have died at the age of 120, in 1137 A. D.

Next comes Nimbārka who is supposed to have lived a few years after Rāmānuja. The date of his death is probably 1162 A. D.* A Tailanga brāhmaṇa by birth and thus a southerner, he however lived at Vṛndāvana near Mathura and his followers are scattered over the whole of northern India and exist in large numbers near Mathura and Bengal.

Madhva lived in the first three quarters of the 13th century (1197-1276), and his birth place is stated to be Kallianpur in the Udupi Taluka of the district of South Kanara—perhaps the

* See Bhandarkar, Vaisṇavism &c., p. 62.

same as the Rajatapīṭha of the Madhvavijaya. The followers of Madhva's doctrine exist in pretty large numbers in the Kanarese Districts of the Bombay Presidency, in the state of Mysore and on the western coast from Goa to South Kanara; there are only a few adherents of this school in Northern India.

Last comes Vallabha who is supposed to have been born about 1417 A. D. He was the son of a Tailaṅga Brāhmaṇa, who lived at a village named Kāṅkarava in the Telugu country. He was born while his parents were on the way to Benares on a pilgrimage. He lived at Vṛndāvana and at Mathura. Śrīkrṣṇa and Gokula figure very prominently in his doctrine. His followers are found in very large numbers in Gujarat and in Northern India.

All these four schools alike preached bhakti, which presupposes a personal God, and condemned the principle of māyā with equal vehemence; the chief differences in their doctrine relate to the metaphysical or the properly philosophic part of the doctrine, that is to say, they are with reference to the nature of the relation between the supreme spirit, the individual soul and the inanimate world.

We shall next indicate briefly the philosophical connections of these five schools of Vedānta,—which forms the main subject matter of the present essay.

III.—THE FIVE SCHOOLS OF THE VEDĀNTA.

THE DOCTRINE OF ŚĀMKARA :—Śāmkara's doctrine, which is usually known by the name of Kevalādvaita or absolute monism, may be summed up in the four sanskrit words : 'ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मित्या.' It is only intelligence, without form, without qualities, without any limitations of time, space or causality, that is real; and the unity which according to Śāmkara is the substratum of all ephemeral and empirical plurality, is itself without the slightest touch of plurality; it is unity absolute; and as such the highest thought of humanity cannot go any further. The greatest merit of Śāmkara's system is his most successful attempt to reconcile the mutually contradictory texts of the Upanisads, in other words, to reconcile bold idealism, which is the result of introspection, with the realism which ruthlessly insists on, forcing itself upon us from outside. This he does by the introduction of māyā in his system; or his doctrine has always two aspects, esoteric and exoteric, be it in reference to theology, or cosmology, or psychology. The world around us consists of souls of limited knowledge or of non-sentient matter; and if we once admit the existence of a supreme spirit with unlimited powers and intelligence, omnipotent and omniscient, (as do all the schools of Vedānta and other orthodox schools also), how can we explain the creation of souls of limited knowledge and of objects without intelligence, from this omniscient spirit, except as the result of ignorance or nescience which puts limitation on the unlimited intelligence of this spirit? That there exists such ignorance is a fact not only mentioned in the revealed texts, but is a matter of ordinary experience, as when one gives expression to one's consciousness of one's ignorance when one says 'I am ignorant'. If this consciousness is true, well, it is a proof of ignorance; if it is not true, so much the better proof it is of ignorance.

Thus esoterically the Brahman or the supreme spirit is knowledge or realisation itself, without qualification and without possibility of change; exoterically, it is qualified, possessed of an infinite number of auspicious attributes, capable of producing this world from itself and reabsorbing it in itself;—in brief, it is Īs'vara.

The exoteric cosmology, according to the natural but erroneous realism (*avidyā*) in which we are born, considers the world as real and can express its entire dependence on Brahman only by the adoption of a myth, viz. creation of the world by Brahman, implying thereby a temporal character for this creation. But this goes against the doctrine that the transmigration of souls is without a beginning. To reconcile the two, Śaṅkara teaches that the temporal character does not belong to the creation for ever; but that there are long periods for which the world is created and after which it is reabsorbed by Brahman, and that this succession of creation and reabsorption lasts for eternity; so that no creation may be regarded as the first. This never-ceasing creation is a moral necessity,—it is neither for God's glorification nor for his particular amusement, nor is it created out of his love of mankind. This explains the theory of Karman, and of the *Saṁsāra*, which goes on endlessly as the sprout grows from the seed, which in its own turn grows from an earlier sprout and so on.

The esoteric cosmology, however, says that all this is a mere appearance of truth. The manifold world is only an illusion, *māyā*, a mirage (*mṛgatṛṣṇikā*), a dream; and the reality is to be attained not by reasoning (*tarka*), but by introspective realisation (*anubhava*). If you return from this variegated world to the inmost recesses of your soul (*ātman*), you will be aware of a reality which can very properly be described as 'timeless, spaceless, changeless.' The same thing was said by Plato, according to whom this world is a world of shadows and not of realities; and the same thing has been said by Kant to whom the world is an appearance only, and not the thing in itself. What was arrived at by intuition by Śaṅkara and Plato, Kant has demonstrated by an analysis of the human mind, showing that the three essential elements of the outside world, viz. space, time and causality, are not,—as we naturally believe them to be and as the other orthodox schools of Vedānta also admit,—eternal fundamentals of an objective reality, but merely subjective, innate, perceptual forms of our own intellect.

According to the esoteric psychology, the *Jīva* is Brahman itself in full and total possession of eternity, omnipresence,

omniscience, etc., but these godly qualities lie concealed within it as the fire in the wood, and will appear only after the final deliverance. Exoterically, this concealment of the divine nature is due to the external adjuncts (upādhis)—the mind (manas), the sense-organs (indriyāni), and the vital airs (prānāh)—which form the subtle body (Sūksma Śarira). The whole psychological apparatus together with Karman accompanies the soul in all his migrations, without essentially infecting his godly nature. These Upādhis of course form part of māyā and are due to the avidyā which is innate in man.

But whence comes this avidyā, this primeval cause of ignorance, sin and misery? No satisfactory answer has been given to this question; or rather the question itself must be regarded as inadmissible; for causality cannot go farther than the Samsāra and beyond it we know nothing.

From the conception of rewards in heaven and of punishments in the dark regions of hell, contained in the hymns of the Rgveda, there arose the theory of Samsāra teaching rewards and punishments in the form of a new birth on earth. The Vedānta thus exoterically admits of a threefold division of men; those who perform good deeds, sacrifices &c. follow the path of the fathers (pitṛ-yāna) and are born again; those who worship the qualified Brahman follow the path of gods (devayāna) and are on their way to final deliverance; and lastly those who are evil-doers have a third place (trtiya-sṭhāna) reserved for them. Esoterically, however, the only reality is Brahman and the knowledge of it is Mokṣa.

Śamkara's system (as opposed to the Parināma-doctrine) maintains the Vivarta doctrine, according to which all effects are only superimposed upon the cause, which alone is real.

The well-known phrase 'tattvamasi' cannot be taken literally as Vallabha does it, but must be understood by jahad-ajahat laksanā. Thus *tat* literally means the Brahman with omniscience, omnipresence, absence of limitations; *tvam* literally means the jīva, with limited knowledge and powers and the copula '*asi*' signifies the apposition or Sāmānādhikaranya of these two. Now this is not possible in the full literal sense; what is incompatible in the connotations of the two terms is therefore to be

rejected (jahat) and what is compatible is to be retained (a-jahat); we arrive thus at the idea of 'intelligence' pure and simple, indivisible and without attributes.

The philosophical part of Śaṅkara's doctrine may therefore be summed up as follows:—

- (1) All plurality is false or unreal, and superimposed upon one pure and eternal Brahman which is all-pervading; and it is māyā which makes us see plurality where there is unity and which itself has no independent existence.
- (2) The individual soul is really nothing but Brahman.
- (3) Knowledge (in the form of the actual realisation) of the identity of these two is the only means of mokṣa.

The practical part of the doctrine amounts to this:—Actions must be performed only to purify the mind so as to make it fit to acquire the knowledge of this identity of Brahman and jīva; but afterwards they must be all given up, since without a complete abandonment (Samnyāsa) of all actions, Mokṣa is impossible; for, action (Karman) and knowledge (Jñāna) are opposed to each other like darkness and light. This is what is called *Nivṛtti-mārga* (the path of renunciation), or *Jnāna-niṣṭhā* (taking our stand on knowledge).

THE DOCTRINE OF RĀMĀNUJA.—The main idea which distinguishes the doctrine of Rāmānuja from the rest of the Vedānta schools is that the individual souls and the inanimate world, essentially different in themselves, form at the same time the body and mode or attribute of the supreme spirit; and, as such, they are incapable of an existence independent of the supreme spirit. This is what gives the doctrine its name of 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' ('non-duality qualified by duality' or 'the non-duality of the supreme spirit which is qualified by the individual souls and the inanimate world'). Thus what the ordinary body is to the individual soul, so are the intelligent and the non-intelligent worlds to the supreme spirit; and just as the body can never be essentially the same as the soul, so the cit and acit can never be essentially the same as the Brahman. It is in this way that Rāmānuja's doctrine reconciles the various statements in the Upaniṣads, referring to unity and to plurality.

The Brahman or supreme spirit is the cause, both material and efficient, of the universe, intelligent and non-intelligent; it is possessed of an infinite number of auspicious attributes; of which omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence and bliss are the most essential. Unconditioned existence, eternal, limitless and uniform knowledge, and an absence of all limitations of time, space and causality, distinguish it from the individual souls and the inanimate world as well. Brahman is at the same time, absolutely void of evil attributes and it is thus that Brahman is sometimes described as qualified and sometimes as non-qualified (cf. sūtra III. 2. 11 ff.). The creation of the universe from Brahman is not a production of something new; it is only a change of attribute or condition. It is a mere modification of that which is subtle into that which is gross. Thus Brahman, having for its body and mode the cit and acit in their subtle condition, is the cause, while the same Brahman having for its body or mode the cit and acit in a gross form is the effect. Similarly, the destruction of the universe is nothing but the becoming subtle of that which is gross.

The individual soul is the subject of consciousness or knower and not mere consciousness itself. It is, however, often called consciousness, simply because consciousness is its essential attribute. Even in the state of dreamless sleep, though there is no consciousness of objects, still the sense of 'I' (ahamartha) persists. Knowledge is intuitive by nature and does not necessarily depend upon the senses. Bliss is also another essential attribute of the individual soul. It has also the power to act (kartrtva) which, according to the sāṃkhyas, belongs to prakṛti and according to Śaṅkara, to Buddhi. The individual souls, in the state of their pristine purity, possess all the auspicious qualities in common with Brahman (which is the reason why the jīva is often described as being identical with Brahman); but they differ from it in two points: (i) they have no power whatsoever on the movements of the world, whose creation and control belong exclusively to Brahman, and (ii) they are atomic in size, while Brahman is all-pervading. Being atomic in size the individual souls are infinite in number and different for different bodies. Owing to ignorance, the individual souls are conjoined to matter and thus in spite of their original resemblance to Brahman, suffer; right knowledge of the

nature of Brahman, from which results devotion (bhakti), brings the soul to liberation, when it is restored to its original purity and bliss. But even then, it does not lose its individuality. Thus 'tat tvam asi' does not mean that *jīva* is essentially and absolutely the same as Brahman, but the apposition is to be understood metaphorically as when we say 'the jar is white', 'ghaṭaḥ s'uklaḥ', where the quality and the qualified stand in apposition with each other. Thus the *jīva* which is an attribute or mode of Brahman is Brahman in the sense that it is very similar to it in nature or is part and parcel of it.

The inanimate world, on the other hand, is also as real as the Brahman and the individual souls and is essentially distinct from both. At the same time, it forms an attribute of Brahman and so cannot exist independently of it.

Thus for Rāmānuja, Brahman, cit and acit are three entities, individually distinct from each other, all equally real, at the same time all forming a unity, in the sense in which the self and its body form a unity.

Rāmānuja admits the *parināma* doctrine or the *Satkāryavāda* which maintains that the effect is nothing but a modification of the form of the cause, in which it is already present.

So much for the philosophical part. The practical part may be summed up thus: The devotion to Vāsudeva is the only means of obtaining mokṣa. This bhakti is not knowledge, but the result of knowledge; it is not belief, which is at best a subsidiary preliminary to bhakti; it is not work, for work is selfish; it is the intuition or immediate presentation arising from a steady remembrance (*dhruvā smṛtiḥ*), uninterrupted like the flow of oil, a result of meditation. Actions are necessary only for the origination of knowledge, but no further. Thus, the function of actions with Rāmānuja is secondary or subordinate as with Śaṅkara.

Rāmānuja's doctrine, as with the other Vedānta schools, is based on the three *prasthānas*, the *Upanisads*, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Brahmasūtras*; to which must be added the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, which occupies a very important place in his doctrine and from which the *Śrībhāṣya* quotes very frequently.

THE DOCTRINE OF NIMBARKA—According to Nimbarka, there are only three principles or entities, *cit* (the intelligent worlds), *acit* (the non-intelligent world) and *Īśvara* (the Lord or the Supreme-Spirit), also called by the significant names of *bhoktr* (the enjoyer, the *Jīva*), *bhogya* (the enjoyable, matter) and *Niyant* (the controller, ruler).

The *cit* or individual soul is of the nature of knowledge (*Jnāna-svarūpa*); it is not the phenomenon of knowledge in the sense in which Śaṅkara understands it; in other words, the *Jīva* is able to know without the help of the sense-organs and it is in this sense that words like '*prajnāna-ghanah*', '*svayam-jyotiḥ*', '*jnāna-mayah*' etc. as applied to *Jīva* are to be understood. The *Jīva* is a knower also; and he can be both knowledge and the possessor of knowledge at the same time, just as the sun is both light and the source of light. Thus the soul, who is knowledge, and his attribute, knowledge, though they are both identical as knowledge, can be at the same time different and related as the qualified (*dharmin*) and the quality (*dharma*), just as the sun and his light, though identical as light (*taijasa*), are still different from each other. Thus there is both a difference and a non-difference between the *dharmin* and the *dharma*; and the extreme similarity between them implies, not necessarily their absolute identity, but only a non-perception of their difference.

The *Jīva* is also Ego (*ahamarthaḥ*). This Ego continues to persist not only in the state of deep sleep, (because our consciousness immediately after getting up from sleep has the form 'I slept happily' or 'I knew nothing') but also in the state of liberation. It even belongs to the Parabrahman. Hence it is that Kṛṣṇa refers to himself so frequently in the first person in the ²Gitā, of which the chief object is thus Purusottama, who is omniscient and at the same time non-different from the Ego or *Asmadartha*.

The *Jīva* is also essentially active (*kartr*). This quality belongs to it in all its conditions, even after release (cf. the Sūtra II. 3. 33). Those passages which deny this *Kartṛtva* of the soul only imply that the *kartrtva* is not independent (*Svatantra*). The *Jīva* is also enjoyer (*bhoktr*) essentially in all its conditions.

For nis knowledge and activity, however, the Jīva depends on Hari; thus, though resembling Him in being intelligent and knower, he is at the same time distinguished from him by his dependence. This quality of dependence or of being controlled (*Niyamyatva*) is the very nature of Jīva even in the state of release, just as *Niyantṛtva* or the quality of being the controller, forms the eternal nature of Īśvara.

The Jīva is atomic in size; at the same time his attribute, knowledge, is omni-present, which makes it possible that he can experience pleasure and pain in any part of the body (cf. the Sūtra II. 3. 25), just as, for instance, the light of a lamp can spread far and wide and illumine objects away from the lamp. The Jīvas are different and in different bodies, and so are infinite in number.

The Jīva has his true form "distorted and obscured owing to his contact with *karman* resulting from ignorance, which is beginning-less, but which can come to an end, by the grace of God, when his true nature is fully manifested.

The *acit* or non-intelligent world is of three kinds; (i) *a-prakṛta* or not-derived from Prakṛti or the primordial matter, such as the sun-like refulgence of Īśvara, his abode, his ornaments, etc; (ii) *prakṛta* or derived from Prakṛti, consisting of the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas, such as prakṛti, mahat, ahaṅkara etc. (just similar to the twenty-four principles of the Sāṃkhyas); and (iii) Kāla or time. The three categories in their subtle form are as eternal as the *cit* or the individual souls.

The third principle is the Highest-self, the Brahman, or Kṛṣṇa. This Kṛṣṇa is naturally free from all faults (such as ignorance, egoism, passion, hatred, attachment), is the store of all beneficent attributes, is adorable by all, has four forms or *vyūhas* (i. e. Vāsudeva, Samkarṣana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha) and appears under various incarnations such as Matsya, Kūrma etc. This Brahman both the *Upādāna* (the material cause) and the *Nimitta* (efficient cause) of the Universe. It is the material cause in the sense that it enables its natural Śaktis (capacities), viz. the *cit* and the *acit* in their subtle forms, to be manifested in gross forms; and it is the efficient cause in the sense that it unites the individual

souls with their respective fruits of actions and means of enjoyments. Thus the creation of the universe is nothing but a manifestation in a gross form of what was subtle before and is thus a sort of modification or Parināma. To say that the universe is only superimposed on the Brahman and hence an illusion (*Vivarta*) is against all reason; for it is only a thing actually existing elsewhere, that can be superimposed upon another thing where it does not so exist.

What is the mutual relation between these three principles, cit, and acit, and Brahman described so far? It cannot be absolute identity or non-distinction, because it would contradict those passages in the Upanisads which speak of a difference between them; and it would involve a mutual confusion of the nature and attributes of these three principles, although they are distinct from each other. Nor can the relation be one of absolute difference; for that would go against such passages as 'tattvamasi', 'aham brahmāsmi', 'Sarvam vai khalvidam brahma' etc. and besides, Brahman, if it is quite distinct from cit and acit, would cease to be all-pervading and all-ruling and would become as limited in character as the cit and acit. Nor can we say that it is non-difference which exists in reality and that the difference we see is all due to Upādhis or limiting adjuncts; for, in that case, Brahman would cease to be pure and would be susceptible to the faults of the Upādhis; it would experience pleasure, pain, hatred etc., and it would undergo modifications, all which is contrary to its real nature. Hence the truth is that both the difference and the non-difference are equally real. The cit and acit are different from Brahman, in-as-much as they are described by the Śruti as possessing attributes and capacities distinct from those of Brahman; at the same time they are non-different from Brahman in the sense that they are absolutely dependent on it and cannot have an independent existence by themselves. Thus *bhedā* or difference means the possibility of an existence, which is separate, at the same time dependent (*para-tantra-sattā-bhāvah*), while *a-bheda* or non-difference means the impossibility of an independent existence (*svatantra-sattā-bhāvah*). Thus in the sentence 'tattvamasi', the word *tat* signifies the Brahman which is omniscient, omnipotent, of independent existence, the self of all; the word *tvam* signifies the individual soul which depends for its existence upon the Brahman; and the word *asi* is the copula signifying the relation of the two,

which is difference, not inconsistent with non-difference, and which can be illustrated by the relation between the fire and its sparks or by that between the sun and his lustre.

To attain deliverance, the *jīva* has to commence with a complete submission to the Paramātman, or *Prapatti*, whose six constituents are:—a resolution to yield (*ānukūlyasya saṅkalpah*), the avoidance of opposition (*prātikūlyasya varjanam*), a faith that God will protect (*rakṣiyatiti vis'vāsaḥ*), acceptance of him as saviour (*goptṛtvavarāṇam*), throwing one's whole soul upon him (*ātmaniksepaḥ*), and a sense of helplessness (*kārpanya*). God's grace extends itself to those who are possessed of these six constituents of *prapatti*, i. e. who are *prapanna*; and by that grace is generated *bhakti* consisting of special love for him, which ultimately ends in the realisation (*sākṣātkāra*) of the Paramātman. For a devotee, the knowledge of the following five things is quite necessary:—(i) the nature of the supreme soul, (ii) the nature of the individual soul, (iii) the fruit of God's grace or *Mokṣa* (which is an uninterrupted realisation of the nature and attributes of Brahman, following from the absolute destruction of all actions and the consequent extinction of all negligence), (iv) the feeling of enjoyment consequent on *Bhakti* and (v) the nature of the obstacles in the way of the attainment of God, such as regarding the body and the mind as the soul, depending on some one who is neither God nor the preceptor, neglecting their commands, and considering God as nothing more than an ordinary being.

Thus we see that the doctrine of Nimbārka has very much in common with that of Rāmānuja; both regard the difference as well as the non-difference as real. But, for Nimbārka, difference and non-difference are on the same level, they co-exist and have the same importance; while for Rāmānuja, non-difference is the principal; it is qualified by difference, which is thus subordinate to it. Another technical distinction between the two doctrines is that according to Rāmānuja, the *cit* and *acit*, which form the body of the Brahman, are regarded as its attributes (*Vis'esaṇa* or *prakāra*), and hence, the name *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, which is explained as 'the unity of Brahman qualified by *cit* and *acit*' (*cidacidvis'iṣṭaparames'varūḍvaita*); but the school of Nimbārka refuses to admit this; for being a body does not necessarily mean being an attribute, and be-

sides the idea is impossible in itself. An attribute is by its nature meant to distinguish the thing that possesses the attribute from another which is without it; but in the present case there is nothing from which the cit and acit should distinguish the Brahman of which they are attributes*. And if the cit and acit are both different and non-different from Brahman, it is ridiculous to say at the same time that there is unity of Brahman qualified by cit and acit.

THE DOCTRINE OF MADHVA:—The doctrine of Madhva, purely dualistic in character, insists on the absolute and eternal difference between Brahman, jīva and jada. Madhva denies even Brahman's being the material cause of the universe, a point clearly established in the Brahmasūtras and the very fantastic and forced manner in which he interprets many of the sūtras leaves no doubt about the fact that he would have even set aside the sūtras altogether, but that their uncontested authoritativeness prevented him from doing so.

In opposition to the pure or qualified Monism of other Vedānta schools, Madhva propounds the five eternal distinctions, the clear understanding of which alone can lead to Mokṣa the distinction between God and the individual soul, between God and the inanimate world, between one individual soul and another, between the individual soul and the inanimate world and finally between one inanimate object and another.

God, according to Madhva, possesses an infinite number of qualities. His chief functions are eight: creation, protection, dissolution, controlling all things, giving knowledge, manifestation of himself, involving the individual souls in the knowledge of the world and deliverance. His form is made up of knowledge and joy, he is independent of everything and remains one in the midst of different forms.

The individual souls are all distinct from God and distinct from each other individually, innumerable, going through a succession of existences and characterised by ignorance or other defects.

* see Vedāntatattvabodha (Chowkhamba Sanskrit series No. 123, pp. 27-32, also Tattvasiddhāntabindu, both by Anantarāma.)

The world is created from Prakṛti, which is ever distinct from the supreme soul, who is thus only the efficient cause but not the material cause of the universe; for, it is against reason to suppose that the non-intelligent world can be produced from a being that is intelligent.

Mokṣa is attained by the direct knowledge or perception of Hari. Some of the means necessary for this direct knowledge are:—(*Vairūgya*) aversion to the enjoyments of this world or the next, the possession of equanimity (*Śama*), self-control and other virtues, acquisition of knowledge from the Guru, self-surrender (*Śaraṇāgati*), love of God (*Paramātma-bhakti*), resigning every act to Hari, knowledge of the five distinctions mentioned above, etc. Even in Mokṣa, jīva cannot be one with Brahman.

Then again the *bhoktṛ* (the enjoying self), the *bhogya* (the objects of enjoyment), and the *nijāmaka* (the controlling Supreme Spirit) are three entities eternally distinct and all equally real. Thus Madhva always lays stress on those passages of the Upaniṣads which clearly proclaim the difference between Brahman and jīva—such as *Svetāśvatara* 1. 6; 4. 5; 4. 6; *Muṇḍaka* 3. 1. 2 etc. While those passages referring to non-difference are explained away by him in various ways. Thus ‘*tatvamasi*’ means ‘*tvaṁ tadiyah asī*’ or ‘*tvaṁ tasya asī*’ ‘thou art His’; ‘*Ayam ātmā Brahma*’ may be a description of jīva, meaning ‘this individual soul grows or advances’ (*vardhana-sīlāḥ*), or a description of Brahman meaning, ‘Brahman is this that pervades’ (*ātmā atansīlāḥ*), or it may be a mere eulogy of jīva, or the sentence may be meant for meditation, or finally it may be nothing but a statement of the Pūrvapakṣa of the exponent of the Māyā-doctrine. In the same way, a passage like ‘*brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati*’, ‘one who knows Brahman becomes brahman itself’, only means that in the condition of Mokṣa the individual soul in question becomes similar to Brahman, owing to his freedom from misery etc., and thus is to be understood in a metaphorical sense as in ‘*puro’hito, yam rūjā saṁvṛttāḥ*’, ‘this priest has become a king’, and not like a statement in ordinary language. Moreover, it cannot be said that jīva and Brahman are different in Samsāra, but become non-different after Mokṣa; for what are different can never be non-different and *vice versa*. So also ‘*ekam evādvitiyam brahma*’ and ‘*sarvam khalvidam brahma*’ mean

that Brahman is unsurpassed and without a parallel and that it pervades the whole world, but not that the world is non-different from Brahman. ' *Mṛtyoh sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nānēva paśyati*' does not imply a condemnation of the perception of plurality, but it is a censure against those who hold that there are many momentary cognitions, instead of one eternal knowledge ; just as for instance, ' *asad evedam agra āśit*' only states the view of the Nihilist for being refuted further on. Duality alone can be the truth, argues the dualist, for we everywhere see nothing but pairs or things in twos, e. g. knowledge and ignorance, merit and demerit, man and woman. So also Brahman and jīva or Brahman and *prakṛiti* must be two entities and never identical with each other.

THE DOCTRINE OF VALLABHA :—The doctrine of Vallabha is called ' Śuddhādvaita ' i. e. the unity of Brahman which is pure or free from Māyā. Thus the jīva and the inanimate world are essentially the same as Brahman, without involving any idea of Māyā. According to Śaṅkara, for instance, the Brahman can create this world only when it is conditioned by Māyā ; but according to Vallabha, it is Brahman, pure and simple, and without any connection with Māyā, that can create the Universe.

The jīva is non-different from Brahman, atomic in size (cf. Sūtras II. 3. 194) and a part of Brahman (cf. Sūtras II. 3. 43). It is produced from Brahman in the sense in which sparks are produced from fire ; the jīva is a manifestation of Brahman itself, with the attribute of bliss obscured. Thus it is as eternal and real as Brahman and production in its case means only a manifestation (āvirbhāva). The jīva is either (i) śuddha (pure), when its qualities such as greatness (aiśvarya) are not obscured by contact with the avidyā (ignorance), or (ii) saṁsārin, when it is in the bondage of avidyā and experiences birth, death etc., owing to its connection with the subtle and gross bodies, or (iii) mukta, when it becomes free from bondage, by means of vidyā. The jīva, though atomic can pervade the whole body by virtue of its quality of intelligence (*caitanya*), just as sandal-wood can by its fragrance make its existence known even where it does not exist (cf. Sūtrās II. 3. 25, 26, 23).

The inanimate world or *prapañca* is also essentially Brahman (*Brahmātmaka*), with the qualities of intelligence (*caitanya*)

and bliss (*ānanda*) obscured, and thus possessing the one quality of existence (*Sattra*). It is at the same time created from Brahman (*Brahma-kārya*) in the sense that Brahman itself is manifested in the form of the gross world. Thus the creation and destruction of objects in this world mean only the manifestation (*āvirbhava*) and disappearance (*tirobhāva*) of the Bhagavat in those forms; and when Brahman appears as a product and as capable of being experienced (*anukhavayogya*), the world is created; but when it goes back to its causal form and ceases to be the object of ordinary experience, the world is destroyed. The world is, therefore, as eternal and real as the Brahman itself, its creation and destruction being nothing but the powers (*saktis*) of Brahman. It is neither illusory nor essentially different from the Bhagavat.

Everything being Brahman, we must find the forms of all things in everything.' Thus for instance, in a jar, anything like *patatva* or the nature of a cloth may manifest itself by the will of God; but as a matter of fact, all these have disappeared (*tirobhūta*) and it is only *ghatatva*, 'the nature of a pot', that is manifest (*āvirbhūta*) and so a jar cannot, for the time being, serve the purpose of a cloth.

From this it follows that the relation between cause and effect is absolute unity. That form of Bhagavat, in which another manifests itself is the cause, e. g. clay; and the other form manifested is the effect, e. g. pot. Thus '*Sarvam-khalv-idam-brhma*' has to be understood in a literal sense.

But the infatuating ignorance affects the *jīva* and, for him, endows the real and actually existing world with illusory or unreal forms. While the world is real, it is only its experience (*pratīti*) which is erroneous. Just as, for instance, to a man in a boat in motion, the trees on the bank, though steady, appear to be in motion, but in the cognition of the moving trees, it is only the movement that is illusory, while the forms of the trees are real, in the same way, the world which has objectivity for us, but which is essentially of the nature of Bhagavat and so purely subjective, is real in form, but it is only the objectivity with which the *jīva* endows the world that is unreal and projected by ignorance. Thus this *prapañca*, which is real, appears to be in three different forms

to three different kinds of persons : (i) to those who have become Brahman, it appears as pure Brahman ; (ii) to those who have got the right knowledge by means of the Sāstras, it appears as endowed with both subjectivity (*Brahmadharman*) and objectivity (*Māyādharman*), at the same time with a clear discrimination between the real character of the former and the unreal character of the latter ; as for instance, a grown up person seeing a piece of cloth appearing green, owing to his own green spectacles, perceives the reality of the form of the cloth and the unreality of the greenness which does not really belong to the piece of cloth ; (iii) finally, to those without knowledge, the *prapañca* appears as endowed with both these forms, but without any discrimination, as, for instance, a child with green spectacles takes the greenness of the cloth to be as real as the cloth itself. Thus all the difference or plurality is in the matter of the perception (*pratīti*) of the *prapañca*, but none at all in the matter of its form (*svarūpa*). To say that the *prapañca*, itself is unreal and at the same time to say that it is identical with Brahman, is against all reason, since relation of identity cannot possibly exist between a real thing and an unreal thing (cf. Sūtra II, 1, 14).

The Brahman is one, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, possessed of an infinite number of attributes, and essentially of the nature of *sat* (existence), *cit* (intelligence) and *ānanda* (bliss). It is *Suddha* (pure), i. e. never contaminated by connection with *Māyā*. It is possessed of *ais'varya* (marvellous power) which makes everything possible for it and even things mutually opposed can co-exist in its case. Thus both kinds of passages, those which describe the Brahman as qualified (*savis'esa*) and those which describe it as non-qualified (*nirvis'esa*) are equally true with regard to it. Or, the denial of attributes refers to the attributes of non-intelligent world (*prākṛta*) from which Brahman is free ; while the affirmation of attributes refers to the infinite number of marvellous powers which it possesses and thus establishes that the Brahman is extra-ordinary (*jagad-vilaksana*). Brahman manifests itself at its own will, as *jīva* or *jada*, simply for the purpose of sport, without undergoing any change in essence, as when, for instance, a serpent forms itself into coils (cf. Sūtra III, 2, 27). Thus the Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of

the universe (notice in this connection the explanation of the Sūtra I, 1, 4) ; and the objections on the ground of partiality and cruelty belonging to Brahman, owing to the diversity of fortune and the miseries to be met with in this world, objections which can be raised only on the assumption of a difference of nature between Brahman and jīva, have no place in Vallabha's doctrine.

The Brahman has three forms, (i) the highest divine form (*ādhidaivika*) as Kṛṣṇa or Purusottama, possessing an infinite number of auspicious attributes, attainable by a devotee (*bhakta*) ; (ii) the *akṣara* form (*ādhyātmika*), in which all the attributes have become non-manifest and which alone is attainable by a sage (*jñānin*), and (iii) the *antaryāmin* form as seen in the different incarnations or *avatāras* of Viṣṇu.

Now, what is the relation between Brahman, the jīva and the jāda ? It is one of pure identity, one that exists between a part (*āṁś'a*) and the whole (*āṁś'in*). For Vallabha, it is non-difference (*abhedā*) alone that is real (*vāstavika*), while all difference is simply for the sake of sport, in opposition to both Rāmānuja and Nimbārka. According to these latter, though both difference and non-difference are theoretically equally real (*vāstavika*), it is difference only that is real, while the non-difference is accounted for by the similarity of nature between Brahman and jīva or by the relation of dependence between the two (*niyamya-niyantṛtva*). Thus the phrase ' *tat tvam asi*' is literally true according to Vallabha, whereas it has to be understood metaphorically by all the rest.

The Mokṣa, which consists in the absolute cessation of all misery and the experiencing of the bliss which was observed in the condition of Samsāra, can be attained by two means, bhakti (devotion) and jñāna (knowledge). Of these the former is superior, since it leads to the realisation of the divine form of Brahman as Kṛṣṇa or Purusottama, in which the Ānandāṁśa is at its best ; while the latter is inferior, as it leads to the realisation of the second or non-determinate form of Brahman where the Ānandāṁśa is of an inferior order. Bhakti itself is of two degrees, *Maryādābhakti* and *Puṣṭībhakti*. In the former, the devotee attains Mokṣa by the practice of means (*sādhana*) on his own part, such as, the disciplines and restraints laid down in the Śāstra, which produce an aversion to worldly things, or worship and prayer of

the Bhagavat. In the latter,—and this is the higher kind of bhakti—the devotee, without having recourse to any sādhanas, depends upon nothing but pure and simple love of Him ; his goal is only the service of Hari ; his highest pleasure is to become one of the associates of Hari and to sport with him in the celestial Vṛndāvana. This *Pustībhakti* is the privilege of only him whom Bhagavat is pleased to favour ; it begins with *preman* which removes a liking for anything but Hari, and passing through *as'akti* which produces a positive aversion to objects not connected with Hari, culminates in *vyasana* or entire devotion to Hari.

In addition to the three prasthānas (viz. the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgīta and the Brahmasūtras), the Vallabha school has a fourth one, i. e. the Bhāgavata, passages from which are very often adduced in the Vallabha-bhāṣya.

Thus we see that these five schools of Vedānta agree in holding

- (1) that Brahman is the supreme cause of the universe ;
- (2) that Brahman is all-pervading and eternal ;
- (3) that the Upaniṣads in the first instance and the Brahma-sūtras and the Gīta are the basis of their doctrines ;
- (4) that in supersensuous and purely metaphysical matters like Brahman, the scriptures are the first authority and reasoning is to be accepted as long as it does not go against the Revelation ; reasoning has a jurisdiction over them, but owing to its limitations, the Revelation is the final court of appeal ;
- (5) that actions are subordinate to knowledge or devotion ; they are efficacious only for the purification of the mind or as a preparation for the right path, renunciation of them being quite necessary for final beatitude ;
- (6) that deliverance from this beginningless samsāra is the final goal.

S'ankara's doctrine is distinguished from the rest in-as-much as

- (1) he admits Māyā, which the other four schools agree in pretending to discard ;
- (2) he insists on knowledge as the sole means of Mokṣa ; while the rest insist on bhakti or devotion.

The four Viśnuite schools alike maintain

- (1) that Bhakti is the means of attaining Mokṣa ;
- (2) that Brahman is Īśvara, possessed of an infinite number of auspicious attributes ;
- (3) that the individual souls and the inanimate world are all as real as Brahman itself ;
- (4) that their individual distinctions can never be completely lost ;
- (5) that the individual souls are atomic, infinite in number, all possessed of the attributes of knowing and acting.

The school of Madhva stands apart in that

- (1) it maintains absolute duality, while all the rest try to reconcile duality and unity in one way or another ;
- (2) it holds that Brahman is only the efficient cause and not the material cause of the universe ; while all the rest agree in holding that it is both ; and that
- (3) consequently its admission of the authority of the Upaniṣads and Sūtras in particular is rather in theory than in practice.

As for the mutual relations of the three entities of Brahman, cit and acit, each of the five schools has its own doctrine, which has given each its distinctive character and name.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL OUTLINE

The word *Vedānta* signifies literally in Sanskrit 'end of the *Veda*'; in common use, however, the word is used with reference to the concluding portions of the Vedic literature, known also as *Upaniṣads*. The name *Vedānta* is applied to all the five systems of philosophy, going under the names of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhvā and Vallabha, because all these five systems alike lay claim to their being specially and directly derived from the *Vedānta*. Really speaking, the other five orthodox schools also pretend to derive their support from the *Upaniṣads*. Thus, for example, the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* schools quote passages from the *Upaniṣads* in support of their particular dogmas, especially when they are treating of the nature and attributes of the soul, or of the difference of nature between *Īśvara* and the inanimate world. Above all, the *Sāṃkhyas*, a very old and influential school, many of whose dogmas have been accepted even by the *Vedānta*, and whose general influence is clearly seen throughout the philosophical literature of India, are seen to make a very great use of passages from the *Upaniṣads*, though it must be noticed here that even according to themselves, their main-stay is not the *Upaniṣads*, but reasoning pure and simple. It is quite evident from the fact that all the *Vedānta* writers take great pains to refute the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine, especially to show that those particular passages which are quoted by the *Sāṃkhyas* in their own support, if properly and rightly interpreted, lend the least support to their doctrine. We cannot, of course, speak of the heterodox schools like the *Bauddhas* and *Jainas* in this connection; because, although from the very nature of the *Upaniṣads*, a support can be found in them for the most varied doctrines possible, and, as a matter of fact, a number of passages may be pointed out which would be favourable to the Buddhistic doctrine, still these schools never lay even the most distant claim to their being derived from the *Upaniṣads*; not only that, but they even directly oppose their authority.

Never-the-less, the term Vedānta applies only to the Uttara-mīmāṃsā and the various schools which it comprises ; and there are solid reasons for this restricted application of the term. First of all, no other school makes as much use of the Upanisads, as does the Uttara-mīmāṃsā ; every small item of their doctrine must be based upon and fully illustrated by passages from the Upanisads. The most important reason, however, is that according to them *Śruti* or the Revelation is the highest authority, nay, in fact, almost the only means of arriving at right knowledge ; and this follows, they say, from the very nature of the subject they have to deal with. For, in fact, the chief aim of philosophy, according to the Uttara-mīmāṃsā, is to find out the truth about the nature of the world, of its cause, of the soul, about the meaning of birth and death, in a word, to arrive at that right knowledge which would bring about the highest, eternal bliss. Reason, pure and simple (*s'uska-tarka*), would not help us in the least to achieve this end. Indeed, truth can be only one and not many ; while reason, being subjective brings us to several and divergent conclusions regarding the truth for which we are making a search. And there is no means of deciding whose reasoning is more correct, because each reasoner apparently pretends to be infallible and to follow the scientific canons of argument. Thus we have to resort to *Śruti* or the revealed scriptures ; and reasoning, being only subordinate, is valid only as long as it conforms to the *Śruti*. Moreover, reasoning, apart from the ridiculous variety of conclusions to which it may lead in accordance with the nature and prejudices of the person reasoning, is very limited in its scope and cannot take us to the end of our enquiry. It can proceed only to a certain stage and then we have to make certain assumptions. Well, why not then assume what is told most authoritatively in the *Śruti* ?

Thus it is that the term Vedānta is restricted to the Uttara-mīmāṃsā only, in distinction from Sāṃkhya and Nyāya, which take their main stand on *tarka* or reasoning and resort to *Śruti* only where convenient. The Upanisads, are beyond question the highest authority as far as the Vedānta and the schools which claim this name are concerned. But this is not the only authority. If reasoning is set aside or rather subordinated, because it is many-faced (i. e. leads to conclusions mutually opposed), the

case is not in any way better with the Upanisads. From their very natures, one and the same passage can be interpreted in more than one way; and moreover, there are passages which are opposed to each other in their purport. Thus for instance, in one place it is said that there was existence in the beginning; in another place it is said that there was non-existence in the beginning. In one place it is said that all is intelligence, which is one and unique; in another place, on the other hand, there is a reference to two persons, one of whom eats and the other only looks on. Once it is said that Brahman created *Ākās'a* or the element of ether to begin with; again it is said that Brahman first created *tejas* or the element of light. If truth is one,—and it is this assumption which is at the root of all philosophical controversies—what shall we do with such mutually contradictory passages? There were many attempts made to evolve a system from the complex and varied passages of the Upanisads, and the one attempt which has come down to us is embodied in what is known as the Brahma-sūtras, traditionally attributed to Bādarāyana or Vyāsa, believed to be the same as the author of the Mahābhārata. We have said that there were many more of such attempts before; and there are some good reasons for it. In the collection of the Sūtras before us, we find several times references to other writers and to their views on some important dogmas. Thus, for instance, in the Adhikarana 6, of Adhyāya I, pāda 4, (sūtras 19–22), the question is raised, how, in the Br. U. 4, 5, 6, the individual soul which is first spoken of in its peculiar nature as being the one for whose pleasure everything is ultimately dear, is in just the next sentence spoken of as the Highest Self that is to be meditated upon and realised. This identification is explained in several ways and not less than three views have been referred to. According to Āśmarāthya, this is an indication of the fulfilment of the promise made in the subsequent sentence that by the knowledge of the self everything without exception becomes known. For, otherwise, if the individual soul is different from Brahman, how is this promise possible? According to Audulomi, however, the reason for the identification in question is that really the individual soul which loses its purity of nature by contact with the limiting adjuncts such as

the body, the sense-organs etc., regains its purity by the practice of such means as knowledge and meditation etc., and thus becomes identical in nature with Brahman, in the course of its going up from this body. Finally according to Kāśakṛtsna, it is the Paramātman himself who becomes the individual soul, when proceeding to evolve name and form; and so the identification is quite justifiable. Many more instances of this kind could be pointed out. But, although there may have existed other similar collections of sūtras, the only one available to us is the one by Bādarāyaṇa. Thus in addition to the Upaniṣads, the Brahmasūtras form the second great authority for the Vedānta schools. A Sūtra-collection as the source and authority of a philosophical doctrine is not peculiar to the Vedānta alone; for we know that the other five orthodox schools also, all of them, claim to be based upon Sūtra-collections attributed to some sage of mythical fame, supposed to be the originator of the doctrine in question.

Besides these two, the Upaniṣads and the Sūtras, all the Vedānta-systems claim to have the authority of the third great fountain of knowledge, so popularly known as the 'Śrīmad-bhagavad-gītā,' or 'the song of the Lord.' Each of the five schools of the Vedānta believes, that its own particular doctrine is the only one contained, not only in the Upaniṣads and the Sūtras, but also in the Gītā. Thus the Upaniṣads, the Sūtras, and the Bhagavad-gītā are known as the three 'prasthānas' or starting points from which proceed the different Vedānta-doctrines and each of the so-called founders of the systems has written commentaries on the Upaniṣads, at least the principal ones, the Sūtras and the Bhagavad-gītā. Of these, we are here only concerned with the commentaries on the Brahma-sūtras.

If the Upaniṣads by reason of their very nature, in that they contain free thoughts and attempts at guessing the truths, most freely expressed, without the slightest notion of systematising, can be interpreted in more than one way, the sūtras present in a still greater degree this character. In fact, they are very brief notes rather than sentences, consisting of as few words as possible, many words having to be supplied from the context; there is thus the greatest scope for the ingenuity of the commentator, who can accordingly find in them whatever ideas he

wants them to convey. The sūtra literature in India presents a phenomenon met nowhere else. The desire to express as much meaning as possible in as few words as possible and to provide most convenient and compressed manuals, which could be easily committed to memory and, at the same time, which could easily bring to the mind a complete sense by applying to them as it were certain keys of interpretation, was sometimes carried too far, so that instead of attaining the intended purpose it often produced the contrary results. Thus, for instance, we have a number of unintelligible, apparently meaningless word-groups, which cannot be understood at all without the help of a voluminous commentary, which, after all may not represent properly what was really meant by the writer of the sūtras. The extreme instance of this sūtra-style is provided by the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* or the sūtras on grammar by Pāṇini, which make almost an impossible reading for the uninitiated. The desire for brevity weighed so much with the Indian mind that the saving of one word was regarded as a greater reason for joy than even the birth of a son. Fortunately, the sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, with which we are here concerned, are much more intelligible and much less brief, especially as there are no technical terms *Samjñās* and canons of interpretation (*paribhāṣās*) specially created for the purpose. Still, they are in themselves, quite sufficient to give rise to a number of interpretations. Nothing will give a better idea of what a sūtra is like than the traditional definition of a sūtra, quoted by the great dualistic Vedāntin Madhvācārya in his introduction to his commentary on the sūtras in question. It runs thus:—

अल्पाक्षरमर्सदिग्धं सारवादिश्वतोमुखम् ।

अस्तोभमनवर्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥

(p. 10, *Madhvabhāṣya*, edited by Cencalray Palle, at Madras, 1900)

“ It should contain as few letters as possible, it should be decisive, not leaving any doubts as to what it means, it should contain the essence, it should be comprehensive on the topic it touches, it should not contain any explanations or supplementary syllables as for instance in a chant or song, and it should be free from any fault. ” One cannot help remarking here that the second

of these conditions, i. e. 'not leaving any doubt,' is hardly fulfilled by any of the sūtra-collections available ; and that the adjective ' *Viśvatomukham*' , if understood to mean ' omni-faced ' i. e. capable of being interpreted in various senses *ad libitum*, is best applicable to many of the Sūtras.

Besides this very nature of the sūtra-literature in general, there are several reasons which facilitate the putting of different interpretations on the individual sūtras, and the deducing of different systems from the collections as a whole. Thus for instance, it is very difficult to decide which sūtras contain the pūrvapakṣa or the *prima facie* view, and which, the Siddhānta or the author's view. Thus in pāda 3 of adhyāya II, adhikarana 13, sūtras 19-28 are interpreted by Śaṅkara as representing the pūrva-pakṣa view according to which the *jīva* is *anu* or atomic in size ; while sūtra 29 formulates the Siddhānta, viz. that the *jīva* is not really atomic (*anu*) but that it is all-pervading (*vibhu*) ; and that in certain scriptural passages it is spoken of as being *anu* only because of the internal organ (*manas*), which forms an essential condition of the individual soul as distinguished from the highest self ; thus the *anutva*, which really belongs to *manas*, has only been transferred to *jīva*. On the other hand, Rāmānuja interprets the first sūtra (II-3-19) of the Adhikarana as stating the Siddhānta view, according to which the individual soul is of minute size ; and sūtras 20-25 are interpreted by him as only confirming this view and refuting objections raised against it ; while the remaining sūtras deal with another questions concerning the *anutva*. We see here how the same set of sūtras can be interpreted as lending support to two views, diametrically opposed, to each other, on an essential point of the doctrine.

There is another circumstance tending in the same direction. There is a traditional division of the sūtras into *Adhyāyas* and *pādas* handed down to us, on which there is a unanimity of opinion. No such division into Adhikarana, unanimously accepted, has come down to us. Thus for instance, in connection with sūtras 41, 42 and 43 of the third pāda of the first Adhyāya, sūtra 41 forms one Adhikarana deciding that the ether which reveals names and forms, spoken of in Chāndogya Upanisad, VIII, 14, 1, is Brahman, and it is neither the elemental ether nor the *jīva* ;

while sūtras 42 and 43 form another Adhikarana teaching that the *vijnāna-maya*, ' he who consists of knowledge ', mentioned in Br. Up. IV. 3. 7, is not the individual soul but Brahman. According to Rāmānuja, and Nimbārka, the three sūtras form but one single Adhikarana which establishes that the ākāśa in the passage in question cannot refer to the individual soul, nor even to the released individual soul, because even then the individual soul continues to be different from Brahman. So the Ākāśa must mean Brahman and nothing else. According to Madhva, on the other hand, the three sūtras form three separate Adhikaranas, sūtra 41 referring to the ākāśa, sūtra 42, to the *vijnāna-maya* and sūtra 43 referring to another passage in Br. Up. VI. 4. 22, where the words, सर्वस्यातिपतिः सर्वस्येशानः (the lord of all, the ruler of all), refer to Viṣṇu or the Lord.

The necessity of having to supply words to complete the meaning of the Sūtra is another prolific source of variety of interpretations. Thus in sūtra 1, pāda 3 of Adhyāya II, न वियद्यतः (lit. not the ether, because of want of scriptural mention) Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka supply the word ' *utpadyate*' (is produced), while Madhva supplies the word ' *anutpattimat*' (is not produced).

Some particular words in the sūtras have two meanings, a circumstance which also leads to different interpretations. Thus the word ' *antarū* ' in the sūtra II. 3. 15 may mean both ' in the midst (madhya) ' and ' without (vinā) '. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Nimbārka accept the first meaning and thus the Sūtra, according to them, means that the mention of *vijnāna* and *manas* in the midst of the passage referring to the creation of the elements need not disturb the order of creation ; while according to Madhva, who accepts the second meaning, the sūtra means that the opposite order of destruction (to that of creation) holds good except in the case of *vijnāna* and *manas*.

Another circumstance is the fact that there is no *padapāṭha* or a record of the separate words singly in the sūtras, handed down by an authoritative tradition, as there is one for the Samhitā of the Rgveda, which leaves no doubt regarding the splitting of a metrical line into separate words. For example, the sūtra II. 3. 26 is read either as शुणाद्वालोकेचत् or as

युणाद्वारेऽलोकवत् both readings being equally admissible, as the words are not usually separated in manuscripts. According to Śaṅkara, the sūtra means that the Jīva, though of minute size (apu) can be affected in any part of the body, owing to the pervasiveness of the quality of intelligence, as is, for instance, the case with certain objects in the world (loka-vat), e. g. with the light of a lamp. According to Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, and Madhva, however, 'ālokavat' (like the light) gives the illustrations wanted for the purpose more directly.

The fact that the Upaniṣad passages under discussion are not actually mentioned in the sūtras must also be considered in this connection. Different commentators may take up for discussion different passages and thus one and the same adhikarāṇa may yield quite a different meaning. For example, in the sūtra I, 1, 5, the passage referred to by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka is Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI, 2, 1 and 2 and the sūtra means that the sat in the passage cannot mean the Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhya; because the act of 'willing' is spoken of in connection with it. Thus the whole of the adhikarāṇa beginning with this sūtra is an attempt to show that the passages which the Sāṃkhya brings forth in support of his doctrine cannot but refer to Brahman, if only properly interpreted with a due consideration of the context. But Madhva interprets the adhikarāṇa in quite a different way. The passages in question are, according to him, Praśna Upaniṣad V, 5, Br. U. VI, 4, 23 etc., in which the ātman or puruṣa is spoken of as something to be seen or meditated upon; and the sūtra, accordingly means that Brahman cannot be said to be 'as'abda' i. e. inexpressible (avācya), because it is described as being something to be seen or known (ikṣanīya or jñeyā); and all the remaining sūtras of the adhikarāṇa are explained accordingly. Thus we see how very easy it is that the collection of sūtras before us should have been interpreted in more than one way. In fact there have been five different commentaries on them, differing in essential points in the interpretation of the individual sūtras, and still more so in the general purport. Five different schools have tried, more or less successfully, to derive their doctrines from these sūtras and each has even gone so far as to show that this particular system is the only one which the author of the sūtras wanted to

communicate through them. In spite of all these circumstances contributing to the variety of interpretations, the question still remains, why is it this particular sūtra-collection which has had the privilege of having so many interpretations put upon it, so as to give rise to not less than five different doctrines differing from each other as regards some essential dogmas? There are similar sūtra-collections; for instance, the Vaiśeṣika sūtras by Kanāda, commented upon by Praśastapāda, the Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama, with the commentary of Vātsyāyana, the Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali, commented on by Vyāsa, the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā sūtras of Jaimini, with the commentary of Śabaravāmin; and we find everywhere that each sūtra-collection has only one authoritative commentary or *bhāṣya*; and though the systems of philosophy represented by these sūtra-collections may have (and as a matter of fact, they have actually in some cases) branched off into different sub-varieties, retaining some common points but at the same time differing in some points not always unessential, still there is no difference of opinion as regards the particular doctrine represented by or supposed to be taught by the sūtra-collection in each case.

The sūtra-collection before us does not differ materially from the other collections, as regards its literary character. Why then is it that an attempt should have been made to found on one and the same sūtra-collection, five different systems,—the absolute monism of Śaṅkara, the qualified monism of Rāmānuja, the monodualism of Nimbārka, the dualism of Madhva, and the pure monism of Vallabha? It is not possible, of course, that the sūtrikāra should have more than one system in his mind. It is difficult to answer the question positively and satisfactorily; and we can only offer a guess here.

As said above, it is the Vedānta that claims to be derived exclusively from the Upaniṣads and that sets the authority of the Upaniṣads over everything else, even reasoning. Although seeds of other systems may be traced in the Upaniṣads, still no other system ever cared for them except in a casual and secondary manner; some even directly condemned them. Much less did any of them try to reconcile the evidently contradictory passages and to deduce one consistent system from them. This was mainly the task of the Vedānta; and the five

systems before us are the results of five such attempts at deducing a system from the Upanisads.

The main question before them may be briefly stated thus : There are certain passages in the Upanisads which emphatically assert a unity and deny a plurality—e.g., 'तत्त्वमसि', 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि', 'तर्व खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जग्निं शान्तं उपर्सीत'. By the side of these there are other passages which clearly assert a plurality and a duality between the Highest Self and the individual self, e. g. 'ज्ञानौ द्वावजावीशानीशौ' (Śvet. I. 9), 'द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सवादा समानं द्वयं परिष्वजाते । तयोरन्यः पिण्डं स्वाद्वन्ति अनश्वन्त्येऽपिभिर्कशन्ति ॥' (Mund. III, 1, 1). How to reconcile these ? Śaṅkara would say that all plurality is illusion, while unity is the only reality, and that all passages referring to plurality have in view only the phenomenal existence or the popular conception of the Universe, which is however ultimately meant to be refuted. Rāmānuja would say that both unity and plurality are real; and that the individual souls and the animate world, though really and inherently different in nature from the Supreme Soul, are at the same time non-different from him, in that they cannot have an existence independent of the Supreme Self. Thus the *cit* and *acit* or the animate and the inanimate worlds are the body and thus the attributes of the Supreme Self. According to Nimbārka also both difference and non-difference are real, without the individual souls and the inanimate world being the distinguishing attributes of the Supreme Self, as there is nothing else from which to distinguish it. Madhva, on the other hand denies unity altogether and holds that duality is the only reality ; and that all affirmations of unity are only for the sake of Upāsanā or meditation, nay, even the sentence 'tat tvam asi' he reads as 'atat tvam asi'. Vallabha, without believing in Māyā or the principle of illusion, holds that the individual soul in its pure and pristine nature is identical with the Supreme Soul.

Thus these five systems may be supposed to have come into existence, in the course of the attempts to reconcile and to deduce a system from the apparently contradictory passages of the Upanisads. The sūtras also represent such an attempt independently made by Bādarāyana ; and other similar attempts must have preceded it, for instance, those by Kāśakṛtsna, Āśmarathya, Vārsyā-

yani and others. Somehow or other the sūtras of Bādarāyana came to survive all the rest and to possess a high reputation; so that every Vedantist came to look upon them as the most authoritative source of his doctrine, next in importance to the Upaniṣads only. One can very well believe it to be very probable that all these five systems in their essential elements must have existed long before the sūtras of Bādarāyana attained to prominence, and that when there arose great teachers like Śaṅkara, and Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Madhva, they thought it their first duty, for the propagation of their system, to write a commentary or bhāṣya on these sūtras and to prove that the sūtras which are reputed as teaching the kernel of the Upaniṣads contain none but their own doctrines. In doing this, they naturally proceeded to interpret the sūtras in the light of their own doctrines and resorted to all sorts of twistings and artificialities to make the sūtras yield the sense they wanted. They had their own doctrine cut and dry before them, and their only task was to show that it had the authority of the sūtras. Naturally they never cared to know what was the real and natural meaning of the sūtras. These facts are too transparent to any one who would just cursorily glance over the several bhāṣyas to require special emphasis.

Now the question before us is: which of these bhāṣyas gives an interpretation of the sūtras which is the most faithful to the original; in other words, which of these five systems, if there is any at all, is the one taught by the sūtras or professed by their author. Perhaps we might not be able to arrive at a positive conclusion, to the effect that such and such a system is the one taught by the sūtras. Perhaps the system in the mind of the Sūtrikāra was different from the five we are considering. But still the enquiry is useful even if we can say that one of these five commentaries is a more natural and correct interpretation of the sūtras than the rest; or that all the sūtras alike do not favour any one particular system. The method of interpretation which we are going to apply to the sūtras in our enquiry is the critical one as opposed to the traditional method applied by the several commentators. For, any piece of literary work can be interpreted in two ways, either by the traditional or by the critical method. The former takes the doctrine for granted and proceeds from this assumption to find the

doctrine in the work under examination. For instance, take the Bhagavad-gītā. Every school of Vedānta appears to attempt to find its own system in it, shutting its eyes to all contradictory passages or more often trying to interpret them in a far-fetched manner, so as to confirm their own doctrine. Śaṅkara, while commenting upon the work would find nothing but the reality of Brahman and the illusory character of the Universe in it; and all passages referring to a personal god and his devotees, which are therefore theistic in character, would be interpreted as having to do with the lower form of knowledge and the lower form of Brahman (*apara Brahman* or *aparā vidyā*). Rāmānuja would find nothing but *bhakti* in it. In all these cases, the interpreter has a certain tradition coming down from of yore and he moves always in the groove where he has once placed himself.

On the other hand, the critical method pre-supposes an attitude of absolute impartiality, considering the work by itself, without a leaning to any one particular doctrine. Of course, mistakes may often be committed in applying this method and very ridiculous conclusions may sometimes be arrived at, owing to insurmountable prejudices due to birth, race and other surroundings, or owing to want of patience, or the lack of sufficient material to go upon. Thus again to take the instance of the Bhagavad-gītā, one German scholar, professing to apply the critical method to it, came to the conclusion that the work was purely theistic and that all the verses which contained pantheistic ideas were later additions. But recently a distinguished Indian scholar has shown by a detailed and thorough-going study of the Gita, that not one verse can be regarded as a later addition, or as being out of place or context, that everything, as it is already there, fits in most smoothly in its context and that the chief teaching of the Gītā refers to neither this nor that particular system of Vedānta, but that it is entirely practical and catholic in its character. It can be summarised in one word thus—‘*jñanapūrvaka-bhaktipradhāna-niṣkāma-karmanuṣṭhāna*’—‘the performance of one’s duty, without any attachment to reward, proceeding from a devotion to the Lord, backed by right knowledge.’ The same may be illustrated from the history of the Vedic interpretation. Sāyaṇa’s method is mostly one-sided, not caring for consistency or the ordinary canons of

interpretation. Roth, on the other hand, went to the other extreme in condemning Sāyaṇa downright and proposing sometimes quite fanciful explanations. Later on Geldner and Pischel have struck the golden mean, and they have come to find some explanations in Sāyaṇa which are correct and ingenious and based on quite sound reasons.

This critical method (as opposed to the purely traditional one) was not unknown to the old sanskrit writers, especially in the domain of philosophy. The Mīmāṃsakas, whose special province it was to lay down the canons of interpretation, have briefly summarised the essentials of this method in the following verse :—

*उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽप्यवृत्ता फलम् ।

अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णये ॥

'the beginning, the end, the' repetition, the novelty, the object, the glorification, and argument,—these are the canons for determining the purport.' Thus for instance in determining the purport of the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, all these can be illustrated. That the chapter mainly teaches the unity of the Supreme Self follows from the beginning e. g. 'ekam eva advitiyam' (Chān. VI. 2. 1) 'one only, without a second', from the close also—e. g. 'aitadātmyam idam sarvam ' 'all this has it for the soul '—(Chānd. VI. 8. 7); there is a repetition of the same idea throughout the chapter, e. g. the phrase 'tat tvam asi' occurs there nine times. There is a novelty here in that the unity of the soul can be known from this and from no other proof. The object of the knowledge of the unity of the self is also mentioned there, e. g. : आचार्यवाच पुरुषो वेद । तस्य तावेच चिरं यावत्त विमेश्ये । अयं संपर्स्ये । 'a man who has got a teacher knows; he has to wait just until he is freed (from the body) and then he becomes one (with the Brahman) (Chān. VI. 14. 2)'. Thus it is taught that the attainment of Brahman is the fruit of the knowledge of the entity without a second. There is also the eulogising of the unity thus : उत तमादेशमपाक्षयो येनश्रुतं श्रुतं चतुर्थमनं मतमविद्वानं विजात् त्वा, 'you have asked me that instruction by hearing which, what is not heard is heard, what is not thought is thought, what is not known

*Quoted in the Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha (Pūrṇaprajñandarśana) and ascribed to the Brāhmaṇa-saṃhitā.

is known,' (Chān. VI. 1. 3). Arguments establishing the same are also stated in several places; e. g., यथा सौभैकेन मृत्युज्ञेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विजाते स्याद्बाचारम्भण विकारो नामयेयं मृत्यिकेत्येष सर्वम्, 'just as by knowing one lump of clay, all that consists of clay would become known, the product depends only on name, it is a name, while clay alone is the reality' (Chān. VI. 1. 4). A cursory glance at the Bhāṣya will show how often this method is employed in determining the meaning of any particular word in an Upaniṣad passage. As one instance among many, one may refer to the first adhikarāṇa in the fourth pāda of the first adhyāya, where in determining what the expression 'avyakta', the undeveloped, means in Katha Up. I. 3. 10. 11, all these canons have been applied.

Before proceeding with the critical examination of the sūtras, as proposed above, we must be on our guard, not to confound the question before us, with another allied to it, but quite different from it, i. e. which of the five systems of Vedānta is the most elevated and conducive to the satisfaction of the human impulse for the quest of truth. It is of course very difficult to pronounce judgment as to which philosophical system is more profound and stands the test of reason better than any other. Every system has its merits and demerits and its advocates and opponents. Perhaps, if philosophy mainly concerns itself with finding unity in plurality, nothing may be higher than the absolute monism of Śaṅkara; and nowhere else can we see the human understanding reaching such heights of elevated thought. But we are not concerned with this point of view at all. The question before us is one purely of literary criticism and not one of philosophy proper. Here is a literary product before us and here we have so many interpretations of it; and our object is to see which of these, if any, has faithfully represented the natural and straightforward meaning of the original, apart from the inherent philosophical value of the doctrines propounded by them.

The Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are divided into four adhyāyas or chapters, each of which is again divided into four pādas or quarters. The sūtras, though they appear to be unconnected from the point of view of their external form, are not really so; they are pervaded by a system running through all of them. The first adhyāya is called the 'samanyavādhyāya' or

the chapter which mainly seeks to establish that all the Upanisads deal with Brahman as their final aim. The first pāda of the first adhyāya states first in general terms that Brahman is the highest object of knowledge and that from it proceed the birth, preservation and destruction of the universe, the Scriptures alone being the means of knowing it and Brahman alone being their final aim, and then discusses certain Upanisad passages in detail. A doubt is raised about them as to whether they necessarily refer to Brahman, or may refer to something else, the pradhāna of the Sāṃkhyas or the individual soul, or some deity ; but they at the same time contain clear and unmistakable indications of Brahman (*spasta-brahma-lingāni*). The second and third pādas also deal with similar passages, which, however, contain only indistinct indications of Brahman (*aspasta-brahma-lingāni*). The fourth pāda more particularly deals with those passages in which certain words are apparently interpreted by the Sāṃkhyas as referring to some of their principles like the pradhāna or the mahat, but these are proved to refer to some categories connected with the Vedānta. The fourth pāda thus contains a polemic specially directed against the Sāṃkhyas.

After having so far established that Brahman alone is the object to which the Upanisads refer, the Sūtrakāra, in the second adhyāya, which is called ' *avirodhādhyāya* ' or the chapter dealing with absence of contradiction, proceeds to show that nothing can be brought forth which would contradict the fact established so far that the systems of Vedānta refer to Brahman. In the first pāda of the second adhyāya, all objections based on Smṛtis like those of the Sāṃkhyas, claiming to contain passages of an opposite purport, as well as those based on pure speculative reasoning, are answered. After having thus defended the Vedānta doctrine against the attacks of contradictory smṛtis and speculative arguments (*nyāya*), the second pāda aims at refuting other doctrines than Vedānta, e. g. the Sāṃkhya, the Nyāya, the Buddhism and so forth, by the very weapons of speculative arguments, which are their forte. The third pāda tries to reconcile the passages, apparently contradicting each other, regarding the creation of the different elements and the essential characteristics of the individual soul ; while the fourth pāda similarly deals with those passages that refer to the vital airs and the sense-organs.

The third adyāya is called 'Sādhanādhyāya' or the chapter dealing with the means of attaining to absolution. The first pāda in particular deals with the manner of the transmigration of the individual soul and inculcates 'Vairāgya' or aversion to the world by describing the misery involved in it. The second pāda discusses the different conditions of the individual soul, e. g. the state of being awake, that of dreaming and that of deep-sleep. The third and fourth pādas deal with the different kinds of meditations enjoined as leading to 'Mokṣa' and attempts to reconcile the contradictions and to fill up the discrepancies regarding them.

The fourth adhyāya is called the 'phalādhyāya', i. e. the chapter dealing with the fruit of knowledge, the 'Salut'. The first pāda more particularly deals with what is called 'jivanmukti' i. e. absolution in this very life. The second pāda discusses the way of the passing away of a knowing soul; and the third and fourth pādas deal with the condition of the released soul.

Each of these sixteen pādas consists of a number of 'adhi-karanas' or sections, each dealing with one and only one topic or subject. The method of treating a topic, in each such adhikarana is also very systematic. First, the subject or the matter of discussion (visaya) is stated; then comes a statement of the doubt or the several alternatives proposed, of which one is to be chosen ultimately (visaya or samīsaya); next comes the statement of the prima facie view (pūrvapakṣa). Then follows the opposite view (uttarpakṣa) and then last comes the siddhānta or the conclusion. Thus, for example, in the first adhikarana of the third pāda of the first adhyāya, the question is, who is meant in the passage 'He in whom heavenly earth etc. are all woven, know him alone to be the Self etc.' (—Here is the visaya); does it mean Vāyu, or the pradhāna or the individual soul, or the highest Brahman? (Here is the samīsaya). He is vāyu or individual soul or anything but Brahman, says the objector (pūrvapakṣa). No, it is only Īśvara, says the Siddhāntin. (This is the uttarapakṣa). This proves that the passage refers to nothing but Brahman. (This is the siddhānta).

After these general remarks regarding the nature, the contents, the arrangement, and the method of treatment of the Sūtras, we now proceed to examine in detail the Sūtras and their interpretations

by the five great commentators, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva, and Vallabha.

CHAPTER II.

ANALYSIS.

ADHYĀYA I, PĀDA I.

The first Sūtra 'then therefore, the enquiry into Brahman' sets forth in general, the object of the treatise. The word 'then' (at̄ha) according to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, means 'after the knowledge of karman and its fruits', but according to Śaṅkara, it means 'after the acquisition of the four requisites' which are, discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things, aversion to the enjoyment of the objects of sense here and in the next world, possession of self-restraint, tranquillity etc., and the desire to be absolutely free. Vallabha prefers to take the word in the sense of 'adhi-kāra' i. e. the beginning of a new topic, and remarks that the enquiry into Brahman is possible, even without any of the requisites mentioned by others. Madhva is not specific regarding the meaning of the word. All agree in the explanation of the word 'therefore' (at̄ah), i. e. 'for the reason that karman and its fruits are known to be perishable and limited and that it is the knowledge of Brahman alone which can lead to eternal bliss.'

The second sūtra defines this Brahman by saying that it is that from which spring the origination etc., of this world. This definition of Brahman is very important, because, at the very threshold of the work it gives a knock to the doctrine of Śaṅkara, according to whom, Brahman proper is merely existence, intelligence and bliss (sat, cit, ānanda); while it is the lower Brahman which, associated with Mayā, produces, sustains and destroys the world, which has nothing but a phenomenal existence. Now can we convince that one who held Śaṅkara's doctrine would define Brahman in this manner at the very outset? No such difficulty presents itself, however, with the other commentators for whom this twofold character of Brahman does not exist.

The third sūtra says that Scripture alone is the means of knowing Brahman,—a fundamental point common to all systems of the Vedānta; and sūtra 4 states that all the scriptures have for their ultimate purport Brahman,—a point which the sūtras in general attempt to make out.

Vallabha reads sūtras 2 and 3 as one and interprets sūtra 4 to mean that Brahman is not only the efficient cause of the world, as stated in sūtra 2, but also the material cause, because it permeates all, in the form of existence, knowledge and bliss, rejecting the interpretation given by others as being superfluous, since the *Samanyaya* as interpreted by them is the object of the following sūtras. The same charge, however, may be brought against Vallabha himself; for Sūtra I. 4. 23 also makes out the same point i. e. that Brahman is also the material cause of the universe.

The fifth adhikarana (Sūtras 5-11) asserts that the non-intelligent pradhāna of the Sāṃkhyas cannot be the cause of the world, because it is not supported by the Śruti, since ' seeing ' or ' willing, ' which is an attribute of something intelligent, is predicated of the cause of the world. This is the purport of this Adhik. according to Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, who all refer to the same passage, i. e. Chānd. VI. 2. 1. All the same, we are conscious that each has his own doctrine in view, in a cut and dry form, and then proceeds to interpret the sūtras in its light. At the end of the adhik., for instance, Rāmānuja remarks that this is also a refutation of the nirguna Brahman, since it asserts ' willing ' as its attribute ; and ' willing ' is only another name for ' being possessed of the quality of intelligence '. Madhva, on the other hand, interprets the adhikarana to mean that Brahman cannot be said to be inexpressible, because it is described as being the object of knowledge (iksaniya) as in the text ' आत्मन्वेतात्मानं पश्येत् ' Vallabha also has a somewhat similar interpretation: Brahman cannot be vyavaharātīta i. e. beyond all expression or proof; because it is described as ' seeing ', which means that it made itself ' vyavahārya '.

After having stated so far in a general way that Brahman is the chief object of the Vedānta Sāstra, that it is the cause of the origination, sustenance and destruction of the universe, and that it is intelligent, the Sūtrakāra proceeds with his task of examining certain passages of the Upanisads and demonstrating that certain words in them refer to nothing but Brahman.

Here again Śaṅkara makes the introductory remarks to the effect that the question now before us is whether the higher or

lower Brahman is referred to in certain passages of the Upaniṣads. But this seems to be without justification, because, in the remaining part of the adhyāya, we are concerned with the choice between jīva and Brahman and even Śaṅkara's own commentary accords with the same. Thus this is only another instance of the commentator showing the influence of his pre-conceived prejudices. The next adhikarāna (sūtras 12-19) asserts that, that the 'ānandamaya' referred to in Taitt. Upa. II. 5 is the Highest Self and not the jīva. This seems to be a natural and straight-forward interpretation and all except Śaṅkara follow it; Śaṅkara, however, after having given this interpretation at length, finally rejects it in favour of another to the effect that the word 'brahman' in the immediately following phrase 'ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' refers to Brahman principally and not as a member of the 'ānandamaya'; and the reason given for accepting this second interpretation is that the 'ānandamaya' would only refer to the saviṣeṣa Brahman and never to the nirviṣeṣa Brahman, which is called 'ānanda' itself and not 'ānandamaya'. That this passage containing this interpretation is not an interpolation, as Deussen seems to think, follows from the fact that it is only in this passage that Śaṅkara refers to the distinction between the saviṣeṣa and nirviṣeṣa Brahman of which he makes a mention before commencing this adhikarāna, and secondly because Vallabha refutes this interpretation, which must therefore have existed somewhere. One sūtra 'कामाच्च नानुमानेषा' (I. 1. 18) is interpreted variously:—Śaṅkara and Vallabha explain it to mean that the ānandamaya cannot be also the pradhāna (anumāna), for 'willing' is immediately predicated of the ānandamaya. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, however, explain thus:—'If the ānandamaya were to denote the jīva, then it would be in need of some non-intelligent material cause (anumāna-acit), just as a potter is in need of clay; but the ānandamaya has no need of any such thing because he has only to will (kāmāt = saṅkālpāt) and so this is another reason why the ānandamaya cannot be jīva.' Madhva explains:—'we need not care for reasoning (anumāna), for reasoning can be had at our free-will'. Now, here the interpretation given by Rāmānuja and Nimbārka seems to be more suitable, for it deals with the question between

Brahman and jīva which has been raised in the preceding sūtras, while Śaṅkara's interpretation unnecessarily brings in the pradhāna, although the question regarding it has been set at rest in the preceding adhikarana ; and besides it would be only a repetition of sūtra I. 1. 5. In this adhikarana, the sūtras 16, 17, 19 deserve notice, because they all rest on the conception of a difference of individuality between Brahman and jīva ; and Śaṅkara, at the end of sūtra 17, comes forth with his usual explanation that such sūtras as these only refer to a difference between Brahman and jīva, which is due to māyā, whereas, really speaking, there exists no such difference,

As regards the remaining adhikaranas of this pāda, all agree in their interpretation, except Madhva, who refers to different passages of the Upaniṣads in the last two adhikaranas. Thus adhikarana 7 (sūtras 20-21) demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye, mentioned in Chānd. Up. I. 6, are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman. Here also the sūtra 21 'मेदव्यपदेशात्मानः' deserves notice, as it refers to the distinction between Brahman and jīva. Adhikarana 8 (sūtra 22) states that the ether mentioned in Chānd. Upa. I. 9 is not the elemental ether but the highest Brahman. Adhikarana 9 (sūtra 3) says that the prāṇa mentioned in Chānd. Upa. I. 11. 5 denotes the highest Brahman. Adhikarana 10 (sūtras 24-27) teaches that the light spoken of in Chānd. Upa. III. 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman. Adhikarana 11 (sūtras 28-31) asserts that the prāṇa mentioned in Kaus. Upa. III. 2 is Brahman. In this adhikarana, the ablative 'upāsā-trai-vidhyat' in sūtra 31, is explained in two ways by Śaṅkara. The sūtra may either mean 'if it be said that Brahman is not meant on account of the characteristic marks of individual soul and the chief vital air being mentioned, we reply, no ; for your interpretation would lead to or would necessitate three-foldness of devout meditation, which it is inappropriate to assume' ; or the sūtra may mean 'even the characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter whose topic is Brahman, on account of the three-foldness of devout meditation' ; i. e. the chapter actually aims at enjoining

three kinds of devout meditation, according as Bahman is viewed under the aspect of *prāṇa*, under the aspect of *prajñā* or in its own nature (or according to Rāmānuja, the meditation on Brahman in its own nature as the cause of the entire world, on Bahman as having for its body the totality of enjoying souls, and on Brahman as having for its body the objects and means of enjoyment). Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Madhva follow the second way of explaining the ablative ; while Vallabha follows the first way ; and no doubt, the second way is more natural, as shown by the ablatives elsewhere and by the ablative immediately following in this very sūtra.

The second pāda of the first adhyāya deals with passages in which the indications of Brahman are not distinct. Adhik. 1 (sūtras 1-8) shows, according to all except Madhva, that the being which consists of mind (*manomayah*), whose body is breath (*prāṇa-sarIrāḥ*) etc., enjoined to be meditated upon in Chānd. Upa. III. 14. 1 and 2, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. This adhikarāna is very important for our purpose, in that it contains many sūtras speaking of the difference of nature between Brahman and *jīva*, e. g. sūtras 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, and Śaṅkara has to add his usual explanation after sūtra 6 that all this difference is to be understood as unreal and only due to the false limiting adjuncts of the Highest Self ; whereas other commentators do not feel the necessity of any such explanation. In sūtra 7, it is interesting to note that the word ' *tad-vyapadesāt*' lit. ' owing to the mention of that ' is explained by all as meaning ' *alpatva(-anutva)-vyapadesāt*' i. e. ' owing to the mention of minuteness ' and as stating one of the reasons in favour of the *jīva* being referred to in the passage in question. Does it not imply an admission, on the part of the Śūtrikāra, of the minuteness of the *jīva*, accepted by all except Śaṅkara, according to whom alone the *jīva* is as omnipresent as the Brahman ? But of this, later on. So also the explanations of the word ' *Vyomavacca*' in the same sūtra, lit. ' like the ether ', are interesting. Śaṅkara explains it to mean that Brahman, though all-pervading, is here described as minute, just as, for instance, the ether, though all-pervading is looked upon as limited in size from the point of view of the jar etc. Of course it must be con-

fessed that the illustration in this sense fits in very well with Śaṅkara's doctrine, as it explains exactly the relation between Brahman and jīva as he believes it to be. It is very curious that Nimbārka follows Śaṅkara in this mode of explanation, though it must be supposed that he understands the illustration only in a limited sense, i. e. to explain how a large thing may be at the same time described as small (ब्रह्मोऽल्पत्वं तु गवाक्षयोमवत्संगच्छते) but without any reference to the relation between Brahman and jīva. Rāmānuja very cleverly explains it thus :—Not only is the manomaya in this passage, described as minute ; but it is also described as being all-pervading like the ether, in the very same passage, e. g. in 'ज्यायात् पृथिव्याः' etc. (Chānd. Upa. III. 14. 3), which is thus an additional argument why the manomaya should denote Brahman. Madhva and Vallabha explain the word just like Śaṅkara. So also the word 'vaiśesyāt' (lit. 'owing to the difference') in sūtra 8, which gives the reason why Brahman is not subject to pleasure and pain just like the jīva, is explained by all except Rāmānuja, to mean 'owing to the difference of nature between Brahman and jīva ;' but Rāmānuja explains it as 'owing to the difference of cause of enjoyment' i. e. it is not the abiding in the body merely which leads to the experiencing of pleasure and pain, but the being subject to actions and to the merit and demerit resulting from them, which is, however, never possible in the case of Brahman,—a point very frequently alluded to by him.

The second adhikarāṇa (sūtras 9–10) teaches that the Being to whom Brahmins and Kṣatriyas are but food, referred to in Katha Upa. I. 2. 24 is the highest self. Adhik. 3 (sūtras 11–12) establishes that the two 'entered into the cave' (Katha Upa. I. 3. 1) are Brahman and jīva. All except Rāmānuja agree in having these as two adhikarāṇas ; but Rāmānuja alone has them as one adhik. His attempt, however, to tackle them together is rather farfetched and without any special purpose (see p. 245 B. S. S. LXVIII). Sūtras 11 and 12 deserve notice ; because sūtra 11 contains the dual 'ātmānau' speaking of jīva and Paramātman ; and sūtra 12 lays stress on the difference of characteristics between Brahman and jīva. Rāmānuja remarks on this sūtra—'अस्मिन् प्रकरणे जीवपरमात्मानोवेवोपास्यत्वेऽपासकत्वप्रवृत्तपान्तृत्वविशिष्टौ सर्वत्र प्रतियादेते' ('in this section, the

jīva and Paramātman are spoken of everywhere as the meditator and the object of meditation, as the attainer and the object to be attained '). Even Śaṅkara says—‘विज्ञानात्मानं रथिनं संसारमेक्षयेऽग्निनां क्रत्य-यति.....परमात्मानं गन्तव्यम्’ (i. e. the jīva is supposed to be the goer ; while the Paramātman, the object to be gone to).

Adhik. 4 (Sūtras 13-17) asserts that the person within the eye, mentioned in Chānd. Upa. IV. 15. 1. is Brahman. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka read an additional sūtra ‘अत एव च स (तद्-निष्ठा०) ब्रह्म ।’ (lit. for this reason it is Brahman) between sūtras 15 and 16. But it cannot be original, because it appears to be quite unnecessary and rather out of place, in the midst of the ablative expressing the reasons ; not to mention that Vallabha and Madhvā also do not have it. Adhik. 5 (sūtras 18-20) says that the ruler within (antaryāmin), mentioned in Br. Up. III. 7. 3, is Brahman; it cannot be the pradhāna of the Śāṅkhyas on account of the statement of the qualities not belonging to it (19) ; nor can it be jīva, for both the recensions of the Brāhmaṇa speak of it as different from the internal ruler (20). Here Śaṅkara, Nimbārka, Madhvā and Vallabha read Sūtras 19 and 20 as न च स्मात्मनद्वर्म-भिलापात् and ‘शारीरश्चयेऽपि हि भेदनैनमधीयते’ while Rāmānuja reads the words ‘शारीरश्च’ as forming part of the sūtra 19. This way has the advantage of connecting both the ablatives with the sārīraḥ; therefore it seems preferable to have sārīraḥ and enam (which refers to sārīraḥ only) in one and the same sūtra. Sūtra 20 asserts the difference between Brahman and jīva; and Śaṅkara, as usual, comes forth with his explanation that all these statements of difference, are due to the limiting adjuncts, which themselves are the products of Nescience.

Adhik. 6 (sūtras 21-23) shows that the being described as possessed of invisibility etc., in Mund. Upa. I. 1. 5, 6 is Brahman; and it cannot be pradhāna or jīva, because of the statement of distinctive attributes and difference. Here also sūtra 22 speaks of the difference of nature between Brahman and jīva. Adhik. 7 (sūtras 24-32) says that the ātmā vaiśvānaraḥ mentioned in Chānd. Upa. V. 11. 6 is Brahman.

Adhik. 1 (sūtras 1-7) proves that the being within whom heaven and earth etc. are woven, mentioned in Mund. Upa. II. 2. 5, is Brahman, on account of the term ‘ātman’ being used of it ; and

on account of its being designated as that to which the released have to resort. It cannot be Pradhāna, nor the individual soul, owing to the declaration of difference. Rāmānuja alone reads sūtras 3 and 4 as one (cf. above I. 2. 19, 20). It is to be noted that the sūtras 2, 5 and 7 specially refer to the difference of nature between Brahman and jīva.

Adhik. 2 (sūtras 8-9) shows that the 'bhūman' (that which is great) in Chānd. Up. 7. 23, 24 is Brahman only and it cannot be prāṇa or the vital air, on account of information about it being given subsequent to Saṁprasāda i. e. bliss or the state of deep sleep or secondarily the prāṇa which is awake in the state of deep sleep.—(Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vallabha follow this explanation of the words 'संप्रसादाद्युपेशात्'. Madhva, however, explains the words to mean 'on account of its being of the nature of unsurpassed bliss and on account of its being declared above all'—which is not reasonable, owing to the absence of 'ca'. Adhik. 3 (sūtras 10-12) teaches that the akṣara (the imperishable one) spoken of in the Brāhmaṇa. III. 8.8. is Brahman. Adhik. 4 (sūtra 13) states that the parah puruṣah (the highest person) to be meditated upon by the syllable *om*, mentioned in Praśnopā. V. 5, is the highest Brahman, because of its being designated as the object of realisation, (ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्) and not the lower Brahman. This is according to Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, however, translate thus—'The object of meditation (iksati-karma) is Brahman (n.) and not Brahman (m.), because it is later designated (vyapadesāt) as the paramātmā. ' Thus the alternatives according to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka are Brahman and Brahmadeva—(जीवसमितिस्योऽप्याधिपतिश्चतुर्मुख तत्सर्वेभ्यः पुरुषोऽन्तमः) and this is natural because the two fold character of Brahman, higher and lower, is not known to them. Vallabha, reads the sūtra just like Śāṅkara, but has the alternatives Paramātmā and Brahmā also—'parapurusaḥ paramātmā dhyānaviśayaḥ aho-svid virātpuruso brahmā vā'. Madhva, reading the sūtra like Śāṅkara explains thus—'In the passage, Chānd. Upa. VI. 2, 3, नक्षेत्र etc., 'Viṣṇu is spoken of, because the mention of the act of seeing (iksati-karma-vyapadeśa) cannot belong to any other'. No doubt Śāṅkara's way of translating the phrase is more natural than that of Rāmānuja for the Sūtra should rather have

been in the form 'इत्यनिकर्म स व्यपदेशात्' if it were to be understood just as Rāmānuja does; though Śaṅkara's reference to the lower Brahman is without sufficient reason, as we shall see later on.

In the next adikarana 5 (Sūtra 14-21), the question is whether the small ether (daharah ākāśah) within the lotus of the heart, mentioned in Chānd. Upa. VIII. 1. 1. is elemental ether, or jīva or Brahman. That it is Brahman is decided owing to the many epithets applied to it subsequently, such as being free from sins etc; and owing to other indicatory marks, such as that all the individual souls are described as giving into it and that it is itself described as being the bridge or the support which prevents these worlds from being confounded. But in subsequent passages, e. g. in Chānd. Upa. VIII. 3. 4, it is the jīva which is spoken of thus—' Now that serene being (lit. complete satisfaction ' Samprasādah ') which after having risen out from this earthly body, and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form; that is the self;—thus said he. And so ' dahara ' may as well denote jīva. The objection is answered in Sūtras 18, 19, 20. Especially Sūtra 19 is very interesting, inasmuch as the different ways of understanding it point back to a fundamental difference in the doctrine. Sūtra 19, literally translated would run thus:—' If it be said that from a subsequent passage, (it appears that the individual soul is meant), it is, however, the one whose true nature has become manifest.' Śaṅkara interprets it to mean that what is referred to in that passage is the individual soul with its true nature no longer obscured by the illusory limiting adjuncts, i. e. is absolutely non-different from Brahman. Here again Śaṅkara adds his usual remark that, in all those places " where a difference between Brahman and jīva is spoken of by the sūtrakāra, he does not mean that the difference is real; his only object is to remove the false notion which attributes the limited nature of jīva to Brahman; and for this purpose, he only takes for granted the popular belief that the two are different. Thus even Śaṅkara in the present case, shows his consciousness of the fact that the Sūtrakāra here refers to a difference between jīva and Brahman. All the other commentators, however, interpret the sūtra to mean that no doubt it is the jīva that

is referred to, but with its true nature manifested, and hence the similarity of epithets ; but even then the jīva cannot be Brahman and so 'dahara' cannot mean jīva. N. has 'पूर्वोक्तागुणयुक्तो नित्यानिर्भावस्वरूपः परमात्मा दहरः । आविभृतस्वरूपो जीवस्तु न'. Madhva also remarks that a difference must be made between the jīva, which when released has his true nature manifested through the favour of Paramātman, and the Paramātman himself, who is indicated by the 'dahara' in a preceding passage. That this second explanation of the sūtra is more natural is clearly stated by Vallabha—'तु शब्देन नायमर्थो दृष्ट्यते किं तु किञ्चिदन्यदस्तीति न नकाप्रयोगः' : here the 'tu' (but) does not refute something, but only says that there is something, else ; hence 'na' (not) is not used (in the sūtra).

The next two sūtras 22-23, form an independent adhikarana according to Śaṅkara (whom Madhva follows also), deciding that 'He after whom everything shines' (Mund. Upa. 2. 2. 10) is not some material luminous body, but Brahman itself. But according to Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vallabha they form part of the preceding adhikarana, giving only additional arguments for understanding 'dahara' to mean 'Paramātman'. It is the imitating jīva that is referred to in the passage with which sūtra 19 concerns ; while the 'dahara' must be the Brahman to be imitated. अनुकर्त्ता प्रजापतिवाक्ये निर्दिष्टः । अनुकर्त्ता व्रह्म दहराकाशः ।

The particle 'ca' in the sūtra 22, no doubt favours Rāmānuja's explanation, as stating something additional to support what precedes ; and Śaṅkara, conscious of this difficulty, has to explain 'ca' as referring to the fourth pāda of the same śloka i. e. 'नस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विमाने'—(by the light of him, everything is lighted), in addition to the first three pādas (Mund. 2. 2. 10 or Kātha, II. 5. 15),—which is not very satisfactory. Rāmānuja gives other reasons also why these two sūtras cannot be taken as a separate adhikarana—'Some maintain that the last two sūtras constitute a separate adhikarana, meant to prove that the text, Mund. Upa. 2. 2. 10, refers to the highest Brahman. This view is, however, inadmissible, for the reason that with regard to the text in question, no purvapakṣa can arise, it having been proved under I. 2. 21 and I. 3. 1 that the whole section, of which that text forms part, is concerned with Brahman and it further having been shown under I. 1. 24 that Brahman is apprehended under the form of light. The

interpretation, moreover, does not fit in with the wording of the sūtras.'

Adhikarana 7 (sūtras 24-25) decides that the being, measured by the thumb (Katha. II. 4. 13), is not the individual soul, but Brahman. And Brahman is described as having the measure of a thumb, because it dwells for the purpose of devout meditation in the heart of the devotee. The heart is of the measure of a thumb and for such meditation men alone are qualified ; so that we are not concerned with the size of the heart of other animals.

The next two adhikaranas (26-33 and 34-38) form a sort of digression, suggested by the preceding adhikarana. The question is whether it is men alone who are qualified for the brahmavidyā. The eighth adhikarana decides that the gods also are qualified for the brahmavidyā and the ninth adhikarana denies this qualification to the Śūdras. Adhikarana 10 (sūtra 39) says that the prāṇa before whom everything trembles (Katha. Upa. II. 6. 2) is Brahman. Adhikarana 11 (sūtra 40) says that the jyotiḥ (light) mentioned in Chānd. Upa. VIII. 12. 3 is Brahman.

Thus sūtras 24-40 form, according to Śaṅkara, five separate adhikaranas. Rāmānuja, however, regards all these as forming one main adhikarana, referring to the 'अङ्गुष्ठमत्रः पुरुषः' . Sūtras 24-25 refer directly to this puruṣa, while sūtras 26-30, 31-33 and 34-38 form three sub-adhikaranas, referring to the qualification of the gods for the brahmavidyā (which forms the devatādhikarana), the madhu-vidyā (forming the madhvādhikarana) and the disqualification of the Śūdras (styled as the apaśudrādhikarana) respectively. Sūtras 39 and 40 state additional reasons for regarding the aṅgustha-māṭra-purusa as Brahman ; for the passages referring to him before whom everything trembles (Katha. Upa. II. 6. 2) and to the primordial light (Katha. II. 5. 15),—both which cannot be anything but Brahman,—occur between the two other passages of the Katha. Upa. (i. e. II. 4. 12 and II. 6. 17) mentioning the aṅgustha-māṭra-purusa. So sūtra 40 is translated by Rāmānuja thus :—(the aṅgustha-māṭra-purusa is Brahman) because a light is seen to be mentioned (in the intervening passage),—which means that he treats jyotirdarśanāt as one compound word,

Nimbārka follows Rāmānuja in regarding all these sūtras (24-40) as one adhikarāṇa (pramitādhikarāṇa).

Madhvā refers sūtra 24 to a passage of the Kaṭha. Upa. 5-3, मध्ये वामवासिनं विश्वदेवा उपासने, and translates it thus :—‘ Viṣṇu is meant or understood (pramita) owing to the direct mention of *vāmanā* which cannot but mean Viṣṇu. Thus Madhvā understands the word *pramita* to mean ‘ known ’ as against others who take it to mean ‘ measured ’. Otherwise Madhvā exactly follows Śāṅkara, in the division of the adhikarāṇa. Vallabha also follows Śāṅkara generally.

Adhikarāṇa 12 (sūtra 41) decides that the ether which reveals names and forms (Chānd. Upa. VIII. 14. 1) is neither the elemental ether, nor the individual soul, but the highest Brahman. The next two sūtras 42-43 form, according to Śāṅkara and Vallabha a separate adhikarāṇa deciding that the *vijñanamaya* (he who consists of knowledge), spoken of in Br̥had. Upa. IV. 3-7, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, however, regard the three sūtras as forming but one adhikarāṇa dealing with the ākāśa in Chānd. Upa. VIII. 14. 1. To the objection that the *jīva* or *pratyagātman* is nothing but the *Paramātman*, owing to many passages teaching their unity and condemning duality and that therefore, the ākāśa may be the *jīva* in its released condition, spoken of in the immediately preceding passage, sūtra 42 replies, ‘ no ; for the *jīva* and *brahman* are spoken of as being distinctly different from each other in the condition of deep sleep in the departure from the body.’ And even in the state of release, the *jīva* can never be non-different from *Brahman*. It is to be noticed that sūtra 42, distinctly speaks of the difference between *Brahman* and *jīva*. And the same passage from the Br̥had. Upa., i. e. IV. 3. 24, is adduced by both Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja as proof. The fact that the word ‘ *vyapadeśat* ’ has to be implied in sūtra 42 seems to be an argument in favour of taking sūtras 42 and 43 as belonging to one and the same adhikarāṇa. Madhvā takes these three sūtras (41, 42 and 43) as forming three different adhikaranas referring to the ākāśa (Chānd. Upa. VIII. 14. 1), the *prājña* (Br̥had. Upa. IV. 3. 21) and to the Lord of all (Br̥had. Upa. VI. 4. 22) respectively, and decides that all these are nothing but the highest Brahman.

ADHYĀYA I, PĀDA 4.

It was shown in I. 1. 5 that the *pradhāna* cannot be the cause of the world, for it finds no support in the scriptures ; and further it was shown that Brahman alone is the subject of the various doubtful passages of the *Upaniṣads* ; still the *Sāṃkhya* comes forth with certain passages in which occur terms most familiar to the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine. The last pāda of the first *Adhyāya* specially aims at showing that such terms cannot but denote something connected with the *Vedānta* doctrine.

The first *adhikarana* (*sūtras* 1-7) establishes that the word *avyakta* (the undeveloped), occurring in *Katha. Upa.* I. 3. 10 and 11, does not denote the *pradhāna*, but the subtle body as well as the gross body viewed as an effect of the subtle body. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka all agree exactly. Madhva, who reads an additional *sūtra* : ' *prakaraṇāt*' between 5 and 6 and who also includes *sūtra* 8 in this *adhikarana*, tries to show that the *avyakta* denotes *Viṣṇu* and he interprets *sūtra* 4 ज्ञेयत्वावचनम् differently from the rest. According to all except Madhva, the *sūtra* means that the *avyakta* cannot be the *pradhāna* ; for if it had been the *pradhāna*, *jñeyatva* (or being the object of knowledge) should have been predicated of it, since according to the *Sāṃkhyas* it is the knowledge of the *pradhāna* that leads to *Mokṣa*. But as it is not so predicated, the *avyakta* can mean only something else. Madhva understands it to mean that the *avyakta* denotes *Viṣṇu*, because *jñeyatva* can never be mentioned of anything but *Viṣṇu*. According to Vallabha, the *avyakta* in the passage in question denotes the grace of the Lord, which is also identical with the Lord himself or with the Brahman that is subtle.

Adhikarana 2 (*sūtras* 8-10) shows that the tricoloured unborn one (*tri-rūpa aja*) in *Śvet. Upa.* IV. 5 cannot be the *pradhāna* or *prakṛti* of the *Sāṃkhyas*, but it is ' *jyotiṛupakramā*' the causal matter of the world, consisting of the three elements of light, water and earth, (instead of the three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, as the *Sāṃkhyas* would say) or it is the divine power of Brahman which creates this causal matter. And the term ' *aja*' (goat) is only a metaphorical description, a ' *kalpana*' . Rāmānuja and Nimbārka have the same general purport for the

adhikarāṇa, but, in accordance with their doctrine, the aja more particularly means 'the sūksma-cid-acid-vastu' the intelligent and material world in its subtle condition which forms the very body of the Paramātman. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, however, explain the words 'jyotirupakramā' in sūtra 9 and 'kalpanā' in sūtra 10 to mean 'produced from Brahman' (brahma-kāraṇīka) 'and creation respectively. If it be asked how the aja be called produced from Brahman' and at the same time 'unborn', the reply is that it refers to the creation, e. g. in वाना यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् Rv. X. 190. 3—(the creator created just as before). Rāmānuja also takes great pains to refute the explanations of the words as given by Śaṅkara. Vallabha generally follows Śaṅkara, though he reads sūtra 9 as 'ज्योतिः उपक्रमान् &c.': the aja is jyotiḥ i. e. the first creation of Brahman, owing to the statement at the commencement of the passage'. Madhva, however, who also reads sūtra 9 just in the same way as Vallabha, interprets the adhikarāṇa to mean that the words denoting karman, i. e. sacrifices like the jyotiṣṭoma, also denote none but Viṣṇu,—an interpretation which is the natural consequence of the way how he has explained the preceding adhikarāṇa.

Adhikarāṇa 3 (sūtras 11–13) according to all the commentators decides that the 'पञ्च पञ्चजन्यः' in Brhad. IV. 4. 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Sāṃkhya, but the five prāṇas.

Adhikarāṇa 4 (sūtras 14–15) asserts that there is no contradiction whatsoever in regarding Brahman, whose essence is intelligence, being the cause of the world. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka have the same general purport, but they connect the adhikarāṇa more directly with the subject matter of the preceding part of the pāda, i. e. the refutation of the Sāṃkhya. The cause is sometimes called sat, sometimes asat or avyākṛta, says the Sāṃkhya; so it must be the pradhāna and the willing (ikṣana) represents metaphorically 'the being ready to create of the pradhāna.' No, says the Vedānta, even the word *asat* means Brahman and it is so called only with regard to the vyākṛta or the gross world, endowed with name and form; and it does not mean absolute non-existence. Śaṅkara, however, followed by Vallabha, thinking that the refutation of the Sāṃkhya is over, connects this adhikarāṇa with

the general question of the samanvaya of the Vedic texts and decides that although there may be contradiction among the texts regarding the order of the creation, there is no such contradiction regarding Brahman being the cause of the world; and so the samanvaya need not be called into question. Madhva, explaining sūtra 14 just in the same way as Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, sees, however, a new adikarana in sūtra 15, which he interprets to mean thus:—‘ even though all words ultimately denote the Paramatman or Viṣṇu, still they may, at the same time, denote other objects in the world, by being secondarily transferred to them: , परस्य वाचकाः शब्दाः समाकृष्टेतरेष्वपि । व्यवहित्यन्ते भनतं लोकवेदानुसारतः ॥

Adhikarana 5 (sūtras 16-18), according to Śaṅkara and Vallabha, proves that ‘ he who is the maker of those persons, of whom all this is the work,’ mentioned in Kaus. Upa. IV. 19 is neither the vital air nor the individual soul, but the Brahman. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, who agree in the general purport, however, bring it more directly in relation to the refutation of the Śāmkhyas, who see in this passage the purusa.

Adhikarana 6 (sūtras 19-22) demonstrates that the ‘ self to be seen, to be heard, etc.’ in Brhad. Upa, II. 4. 5, is not the individual soul, but the Highest Self. In this also, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka see a refutation of the Śāmkhyas according to whom the ‘ puruṣa ’ is spoken of in the passage. This adhikarana is important, because it raises the question how it is that while the passage आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति (every thing is dear for the pleasure of the self) is referred to the jiva, the subsequent passage आत्मनस्तु विज्ञानेन सर्वं विज्ञातं भवति (by knowledge of the Self, everything becomes known) is to be maintained as referring to the Brahman ; and three different views are stated under the names of Āśmarathyā, Audulomi and Kāśakṛtsna, the last representing the siddhānta. Sūtra 22, however, containing the view of Kāśakṛtsna is interpreted differently. According to Śaṅkara it means ‘ because (the Highest Self) exists in the condition, ‘ *avasthiteh* ’ (of the individual soul); i. e. because the Highest Self only is that which appears as the individual soul, which is evident from such a passage as ‘ let me enter into them with this living self and evolve names and forms ’. This implies an absolute identity of

the *jīva* and Brahman. According to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, however, the word ' *avasthiteḥ* ' means 'on account of (Brahman's) abiding (within the individual soul,) i. e. the words denoting the *jīva* are applied to Brahman, because Brahman abides as its self within the individual soul, which thus constitutes Brahman's body (cf. ' he who dwelling within the self etc., whose body the self is etc. ' Bṛhad. Upa. 1 III. 7. 22. Thus Rāmānuja and Nimbārka refer to the *Antarayāmin* ' the ruler within ', implying a real difference of individuality between Brahman and *jīva*. Vallabha explains the word *avasthiti* to mean *arasthā* and says that the *jīva* is only an *avasthā* (condition) of *bhagavān* and hence the words denoting the *jīva* are applied to Brahman, thus referring to his doctrine of pure monism (without the help of *māyā*). It is difficult to say which of these meanings of the word ' *avasthiti* ' is the most natural; or very probably the advocate of this view, not having in view any definite solution of the problem, used a general word to explain the relation between Brahman and the *jīva*.

Adhikarana 7 (sūtras 23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the operative or efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) of the world, but the material cause (*upādāna* or *prakṛti*) as well. Here again Rāmānuja takes this as a special refutation of the *Seśvara-Śāṅkhya*, according to whom, the *īśvara* is only the operative cause; while the *pradhāna* is the independent material cause. Vallabha follows Śaṅkara. Here the world ' *parināmāt* ' in sūtra 26. is most important; for it is distinctly applied to the *vivarta* (superimposition) doctrine held by Śaṅkara.

The last sūtra 28 of the pāda is explained by Śaṅkara and Vallabha thus: the refutation of the Śāṅkhya view can be and is applied *mutatis mutandis* to other doctrines also, such as the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka however translate it thus: all the passages of the Vedānta text are explained as referring to Brahman and Brahman alone. These two modes of translating this last sūtra are very surprising; indeed, in view of the fact that Śaṅkara has nothing to do with Śāṅkhya doctrine in the preceding four adhikaranas (sūtras 14-27); while Rāmānuja connects them as a rule, with the refutation of one or other point in the Śāṅkhya

doctrine. Śaṅkara is, no doubt, inconsistent with himself in not referring about half of the pāda to the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, though in introducing the pāda he remarks that this pāda has for its special aim, the demonstration that certain words and passages claimed by the Sāṃkhyas as supporting their doctrine can really speaking only refer to certain things connected with the Vedānta doctrine. On the other hand Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, following him, have uniformly directed the whole of the pāda against the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine.

Madhva differing from all the rest, sees in this pāda an attempt to show that all words without exception ultimately denote Viṣṇu; and from this point of view, he has consistently interpreted all the sūtras. Sūtras (15-22) form one adhikarana and are explained consistently with the sūtra 15 explained above. Thus the use of words to denote the world by objects as opposed to Viṣṇu is due to the popular usage and it has nothing to do with the Śāstra; and thus there is no inconsistency at all; for all words denote Viṣṇu esoterically; while at the same time, they may denote worldly objects exoterically (sūtra 16). Since an object may be denoted by words referring to Viṣṇu, all objects being dependent on and owing their existence to Viṣṇu, the jīva and the chief vital air also may be denoted by words referring to Viṣṇu, owing to the three-foldness of Upāsanā (see above I. 1. 31) (sūtra 17). All the following sūtras are explained by him in the same strain. Thus for instance, the three sūtras 20, 21 and 22 give the different views regarding the reasons why words refer to actions in the first instance and to Viṣṇu ultimately, Kāśakṛtsna's view being that words denote the worldly objects, because everything is in Paramātman, is supported by and rests in Viṣṇu (avasthitēh). Sūtras (23-27) form another adhikarana, proving that the word 'prakṛti' and all other similar words mean Viṣṇu ultimately. Sūtra 28 finishes the topic by asserting that all words (like śūnya, abhāva, etc.)* may be explained or derived as meaning

* Madhva derives the words 'śūnya' and 'abhāva' so as to mean Viṣṇu:—‘कौं कन्तं कुरुते असौ शून्यः’ i. e. he who makes the pleasure of others inferior to his own' and 'नेत्र भावयितुं योग्यः अतो भावं वदन्त्येनम्' i. e. 'he is not capable of being thought of and hence is called abhāva.'

Viṣṇu. According to Madhva, thus, the whole of this pāda serves one purpose, viz. to demonstrate that all words, like avyakta, aja, prakṛti and what not, ultimately refer to Viṣṇu. Thus Madhva's interpretation, though standing by itself, and rather fanciful in some cases, has the merit of consistency, in that it strictly takes its stand on *Samanvaya*, the title of the first adhyāya.

ADHYĀYA II, PĀDA I.

After having established in the first Adhyāya that all the Vedānta passages aim at the intelligent Brahman being the cause of the universe and that no passages support the Sāṃkhya doctrine, the Sūtrakāra next proceeds to answer objections against the doctrine of Brahman, based on the grounds of smṛtis or speculative reasoning. The first adhikarana (sūtras 1-2) of the last pāda of the second adhyāya answers the objections that the acceptance of the Vedānta doctrine involves the rejection of certain smṛtis, such as that of Kapila, which preach the Sāṃkhya doctrine, by saying that the acceptance of the Sāṃkhya doctrine would in its turn involve the rejection of many other smṛtis, such as that of Manu, which preach the doctrine of Brahman. And when two Smṛtis disagree, that alone is to be accepted which is in conformity with the Smṛti; no support whatsoever can be found in Śruti for the Kapilasmṛti. All agree as regards the general purport of the adhikarana. But sūtra 2 is explained differently. According to Śaṅkara and Vallabha it means 'because other principles of the Sāṃkhyas, such as mahat etc. are not found in Smṛti, nor in Veda nor in the popular belief.' According to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka it means 'because, in other Smṛtis like those of Manu, the doctrine of the pradhāna is not found,' which involves a repetition of a part of the first sūtra. Madhva explains it to mean 'other Smṛtis are not authoritative, because other things such as the fruits etc. spoken of in these Smṛtis, are not experienced directly,' which is not satisfactory. Adhikarana 2 (sūtra 3) applies the same argument to the Yoga doctrine.

In adhikarana 3 (sūtras 4-11), the objection that Brahman which is intelligent cannot be the cause of the world which is non-intelligent is answered by pointing out instances of dissimilar causes and effects, e. g. the cowdung and the scorpion produced from it, etc. Nor can Brahman be soiled or rendered impure by the

effect being merged into it, the cause. And reasoning pure and simple will not do in such supersensuous, purely metaphysical matters owing to the diversity of the judgment of different *savants*, who all claim to be equally infallible. All except Madhva agree in this general purport of the Adhikarana. Sūtra 7, however, is explained differently. According to Śaṅkara it means 'if it be objected that the effect is non-existent before its production, we do not allow that, because it is a mere negation (without any object to be negated)'. For, as a matter of fact, the effect always exists, whether before or after its origination, through and in the form of the cause itself. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka explain it thus:—The effect cannot be said to be non-existing; because what the preceding sūtra has laid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule demanding that cause and effect should be of the same nature; it was not asserted that the effect is a thing altogether different and separate from the cause. Vallabha on the other hand says—'if it be said that even the *asat* is spoken of as being the cause, in Śruti, we reply, no; for the mention is made only to deny that something non-existing can be the cause, e. g. in 'कथं असतः सज्जायेत्, how can *sat* be produced from *asati*? ' It is to be noticed that this adhikarana rests entirely upon the doctrine of *parināma* and the instances quoted in commenting on sūtra 6 by all including Śaṅkara are such as lend support to *parināma*; and none implies the idea of *vivarta*. Here also it is to be noted that it is the Śāṅkhya doctrine of the similarity of cause and effect and the supposition that the *pradhāna* consists of the three qualities in order to account for their existence in the world which is intended to be rebutted. Adhikarana 4 (sūtra 12) says that the same line of reasoning may be directed against other doctrines, like that of the atoms etc.

Madhva, however, puts rather a different interpretation on sūtra (4-12.) In sūtra 4, forming an adhikarana by itself, he shows that the śruti and the smṛti following it, which are eternal and free from faults, are quite different in character from other sources of proof and so their *prāmāṇya* must not be questioned on the ground of the fruit not being immediately perceived. Sūtras 5 and 6, forming another adhikarana, answer the objection that the Veda is opposed to reasoning, because it describes the earth as speaking (e.g. 'मृद अब्रवित्'), which is impossible, by saying that it is the

sentient deities that are meant here; and that they have a special power which is seen only by great beings ('इत्यते च' instead of 'इत्यते तु' which is the reading of all others). Sūtras (7-12) forming an adhikarana prove that the mention of *asat* as the cause of the world does not involve any contradiction, since it is only meant for denying that *asat* can be the cause. And even in pralaya, the non-existence (*asattva*) of the world and its cause is contrary to reason; for, instances can be given in favour of *sattva*, but none in favour of *asattva*. Nor can we resort to another mode of reasoning than this; for in that manner, mokṣa and the other things, admitted to be true so far, will have to be given up. In the same way, i. e. owing to the presence of favourable instances and the absence of unfavourable instances, all other doctrines not accepted by Śruti can be repudiated.

Sūtra 13, which comes next and forms adhikarana 5, is very interesting, since each commentator has his own peculiar way of interpreting it. According to Śaṅkara, it teaches that although the enjoying souls (bhokṭṛ) and the object of enjoyment (bhogya) are really non-different from Brahman, still they will not necessarily be identical with each other, i. e. their mutual distinction may at the same time be maintained; just as, for instance, in the world the waves and ripples, though all non-different from the sea, still preserve their mutual distinction. Vallabha strictly follows Śaṅkara, though he takes another instance, i. e. that of the bracelet and the ear-ring, both being non-different from gold, at the same time, being individually distinguished from one another. He also prefaches his explanation by saying 'कारणं दोषं परिहृत्य कार्यदेष्वाहित्यम्' 'so far the objections regarding the cause were removed; now we proceed to remove those with regard to the effect (i. e. the world consisting of enjoying souls and the objects of enjoyment)'.

Rāmānuja, however, translates the sūtra thus:—'If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer there follows non-distinction (of Brahman and jīva); we reply, it may be as in ordinary life'. If the cit and acit, whether in a suitable or gross condition, form the body of Brahman, then Brahman being as much embodied as the jīva, would like him, be also an enjoyer; so the difference of nature between Īśvara and jīva (i. e. that one is the en-

joyer, while the other is not) would no longer be possible. No, we reply, it would be possible, because bhoktṛtvā, 'being an enjoyer', is not due to mere sa-śarīratva 'having a body', but to karma-vāsyatva 'being subject to merit and demerit.' And we see in the world that a king, though an embodied being just like his servants, does not experience their pleasure and pain.

Nimbāraka very similarly explains thus: If Brahman is the cause of the world, then Brahman, in the form of jīva would have to be the experiencer of pleasure and pain; and so the distinction between Brahman and jīva that Brahman is *niyantṛ*, 'the controller,' and jīva is the bhoktṛ, 'the enjoyer,' would no longer be possible. The reply is that it would be possible simultaneously with the non-difference of Brahman and jīva, just as, for instance, the sea and the wave, or the sun and the lustre, are both non-different and different.

According to Madhvā, the sūtra teaches thus: If the individual soul (bhoktṛ), when released, is described as being one with the Highest Self, so that there is non-difference between the two, then, even before release, we shall have to admit a similar non-difference; for, that which is once different can never be non-different. The reply is that the released soul, though being one with the highest self, still continues to preserve its difference, just as one mass of water mixed with another becomes apparently one, but is really different and not the same, as is proved, for instance, by the increase in the volume of the water.

The difference of interpretation mainly turns on the translation of the word *bhoktrāpatti*. Śāmkara and Vallabha take it to mean 'the bhoktṛ becoming bhogya and the bhogya becoming bhoktṛ'; Rāmānuja and Nibārka, 'Brahman being the bhoktṛ' and Madhvā, 'the bhoktṛ being Brahman.' Now it is quite evident that the first translation is not natural. The Sūtrakāra would rather have said 'इरितरभवापत्तेः' or 'भोक्तुमोग्यापत्तेः'. And moreover, the question of the difference or non difference between bhoktṛ and bhogya seems to be rather out of place, inspite of the explanation given by Vallabha. For, we expect something regarding the relation between cause and effect (and this is the subject of the following sūtra also); and the question regarding the relation between Brahman and the

material world being already disposed of in the third adhikarana, the Sūtrakāra would naturally occupy himself with its sequel, i. e. the relation between Brahman and jīva as cause and effect. Also the illustration of the wave and ripple and the sea does not quite fit in with the bhoktr̄, the bhogya and the brahman; for the relation between bhoktr̄ and bhogya cannot bear comparison with that between a wave and a ripple or that between a bracelet and an ear-ring. And how is it conceivable that one who held the doctrine of absolute monism should devote a separate adhikarana to the establishing of the difference between bhoktr̄ and bhogya? And as usual, Śaṅkara comes forth with his explanation that what this sūtra has to say does not refer to the highest verity, but only to the popular conception.

Madhva explains the sūtra so as to establish his doctrine of absolute difference between Brahman and jīva; but his way of taking the word 'bhoktrāpatteḥ' is far from satisfactory; and moreover, his reference to the released condition of the individual soul makes the adhikarana more appropriate in the *phalādhyāya*; and Madhva himself, conscious of this, tries to show the propriety of the adhikarana in the present pāda which deals with a-virodha or the removal of contradictions: 'फलाद्ये अपि युक्तिविरोधे अन्तर्भावाद्व्रोक्तम्'.

Rāmānuja's way of taking the word 'bhoktrāpatteḥ' is the most natural; and the question he refers to is also quite in place here. He also quotes the authority of the Dramida-bhāṣyakāra in support of his view, and, before concluding, tries to show the unreasonableness of Śaṅkara's way of interpretation, by remarking that no one ever doubts the difference or non-difference between bhogya and bhoktr̄, whatever be the relation between Brahman and the Universe as cause and effect.

The same remarks may be made about Nimbārka's explanation, though he tries to bring out more clearly his doctrine of 'bhedābheda'.

Adhikarana 6 (sūtras 14-20) states according to all except Madhva the Vedānta-doctrine of the non-difference between cause and effect, which is opposed to the Vaiśeṣika view according to which the effect is something new created from the cause.

But this non-difference itself is interpreted by the different commentators according to their respective doctrines. Thus Śaṅkara thinks that the non-difference of cause and effect means that the cause alone is the reality ; while the effect is mere delusion ; something super-imposed upon the cause. Brahman alone therefore is the reality ; while the universe, both intelligent and non-intelligent, is only illusory (*vivarta*). Rāmānuja thinks that the effect is only a modification of the cause (*parināma*) ; thus Brahman with the cit and the acit in their subtle condition as body is the cause, which sometimes transforms itself into the effect, Brahman with the cit and the acit in their gross condition as body. Nimbārka explains ‘ *ananytva* ’ as ‘ *na atyantabhinnatva* ’ ‘ not absolute difference ’ and holds that the effect is both different and non-different from the cause. Vallabha maintains a non-difference without any reference to *māyā*. The passage, expressly referred to in *sūtra* 14, is that ‘ which contains the word—‘ *ārambhaṇa* ’—‘ *वाचारम्भणं विकरो नामदेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सम्बन्धः* ’ (*Chānd.* VI. 1. 1. All depends upon how the word ‘ *vācārambhanam* ’ is understood. Śaṅkara translates it thus—‘ the modification (i. e. the effect, the thing made of clay) is a name merely, which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely.’ Thus he deduces the doctrine of *mithyātva*, the unreality of all effects, Brahman alone being real. Rāmānuja translates it thus—‘ on account of speech (i. e. for the sake of the accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water etc., which are preceded by speech) the clay takes an effect (form) and a name ; they all (the things made of clay) are clay, this only is true ’, i. e. the substance clay itself receives a new configuration and a new name.

A little consideration will show us that Śaṅkara’s interpretation is open to the objection that the two words ‘ *vācārambhanam* ’ and ‘ *nāmadheyam* ’ convey the same idea and are almost synonyms, so that one of the words is superfluous ; whereas, according to Rāmānuja the two words convey two distinct ideas. ‘ *Nāmadheyam* ’ means ‘ name ’ as opposed to ‘ form ’ ; while ‘ *vācārambhanam* ’ means ‘ having nothing but a practical purpose in view,’ the idea being that the products of clay, for instance, are clay, with the difference, however, that they can serve a practical purpose, which clay in itself cannot.

The illustration of clay and its products is distinctly in favour of the *parināma-vāda* and makes it difficult to deduce the *vivartavāda*. *Vallabha* very aptly makes some scathing remarks against those who deduce the doctrine of the unreality of all products from the *Upaniṣad* passage in question, which is quite against the spirit of the whole section and which is not supported at all by the wording of the *sūtra* before us. *Rāmānuja* also criticises *Śaṅkara*'s explanation. To the same conclusion lead the two illustrations in the *sūtras* 19 and 20. The effect is non-different from the cause just as a piece of cloth is non-different from the threads etc. of which it is made, or just as the different vital airs performing different functions and as such receiving different names are none but the vital air. All this only supports the *parināmavāda* and cannot, even by the highest stretch of imagination, be made to favour the *vivartavāda*.

Madhvā, on the other hand, interprets the *adhikarana* differently. According to him the question is whether Brahman wants the help of *Kāraṇas* or instruments like ordinary agents in this world. The reply is that *Īśvara* creates the world without the help of any other instrument (*ananyatvam*) as is seen from *Rgveda* X. 81. 2, in which all instruments etc., are denied. 'किं स्विद्यारम्भणम्,' etc. And if there had been any such instruments they might have been known or demonstrated in the *Vedas*; but as a matter of fact they are not. The remaining *sūtras* of the *adhikarana* are also interpreted by him in the same strain. It is quite evident that the topic is irrelevant in the present place.

Adhikarana 7 (*sūtras* 21-23) answers the objection that if Brahman and *jīva* are exactly identical, as evidently follows from such passages as 'tat tvam asi' etc., then the Lord would be open to such faults as not always doing what is good and he would be also subject to the miseries of the worldly existence, by saying that Brahman is something over and above and superior to *jīva*, because their difference is clearly and explicitly stated as in *Bṛhad. Upa.* II. 4. 5 'the self is to be seen, to be heard etc.' and elsewhere (*Chānd. Upa.* VIII. 7. 1, *Bṛhad. Up.* IV. 3. 35). This *adhikarana* leaves not the slightest doubt that according to the *sūtrakāra*, the *jīva* and the Brahman cannot be absolutely non-different as understood by *Śaṅkara*; and one can easily see that *Śaṅkara*

was conscious of this, since he comes forth with his usual explanation that the difference, maintained in sūtra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts. On the other hand, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vallabha simply follow the words of the sūtras, of which sūtra 21 formulates the objection, while sūtra 22 states the reply. Sūtra 23 is explained by Śaṅkara to mean that the objections raised by others cannot be established, because the case is analogous to that of stones etc., i. e. just as some stones are worthless and others are very precious, though all are alike stones, in the same way one and the same Brahman may perform different kinds of functions (तदनुपपत्तिः = परकात्प्रियतदेवापानुपपत्तिः). Rāmānuja, however, explains thus :—‘ just as the material world or acit, (of which stones are a type) can never be absolutely identical with Paramātman in the same way, the jīva or cit can never be absolutely identical with the Paramātman (तदनुपपत्तिः = इतरव्यपदेशानुपपत्तिः). Nimbārka has :—‘ the jīva though non-different from Brahman is at the same time, individually different, just like adamant, diamond etc., which are all modifications of the element earth (prthivi). ’ Vallabha interprets somewhat similarly to Śaṅkara. It is difficult to say which of these interpretations is more natural than others, still sūtra 22 ‘ अथिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् ’ decides the purport of the adhikarana beyond doubt.

Adhikarana 8 (sūtras 24–25) affirms, according to all except Madhva, that Brahman can create the world by its mere will, without the employment of other external instruments, just as gods can do ; and just as milk can, of itself, turn into curds. Adhikarana 9 (sūtras 26–29) teaches that Brahman can create the world, without entirely passing over into it, and at the same time remaining one and undivided ; for it is so stated expressly in the scriptures. Adhikarana 10 (sūtras 30–31) says that Brahman, although unassisted by other means, can create the world, by virtue of its manifold wondrous powers. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka regard sūtras 26–31 as forming one adhikarana, though they agree with Śaṅkara as regards their general purport. However, Śaṅkara would explain this sort of the creation of the world, by its illusory character ; while Rāmānuja would say that the creation of the world means merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle,

imperceptible condition. Vallabha explains the creation as being possible through the unfathomable greatness and the incomprehensible powers (*aiśvarya*) of Brahman in which all sorts of opposites are possible.

Adhikarana 11 (sūtras 32-33) states that Brahman in creating the world has no purpose but mere sport. Adhikarāṇa 12 (sūtras 34-36) says that Brahman cannot be laid open to the charges of cruelty and partiality owing to the unequal fortunes of the beings in this world and the universal suffering ; for Brahman acts only with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls ; and this succession of merit and demerit and their corresponding consequences, i. e. this *Saṁsāra*, is without beginning. Adhikarāṇa 13 (sūtra 37) finishes the pāda by declaring that all the qualities, such as omniscience or omnipotence, are possible in Brahman and thus make it capable of the creation of the world. Vallabha, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka agree as regards the interpretation, although Rāmānuja regards sūtras (32-37) as forming one adhikarana.

Madhva, on the other hand, regards sūtras (21-26) as forming one adhikarāṇa, whose object is to refute the view that *jīva* is an independent creator of the universe. If the *jīva* were such an independent agent, he should always do what is good and never do what is bad ; but as a matter of fact, the case is quite the contrary ; therefore, *jīva* cannot be an independent agent (21). Parameśvara, on the other hand, is possessed of superior powers and therefore no such faults are possible in his case (22). And the *jīva*, even though intelligent like Parameśvara, cannot possibly be the maker of the world, because he is dependent and not a master of himself, just like the non-intelligent stones etc. (23). If it be said that this denial of *kartṛtva* to *jīva* is not right, because he is seen to finish or put an end to things, we reply, that even in this he is dependent on Īśvara (24). Īśvara, though unseen, can be the maker just like gods and goblins etc. (25). Moreover, if *jīva* is the maker, either he should exert his whole strength entirely in every little thing,—but this is not seen,—or he should exert himself only partially,—but that would contradict his being one without parts. For all these reasons *jīva* cannot be an independent creator (26).

Sūtras (27-31) form another adhikarana which says that no similar objections can be brought against the Parameśvara being the independent creator ; for his kartr̄tva is based on śruti (27). And Parameśvara does possess marvellous and manifold powers (28). And all the objections raised above can be applicable only to jīva but not to Īśvara (29). Īśvara is moreover possessed of all powers (without exception) (30). Nor can the objection on the ground of the absence of helping instruments be raised, because such absence is admitted by the scriptures. The remaining sūtras of the pāda are divided into adhikaranas and interpreted just in the same way as is done by Śaṅkara.

ADHYĀYA II, PĀDA 2.

In the second pāda of the second adhyāya, the Sūtrakāra proceeds to refute the philosophical theories regarding the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedānt view, by means of speculative argument, independent of passages from the scriptures. Adhikarana 1 (sūtras 1-10) is, according to all except Madhvā, directed against the Sāṃkhyas and goes to prove that a non-intelligent cause like the pradhāna cannot possibly create or proceed with any activity without the guidance of an intelligent being. The secoud sūtra means according to Śaṅkara and Nimbārka that ' the pradhāna cannot be the cause, because of the impossibility of activity, thus implying the word ' anupapatteḥ ' from the first sūtra. Rāmānuja has : ' because a non-intelligent cause is seen to be inactive ' when guided by an intelligent being (तज्ज्ञानाविष्टितस्य कार्यरभ्यप्रवृत्तेऽकर्षनात्). Sūtra 4 is also interpreted differently by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Vallabha ; but the differences are of no material importance. At the end of this adhikarana, Rāmānuja remarks that the doctrine of the nirviśeṣa Brahman is even more unreasonable than the Sāṃkhya doctrine, in that the latter admits of a plurality of souls to account for births and deaths ; while the māyāvādins do not even admit that.

Madhvā regards sūtras (1-4) as forming one adhikarana refuting the niriśvara-sāṃkhyas, sūtra 5 as another adhikarana refuting the Sesvara-sāṃkhyas, sūtra 6 as the third adhikarana, levelled against the cārvākas, sūtras (7-8) as the fourth adhikarana, denying the activity of the primordial matter as being subordinate to the puruṣa (पुरुषोपसर्जनप्रकृतिकर्त्तुत) and sūtras (9-10) as forming

the fifth adhikarāṇa, directed against the activity of the puruṣa being subordinate to the primordial matter (प्रकृत्युपर्सर्जनपुरुषकर्तृत्व).

The next sūtra (11) forms an adhikarāṇa by itself according to Śaṅkara, who sees in it a reply to the objection raised by the Vaiśeṣika against the doctrine of the intelligent Brahman being the cause of the universe. Just as a binary atomic compound differs in its dimensions from the cause, the atoms, in the same way the world may be produced from Brahman and may not possess all its qualities. Sūtras 12-17 form an adhikarāṇa refuting the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas, according to whom the world is created from atoms set in motion by the adr̥ṣṭa. According to all the other commentators, however, sūtras 11-17 form one adhikarāṇa directed against the Vaiśeṣikas, sūtra 11 meaning that the whole of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine is unreasonable, just like the production of the binary and tertiary atomic compounds from the atoms and binary atomic compounds respectively, though they differ in dimensions; and this appears, no doubt a more reasonable procedure than that of Śaṅkara; for in the midst of the refutation of the several doctrines, opposed to the Vedānta, with which the entire pāda is occupied, it is rather awkward to understand one solitary sūtra as answering an objection raised against the Vedānta-doctrine, especially on the ground of the vilakṣanatva or the difference of nature between cause and effect, a point which has been sufficiently thrashed in the preceding pāda.

Sūtras (18-32) are directed against the Bauddhas who can be distinguished either as bāhyāthavādins or sarvāstitva-vādins (Realists), according to whom both material objects and their cognitions are real, or as vijñāna-vādins or yogācāras (Idealists), who hold that ideas only are real and that external objects apart from their cognitions have no independent existence, or as śūnyavādins (Nihilists) according to whom everything is void or unreal. According to Śaṅkara and Vallabha, sūtras 18-27 are directed against the Realists, and sūtras (28-32) against the Idealists, the last sūtra (32) being a general condemnation of the Bauddha doctrine as a whole. Both Śaṅkara and Vallabha remark that the Sūtrakāra did not care to refute the Nihilists, as their doctrine is, on the face of it, contrary to all reason, Vallabha also adding that a nihilist is as absurd as a māyāvādin. Rāmānuja

and Nimbārka agree with Śaṅkara in all points except that they regard this last sūtra as directed against the Nihilists. Madhva regards sūtras 18-25 as directed against the Realists, sūtras 26-29 against the Nihilists and sūtras 30-32 against the Idealists. Owing to the peculiar nature of the sūtras, it is not possible to decide exactly which sūtras refute which particular school of the Bauddhas, though Prof. Stcherbatskoi holds that the Buddhist doctrine referred to in the sūtras is the vijñānavāda and Prof. Jacobi that it is the śūnyavāda,* not to speak of the fact that what is a refutation of the idealist (e. g. proving the existence of external objects) may as well be a refutation of the nihilist. The truth of this may be illustrated by noting here some of the sūtras which have been interpreted differently. Thus sūtra 26 'न अस्तः अदृष्टत्वात्' is explained by Śaṅkara, Vallabha and Nimbārka to mean that an entity cannot spring from a non-entity on account of this being not observed, whereas the Bauddhas who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven to maintain that an entity springs from a non-entity. Rāmānuja, who directs the sūtra against the sautrāntika Bauddha† in particular, maintaining that a thing can become an object of cognition, even though not in actual existence at the time of the cognition, interprets it thus : 'The special forms of cognition such as blue colour etc. cannot be the forms of things that have perished and therefore are not in being, since this is not observed. For it is never observed that when a substrate of attributes has perished, its attributes pass over into another thing.' Madhva directing the sūtra against the Nihilist explains it to mean that a non-entity (śūnya) cannot be the cause, because, it is never so observed. So also sūtra 28, according to Śaṅkara, Nimbārka and Vallabha, means that the non-existence of external things cannot be maintained, on account of our consciousness of them. According to Rāmānuja it means: The non-existence of things apart from ideas cannot be maintained, because we are conscious of cognitions as something that renders the knowing subject capable of thought and intercourse with regard to particular things'. According to Madhva, who directs the sūtra

* Journal Am. Or. Society, Vol. 31.

† The Realistic Bauddhas are of two kinds,—Sautrāntikas, who hold that external objects are only inferrable, and the Vaibhāṣikas, according to whom they are also perceptible.

against the Nihilists, it means : ' It should not be said that the world itself is a void (Śūnya), for we actually see it.' Sūtra 30, according to Śaṅkara, Nimbārka and Vallabha, maintains the impossibility of the existence of mental impressions in the absence of the perception of external objects ; while according to Rāmānuja, it maintains the impossibility of the existence of mere cognitions devoid of corresponding things, owing to our never perceiving cognitions not referring to a cognising object. Madhva, directing the sūtra against the idealist, explains it to mean that the world cannot be mere idea or thought, because of the absence of such a consciousness in us.

The next adhikarana (sūtras 33-36) contains a refutation of the Jaina doctrine and sūtras 37-41, forming a single adhikarana, are directed against the Pāśupatas, according to whom Īśvara is only the operating or efficient cause of the universe, but not its material cause.

The last adhikarana of the pāda (sūtras 42-45) refers to the Pañcarātra or Bhāgavata doctrine. According to Śaṅkara and Vallabha, this is also refuted just like the other doctrines in the rest of the pāda. According to Rāmānuja, however, the first two sūtras only of the adhikarana (42-43) contain objections against the doctrine in question ; but the last two sūtras (44-45) refute those objections and ultimately establish the Bhāgavata doctrine, which is, thus, the doctrine held by the Śūtrakāra. Nimbārka agreeing neither with Śaṅkara nor with Rāmānuja, regards the adhikarana as a refutation of the Śakti doctrine, according to which, the Śakti, independent of the intelligent being, can create the world. Madhva also follows Nimbārka.

To come to the meaning of the sūtras individually, Śaṅkara commences by remarking that the Bhāgavata doctrine deserves our acceptance, so far as it holds that Īśvara is both the efficient and material cause of the Universe. So also when it says that the one holy Vāsudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and that he, dividing himself in four parts, appears in four forms as Vāsudeva (denoting the Highest Self), Saṁkarsaṇa (individual soul), Pradyumna (the mind), and Aniruddha (the principle of egoism), we have nothing to object. But when it

further adds that Saṁkarṣaṇa springs from Vāsudeva, Pradyumna from Saṁkarṣaṇa, and Aniruddha from Pradyumna, we must take exception to it. For it is impossible that the individual soul would spring from the Highest Self, which would make the former non-eternal (42); nor is it observed that the instrument (i. e. the mind) is produced from the agent (i. e. the individual soul, 43). Or even if it be said that in consequence of their being endowed with knowledge, glory, ruling capacity etc., Saṁkarṣaṇa and others are really all Lords, all Vāsudevas, free from faults, and without any imperfections, still the objection raised above remains uncontradicted (44). And moreover, the Bhāgavata doctrine cannot be accepted owing to there being many contradictions in the doctrine itself and owing to its containing many passages contradictory of the Vedas (e. g. ' not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas, Śāṇḍilya studied this Sāstra '). Vallabha follows Saṁkara except in sūtra 44, where 'न अप्तिषेधत्' is explained by him to mean 'इत्यग्नां अप्तिषेधत्' i. e. because of the plurality of lords—which is unreasonable—remaining uncontradicted.

Rāmānuja, however, translating the first two sūtras just like Saṁkara, explains sūtra 44 thus :—'or if they are of the nature of that which is knowledge and so on, there is no contradiction of that (i. e. the Bhāgavata doctrine).' What the doctrine really means is that Saṁkarṣaṇa etc., are of the nature of the highest Brahman, which, from kindness to those devoted to it, voluntarily abides in a fourfold form, so as to render itself accessible to its devotees, its birth being nothing but a voluntary assumption of bodily form. Sūtra 45, moreover, says that the origination of the jīva, which is brought forth as an objection, is distinctly controverted in the books of the Bhāgavatas also. Rāmānuja winds up the adhikarana with a long discussion on the authoritativeness of the Bhāgavata doctrine, being strongly recommended in the Mahābhārata, by Vyāsa himself, the author of the sūtras, and remarks that the statement that Śāṇḍilya, not finding any satisfaction in śruti and smṛti, at last found it in this doctrine is opposed in no way to śruti and smṛti, on the other hand, it means a high eulogy of them.

Nimbārka explains the sūtras thus :—It is impossible that the world can be produced (from śakti without the purusa) (42).

(If you think that the purusa is there in touch with the śakti), still there is no instrument, (because all instruments are produced only after the creation has begun) (43). And if you think that the śakti is possessed of inherent knowledge etc., then there is no objection (because you have thereby come over to our doctrine of Brahman) (44). (Moreover the doctrine of śakti cannot be accepted), because it is opposed to śruti etc. (45).*

It is very difficult to decide which of these interpretations is the correct one, especially, whether the adhikarana is only a refutation of the Bhāgavata doctrine or whether it aims at establishing it. Between the two explanations of sūtra 44, which turns the whole drift of the adhikarana, there is nothing to choose;‡ and the argument that it is not an un-natural procedure to end the polemical pāda with the defence of the doctrine which is to be viewed as the true one is without force ; since, the exposition and defence of the true doctrine, whatever it be, is the subject directly or indirectly of the whole book, and, what is more important, we do not meet with, even once in the sūtras, terms like Vāsudeva, Saṅkarsana etc., so peculiar to the Pañcarātra doctrine ; not to mention the fact that Rāmānuja is the only commentator who sees in this adhikarana such a defence of the doctrine. The fact that this particular doctrine is refuted last of all, can be explained by the circumstance that it is the most allied to the Vedānta doctrine, and Saṅkara has admitted this at the beginning of the adhikarana, as we have remarked above.

ADHYĀYA II, PĀDA 3.

The third pāda of the second adhyāya proceeds to discuss the question whether the different forms of existence which constitute the universe are produced or not. The first fifteen sūtras deal with the elements, while the remainder of the pāda deals with the individual soul. Adhikarana 1 (sūtras 1-7) teaches that the

* It is very curious that, though Śrinivāsa in the Kaustubha exactly follows the Pārijātasaurabha of Nimbārka, Keśava-kūśmīrin in the Kaustubhaprabhā begins with a lengthy explanation, word for word identical with that in the Śribhaṣya, and in the end very briefly observes that, really speaking, this adhikarana should be a refutation of the śakti doctrine, and then gives a short explanation, exactly following Nimbārka and Śrinivāsa.

‡ Perhaps the particle 'vā' in the sūtra 44 goes well with Saṅkara's way of interpreting.

ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect. Adhikarana 2 (sūtra 8) shows that air similarly springs from ether. Adhikarana 3 (sūtra 9) is a kind of digression saying that Brahman, which is only *sat* 'that which is' cannot have originated from anything else. These nine sūtras are regarded by Rāmānuja as one adhikarana, without any special reason; the other commentators are in entire accordance with Śaṅkara.

The next three sūtras (10-12), forming three adhikaranas, teach respectively that fire springs from air, water from fire, and earth from water. Adhikarana 7 (sūtra 13) proves that it is Brahman only in these various forms, to which the creation of the elements is due; and that it is not effected by the elements themselves. Adhikarana 8 (sūtra 14) teaches that the order of re-absorption of the elements is just inverse to that of their creation or emission. Adhikarana 9 (sūtra 15) observes that the above-mentioned order of creation and absorption of the elements is not disturbed by the organs of sense and the mind; for these latter, being themselves of elemental nature, are created and destroyed along with the elements of which they consist. Thus Śaṅkara has six adhikaranas for the six sūtras (10-15); and Vallabha is quite in accordance with him.

Rāmānuja, however, regards all these sūtras (10-15) as forming one adhikarana, of which sūtras 10-12 (sūtra 12 is split into two by Rāmānuja 'prthivi and adhikāra etc.') form the pūrvapakṣa, stating that every preceding element itself produces the subsequent element, and sūtra 13 begins the siddhānta to the effect that it is Brahman that creates. Sūtra 14 is interpreted by him differently so as to be an argument in favour of the siddhānta view in sūtra 13: 'The order of succession (*kramah*) which is contained in such passages as 'तत्साज्जायते प्राणः मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च । खं वायुज्येनिरापः पृथिवी विश्वस्य धारणी ॥ (Mund. Up. 2. 1. 3), describing the direct origination from Brahman of all effects, and which is reverse (*viparyayena*) from the order mentioned so far (i. e. each preceding element producing the subsequent one) is possible (*upapadyate*) only on the supposition of the origination of each effect being really from Brahman itself (*atah*) in the form of a special causal substance.' That this interpretation is far less natural than the one given by Śaṅkara goes without saying.

Nimbärka also, just like Rāmānuja, regards sūtras 10-13 as one adhikarāṇa of which sūtras 10-12 state the pūrvapakṣa and sūtra 13 states the siddhānta; but he reads sūtras 14-15 as forming two separate adhikarāṇas and interprets them just like Śaṅkara. Madhva regards sūtras 10-14 as forming five adhikarāṇas; but he interprets the sūtras 10-12 as meaning that the elements are all produced from Viṣṇu and not that the subsequent element is produced from the preceding one. Sūtra 13 is interpreted as asserting that not only the creation but the destruction also proceeds from Viṣṇu and from no other being such as Rudra etc. Sūtras 15 and 16 according to him form one adhikarāṇa, sūtra 15 stating the pūrvapakṣa and sūtra 16, the siddhānta.

Sūtra 16 and the rest of the pāda deal with the nature of the individual soul, and as such is very important for our purpose. As we know, all the five schools agree in holding that the jīva is unborn and eternal; and that the birth and death, spoken of in the case of the jīva, are only metaphorical, as they really belong to the body of the individual soul. This is the purpose of sūtra 16. Śaṅkara, Nimbärka and Vallabha agree literally. Rāmānuja (according to whom this is sūtra 17, forming part of the preceding adhikarāṇa), on the other hand, interprets the sūtra differently thus:—The words in ordinary use, which are connected with and thus denote the moving and non-moving things, possess with regard to Brahman a denotative power which is not secondary but primary and direct (Rāmānuja reads 'a-bhāktah' while others read 'bhāktah'), because the denotative power of all words is dependent on the being of Brahman. The very obscurity of the explanation is sufficient for its rejection. Madhva's interpretation also is equally unsatisfactory. He connects it with the preceding sūtras and thus explains:—The production of *vijñāna* from *manas* (which has been put forth as disturbing the order of creation and that of destruction, which are exactly opposite) does not mean that the category called *vijñāna* is produced from the category called *manas*; but it only means that knowledge arises from the act of reflection, referring to moving and non-moving things; this is thus a kind of metaphorical statement.

The next sūtra (17) means that the individual soul is never

produced; because the scriptures never speak about its production, on the other hand, everywhere assert its eternal character. Here Śaṅkara and Nimbārka read 'न आत्मा अश्रुते' while Rāmānuja, Vallabha and Madhvā read 'न आत्मा श्रुते'; but that does not make any difference as regards the ultimate sense. Here also all agree in referring this sūtra to the denial of birth for the individual soul, except Madhvā, who explains it to mean that the soul, i. e. the Parmātman is not destroyed or absorbed in something else. That the interpretation of the preceding sūtra, as given by Rāmānuja, is not natural enough follows from the following sūtra itself; since the denial of the birth of the jīva is the logical corollary of the statement that the so-called birth and death of the jīva really belong to the material body.

The next sūtra (18) which runs as 'ज्ञः अतः एव' is interpreted by Śaṅkara to mean that the individual soul is 'Knowledge' (*jñanam*); while Rāmānuja and Nimbārka explain it to mean that the jīva is a knower* (ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वे सति ज्ञानाश्रयः), Nimbārka taking it as an adhikarana by itself like Śaṅkara, while Rāmānuja connecting it with the following sūtras. Vallabha, who also holds with Rāmānuja and Nimbārka that 'knowledge' or 'intelligence' is an attribute (*guna* or *dharma*) of the jīva, interprets the sūtra as stating the *prima facie* view, according to which jīva is knowledge and is therefore Brahman itself, and all distinctions are due to the principle of Māyā; though really, the jīva is a part (*amśa*) of Brahman, and is related to it just as sparks are related to fire. And, while refuting this view, Vallabha makes the very interesting remarks: तस्मात् तदेशस्य तव्यपदेशवाक्यमात्रं स्वीकृत्य शिष्टप्रियहर्थं मायाविकर्स्य एव अपरावतरो नितरो सद्विरुपेशः 'The Māyā-vādin is only an incarnation of the idealist Buddhist, who takes his stand on only those statements in which what is only a part is spoken of by the name of the whole, using this device only to make his doctrine acceptable to the learned.' Of course this interpretation of the sūtra is far-fetched, though it makes no material difference, as ultimately he means that the soul is a knower. Madhvā, as usual, has an absolutely new interpretation that the knowing self (*jñāḥ*), i. e. jīva, is produced from

* Jīva ought to mean 'knower'; see Pañ. III. I 135 'इगुपष्ठापीकरः क्व'.

the Paramātman (spoken of, according to him, in the preceding sūtra), and after this, he reads a new sūtra ' युक्तेः ', not found in any other bhāṣya, and explains it to mean that such a birth, with reference to the *upādhi* or the limiting adjunct in the form of the body etc., is possible or reasonable in his case, though he is otherwise beginningless and eternal. Madhvā's interpretation, though plausible in itself, has to be rejected, as it necessarily depends upon a reference to the Paramātman in the preceding sūtra,—an interpretation which is without doubt far-fetched. And as between Śaṅkara on the one hand and Rāmānuja and Nimbārka on the other hand, the latters' view is acceptable, since the word ' *jñāḥ* ' can mean only ' one who knows ' and not ' knowledge ' ; and if indeed the sūtrikāra had held the doctrine of Śaṅkara that the *jīva* is ' knowledge ' and thus absolutely non-different from Brahman, we should have expected him to say ' *jñānam* ', instead of saying ' *jñāḥ* ' and then understanding it in the sense of ' *jñānam* '.

There is a similar diversity of interpretation regarding the following adhikarṇa, which is made up of sūtras 19-32. After a discussion of the beginninglessness and the knowledge of the individual soul, the next question naturally concerns the spatiality* of the soul, whether it is all-pervading (*vibhu*), or of the middle size (*madhyama-parimāṇa*) or atomic (*anu*). Regarding the literal or verbal sense of the sūtras, there is, in general, no difference of opinion ; but it is regarding the general purport of the adhikarana that materially different opinions are held. Sūtras 19-28 affirm that the *jīva* is *anu* or atomic in size ; but this is regarded as the *siddhānta* by all except Śaṅkara, who regards it as only the *prima facie* view to be refuted immediately in sūtras 29-32. Before deciding which of these ways is more natural, it is necessary to examine the sūtras in detail.

As regards sūtras (19-28), all agree in the interpretation, except that Rāmānuja and Nimbārka regard ' व्यतिरेको गन्धवते, तथा च दर्शयति ' as one sūtra, instead of regarding them as two sūtras as Śaṅkara and Vallabha do. The real difference

* *Parināma*, lit. dimension, signifies here the soul's relation in space, i. e. spatiality.

turns upon the interpretation of sūtra 29 which runs thus : ' तदुण्णासत्वात् तु तत्यपदेशः प्राज्ञत् ' and which may be literally translated : ' but, on account of that quality (or those qualities or the qualities of that) being the essence, there is that designation (or the designation of that), just as is the case, for example with the *prājña*. ' "

Now, Śaṅkara begins the siddhānta with this sūtra, refuting the atomic size of the jīva. He means that the jīva, though really all-pervading and non-different from Brahman, is called *anu*, because, the qualities of the Buddhi, the limiting adjunct, form its essence, as long as it is in the condition of the worldly existence ; in other words, the *samsāritva* of the jīva consists essentially in its being limited by and possessing the qualities of the Buddhi, and so the atomic size of the Buddhi is only metaphorically predicated of the jīva and (sūtra 30) this connection of the jīva with Buddhi lasts as long as the jīva continues to be in *samsāra* i. e., continues to be jīva ; and so there is no difficulty and (sūtra 31) this connection with Buddhi, though not manifested in the state of deep sleep for instance, is present all the same. And (sūtra 32) if we do not admit of such a Buddhi or internal sense-organ, the jīva would be always perceiving or would never perceive. Thus Śaṅkara ultimately establishes that the jīva is really not *anu*.

Rāmānuja, on the other hand, interprets sūtra 29 thus : The jīva, though really a knower, is, however, designated as knowledge, because that quality, knowledge, forms his very essence. It must be remembered here that Rāmānuja tackles on the sūtra (18), ' the self is a knower ', with this *adhibarana*. If the soul, says he, is a knower by his very nature, then he will be knowing every thing, in every place, if he is all-pervading. This objection is answered by saying that the jīva is not all-pervading, but only atomic in size. After having established this point in nine sūtras, he again turns back to the original question of the relation between jīva and *jñāna*. If *jñāna* is only an attribute of jīva, how is it called *jñāna*, instead of *jñātr* ? Because, he replies, *jñāna* is the very essence of him. And (sūtra 30) as knowledge ever continues to be his essence, such a designation involves no objection. And (sūtra 31) this knowledge is present always,

though it may be sometimes not manifested, e. g. in the state of deep sleep. And (sūtra 32) if the jīva is only knowledge and not a knower, and if he is all-pervading and not atomic, then there would be always perception or always non-perception.

Nimbārka holds with Rāmānuja that *anulva* is the siddhānta; but interprets the last four sūtras differently. The jīva, though really atomic in size, is sometimes designated as all-pervading, because the quality of knowledge, which is all-pervading, forms his essence; in other words, the jīva, which is *gunin* (the qualified), is sometimes designated as all-pervading on account of the all-pervading nature of his *guṇa* (attribute); and this *guṇa* continues to be always with the *gunin* in all conditions, whatever the condition of the latter, though it may be sometimes manifested and sometimes not; otherwise, that is, if the jīva by its nature were all-pervading, its bondage and release would be impossible or would be always present.

Vallabha interprets the last four sūtras in a still different way. The jīva though *anu*, is designated as Brahman, e. g. in such sentences as 'तत्त्वमसि', because the qualities of Brahman form the essence of jīva, distinguishing it from the inanimate world. Here also Vallabha passes some scathing remarks against the *Māyāvādins*, who misunderstand such passages as 'तत्त्वमसि' and deduce therefrom the doctrine of Māyā.

Madhva regards sūtras 19-26 as one adhikarana, establishing the atomic size of the soul; then he takes sūtra 27 as an adhikarana by itself, trying to reconcile the passages, speaking of the uniform or multiform nature of the jīva; he then reads sūtras 28-29 as another adhikarana,—which is very interesting as it attempts to reconcile passages like 'तत्त्वमसि',—speaking of the non-difference of *jīva* and *Brahman*, with passages like 'द्वा भूयर्णा सयुजा सख्या' etc., which speak of their difference. Sūtra 28 would state the siddhānta that the jīva is different from Brahman, owing to such a mention in the scriptures; (it is to be remembered here that this very sūtra has been interpreted by the other commentators as referring to the difference between the thing qualified, the jīva and the quality, knowledge); and sūtra 29 would say that there is the statement of non-difference, only on account of the fact that the

attributes of Brahman, such as knowledge, bliss etc. form the essence or nature of *jīva*.

Now if we compare all these interpretations, especially of sūtra 29, we find that none is quite satisfactory by itself; and an impartial critic, it would appear, will find the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja least satisfactory of all. That the Sūtrakāra is in favour of the atomic size of the individual soul is very probable, though not absolutely certain. It is no doubt curious, as Thibaut observes that as many as nine sūtras should be devoted to the statement of a mere *prima facie* view to be refuted afterwards. At the same time such a course is not impossible and especially the word 'tu' (but) in sūtra 29, leads us at first sight to believe that a new point of the siddhānta, as opposed to the *prima facie* view, begins. But Śaṅkara's interpretation of sūtra 29 strikes us as very far-fetched indeed. That the pronoun 'tad' in the word 'तत्त्वं सारन्वात्' should refer to *Buddhi* all at once, without any reference whatsoever to it in the sūtras preceding, is rather awkward; I do not agree with Thibaut in finding fault with the meaning of the compound word, if once it is admitted that 'tad' means '*Buddhi*'. When Śaṅkara says that the qualities of the '*buddhi*' form the essence of the *jīva*, he means that the essential characteristic which distinguishes the *jīva* from the Brahman (though they are really identical) is the connection of the former with '*buddhi*', whose attributes belong to the *jīva* also, as it were, for the time being; and so far, in a certain sense, they constitute his essential nature.

But the explanation of the word '*prājña-vat*' in the sūtra offers a serious difficulty; because, really speaking, we see no difference whatsoever between the '*drṣṭānta*' the illustration, and the '*dārśāntika*', the thing illustrated. *Jīva* is called atomic etc., owing to the atomic size of the limiting adjunct *buddhi*, just as, for instance, the *prājña* or the Paramātman is designated as being atomic etc., owing to the qualities of its *upādhis* or limiting adjuncts. But Brahman and *jīva* being the same, we fail to see how one illustrates the other. As for the interpretation of the following sūtras they fit in well with sūtra 29, if once we accept the interpretation of the latter, though, throughout the subject of the

connection of the *jīva* with the *mūnas* or *buddhi* seems to be foreign to the general trend of the adhikarana.

Rāmānuja's interpretation of sūtra 29 is no doubt straightforward, if taken by itself, but it is evidently out of context, as it raises the question of the *jīva* being knowledge or knower, touched upon in sūtra 18. To say that it recurs here after as many as nine sūtras dealing with its atomic size is to make too great a demand on the complacence of the reader. The meaning of the word 'prājñavat' too, according to him, is quite appropriate. Just as the *prājña* or Paramātman is designated as Ānanda, because the Ānanda is his essential attribute, in the same way, the individual soul is called *Vijñāna*, because *vijñāna* is his essential attribute. Moreover, Rāmānuja's way of construing the nine sūtras establishing the atomic size of the individual soul seems no doubt more natural than that of Śaṅkara.

I am inclined to believe that, on the whole, the interpretations as proposed by Nimbārka and Vallabha are most satisfactory and least far-fetched. After having established the atomic size of the individual soul, the question naturally arises, if the *jīva* is atomic, how and why is it that he is often designated as being all-pervading ; the answer according to Nimbārka is that he is so called, because his quality of intelligence is all-pervading ; and this is quite appropriate, when we consider some of the preceding sūtras, e. g. 'व्यतिरेको गन्धवत्' 'युगाद्वा आलोकवत्' The same question is proposed and answered by Vallabha, but in a more general way. The *jīva*, though atomic, is called Brahman, because the qualities of Brahman form his essence.

Madhva's interpretation also of this particular sūtra is quite good ; but his splitting up of what forms a single adhikarana according to others into so many different adhikaranas is anything but satisfactory.

Taking this adhikarana with the last, which says that the individual soul is a knowing being, we can safely assert so much that on this essential point regarding the characteristics of the individual soul, we cannot see our way to find Śaṅkara's system in the sūtras; and very probably the sūtrakāra holds that the *jīva* is atomic and has knowledge as his attribute, being at the

same time of the nature of knowledge,—a point common to all the four Vaiṣṇava schools.

The following eight sūtras (33-40) deal with question whether the individual soul is an agent or not. All except Śaṅkara agree in regarding these eight sūtras as forming one adhikarāna, establishing the *Kartr̥va* as a natural attribute of the individual soul, though they may differ amongst themselves regarding the interpretation of a sūtra here and a sūtra there. Thus the sūtra 'उपलब्धिवद्वियमः' (II. 3. 37) is explained by Rāmānuja thus: if the self were not an agent (and all activity belonged to Prakṛti), there would be no definite determination (regarding the distribution of the experiences resulting from actions, because Prakṛti is a common possession of all souls and thus there would be enjoyment on the part of all souls, or else, on the part of none); just as (there would be no definite determination) with regard to consciousness, (if the soul were all-pervading, as shown in sūtra 32 above). Nimbārka, on the other hand, explains it thus: 'कर्तृपत्रविकरणा नियमे नास्ति', which is not quite clear, and which does not explain the 'vat' in the sūtra at all. It is however explained by the commentators Śrinivāsa and Keśava Kāśmirin to mean that there is a definite determination regarding the acquisition of the fruits of good or bad actions; but there is no such determination regarding the soul's proceeding to do an act. This is not satisfactory and is evidently far-fetched. Vallabha and Madhva however explain it thus: There is no definite determination regarding the doing of acts (i. e. doing only good acts and avoiding all bad acts), just as there is no such determination regarding perception (i. e. the soul has to perceive sometimes beautiful things, sometimes ugly things, has sometimes pleasant experiences, sometimes not). This is also the interpretation of Śaṅkara and is apparently the most natural and straightforward one.

But the most important difference is regarding sūtra 40 'यथा च तत्त्वा उभया' which naturally would mean 'just as a carpenter is both or does both ways' i. e. just as a carpenter, though an agent, is sometimes active and sometimes inactive; in the same way, the soul though possessed of the natural attribute of *Kartr̥va* is sometimes found to be active and sometimes

not. It is so interpreted by Rāmānuja and Nimbārka. Madhva explains that just as the carpenter both acts for himself, at the same time is controlled by the master; so the self is an agent, at the same time, is at the disposal of the Parmātman. Thus this sūtra naturally provides an answer to the question how it is that the jīva is sometimes active and sometimes not, if *Kartr̥tva* is its natural and inherent attribute; and it fits in well with the preceding sūtras.

Śaṅkara, on the other hand, takes this sūtra as a separate adhikarāṇa, answering the question whether the *kartr̥tva* which has been proved as belonging to the soul, in the preceding sūtras, belongs to it by nature as its inherent attributes or is only attributed to it by superimposition; and he comes to the conclusion that it is only superimposed. But that the sūtra cannot at all mean this is apparent even to a casual reader. In the first place, the particle 'ca' in the sūtra goes against the interpretation of Śaṅkara. Had it been the object of the sūtrākāra to modify what was established in the preceding sūtra he would have more naturally used 'tu'—and in fact this difficulty, Śaṅkara is conscious of, and he has to say त्वं चायं पटितः—'this 'ca' is used in the sense of 'tu' here.' And even then, one cannot see how the instance of the carpenter illustrates the point in question, i. e. that the soul is not really an agent. 'Just as a carpenter, however, with the tools, is an agent and thus becomes miserable, but the same carpenter, when he returns home and leaves aside the tools, takes rest and is inactive, in the same way, the self, in the conditions of dream and awakening, united to the plurality set up by nescience, becomes an agent and suffers, but when he enters into the Highest Self, in the state of deep sleep, he being freed from the objects and sense-organs, becomes inactive and happy.' If we understand this illustration in the straightforward way, it would only go to establish the *kartr̥tva* of the self which may sometimes manifest itself and sometimes not. But one cannot see how it is an argument for the superimposed and therefore unreal *kartr̥tva* of the self. Śaṅkara also quite sees the difficulty and, to clear off his conscience, thinks it necessary to add: 'The illustration of the carpenter is to be understood only so far. Just as the carpenter, in the case of the

particular acts of chopping etc., is an agent, only through the particular tools, but is quite inactive, as far as his own body is concerned, in the same way, the self, in all the actions, is an agent only through internal sense-organs like manas and others, but is quite inactive by himself.' But to this we demur. The carpenter is, as a matter of fact, active through his body too; or in other words, the body acts, as much as the tools act; and what is more, the tools cannot act without the body. This illustration cannot support the point which Śaṅkara has tried to make out, in spite of all the explanations which he has given. And what is more strange is that he adds explanations of his own, refuting each and every sūtra in the preceding adhikarāna establishing the *kartrīva* of the self.

Śaṅkara's interpretation seems to be even more far-fetched, when we look to the sūtra that follows: परात् तच्छ्रुतेः 'but this *kartrīva* (of the 'self') is from the Highest Self, for it is so said in the scriptures' The question raised is whether the self is absolutely independent in his action or is dependent on some one else; and the answer is unanimously given that the self derives his capacity as an agent from the Highest Self. At the same time, the Highest Self has regard for the efforts made by the self and He makes him act only with a view to these efforts.

Now if it were decided that the self is not an agent at all, that his *kartrīva* is only super-imposed on him, how could the question arise whether the self is an independent agent or a dependent one? Of course Śaṅkara does refer the question to the *kartrīva* of *jīva* 'as due to the limiting adjuncts in the condition of Nescience etc.', but this is far from convincing; while the question proposed in this adhikarāna arises quite naturally from the interpretation of the preceding adhikarāna as given by Rāmānuja and others.

It is to be noticed here that Madhvā regards all these sūtras (32-42) as forming one adhikarāna; while all the rest divide them into two adhikarānas; but this does not make any difference in the ultimate sense. So also Rāmānuja reads उपादानाद् विहारोपदेशाच्च (II. 3. 34 and 35) as one sūtra, while all the rest read them as two sūtras, in the inverse order as विहारोपदेशात् । उपादानाच्च.

The sūtra 'शक्तिविषयकात्' (II. 3. 38) is also interpreted differently. Śaṅkara explains it to mean that if the *kartṛtva* belongs to *Buddhi* as in the phrase विज्ञानं यज्ञं कर्त्त्वे 'the *vijñāna* performs the sacrifice,' then it would cease to be the *Karana* or the instrument as opposed to the *Kartṛ* or the agent; and this would amount to nothing but a change of name. Nimbārka and Rāmānuja, explain it to mean that if *Kartṛtva* belongs to the *Buddhi*, then the *bhoktṛtva* or the capacity of enjoying would also belong to it; as these two must always go together; so bondage and release would also refer to *Buddhi* instead of to the *Puruṣa*, who is the enjoyer even according to the Śāṅkhya. Madhva and Vallabha, on the other hand, explain that the self, though an agent, is not free to do only good actions and avoid all bad actions; because of the want of absolute, unrestrained power which belongs to the *Paramātman* and which makes all the difference between the *kartṛtva* of the self and of the Highest Self.

It is very difficult to decide which of these interpretations is better than the others; still this does not affect our general conclusion that according to the sūtrakāra, the individual self is an agent by its nature, though it depends upon the *Parmātman*; and that Śaṅkara's way of interpreting the general meaning of the *adhikarana* in question is far from being natural or satisfactory.

As regards sūtras (41-42), which establish the point that the *kartṛtva* of the self depends upon the Highest Self, who has regards for the efforts made by the former, there is nothing deserving to be noticed; as all agree in their explanation of them.

The next *adhikarana* (sūtras 43-53) is most important for our purpose, in-as-much as it deals with the vital question of the relation between the Highest Self and the individual self, between *Brahman* and *jīva*; whether they are absolutely the same, or one forms the body of the other, or whether both are absolutely different from each other. The question arises naturally, because there are passages speaking of the difference as well as the non-difference of *Brahman* and *jīva*. Sūtra 43, literally translated, would run thus: (The individual soul is) a part (of *Brahman*), on account of the declaration of difference and because in a different way also, some record that *Brahman* is of

the nature of slaves, fishermen etc.' Now here the sūtrākāra distinctly says that the individual soul must be regarded as a part of Brahman, because it is both spoken of as being different and non-different from Brahman. So, we must understand this ' *Amśatra*' or being a part, in such way as to make room for both difference and non-difference. Before discussing the relative value of the meanings put upon this ' being a part,' we can dispose of one point; and it is that Śaṅkara's theory cannot at all fit in with this. Whenever there is an opposition like this between passages asserting difference and those asserting non-difference, he always cuts the gordian knot by saying that the passages asserting non-difference represent the truth and are to be understood literally; whereas those asserting difference only refer to the popular notions of things and they are there only to be refuted and to make room for the passages asserting non-difference. Thus all plurality is delusion; while unity is the only reality. Accordingly, in the sūtra before us, Śaṅkara has resort to the device of understanding the word ' *avīśah*' as meaning *amśah ita* ' as it were a part', for which there is no justification whatsoever. And why can we not say that the *jīva* is the same as Brahman? Because there is the declaration of difference. Thus Śaṅkara finds himself in a dilemma.

On the other hand, the sūtra goes very well with the doctrine of Nimbārka, which is also generally called the ' *bhedābheda-vāda*' ' the doctrine of difference and non-difference (being both true at the same time)'. By ' *amśa*' or a part is not to be understood ' a piece cut and separated,' for that would involve an absolute difference, and would contradict such passages as ' thou art that.' But ' *amśa*' here means ' *sakti*' or capacity; and Brahman possesses various capacities which are of the nature of the animate and inanimate worlds.

Rāmānuja also interprets it similarly with some modifications. Both the classes of passages, those asserting difference and those asserting non-difference, must be understood to be true and to represent the reality; and for this it must be admitted that the *jīva* is a part of Brahman; i. e., it forms the body of Brahman and is dependent on it, at the same time being individually distinct in nature.

Madhva understands the word ' *āṁśa*' to mean literally ' तद्विच्चाते भूति तच्चेत्प्रत्ययम् ' (that which remains, when there is a separate existence from it). He opines that the passages speaking of ' *bheda*' or difference are to be understood literally and as representing the truth; while the passages speaking of ' *abheda*' or non-difference are to be understood metaphorically, in the sense of ' ततो न्यूनत्वे सति किंचिन्नतद्वशत्वम् ', i. e. being inferior to it and at the same time having some little resemblance to it; and both these meanings of *bheda* and *abheda*, he includes in the connotation of the word ' *āṁśa*' .

Vallabha interprets this *sūtra* very much like Rāmānuja or Nimbārka. It goes without saying that the interpretations of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka are most natural; and that Śāṅkara's interpretation is forced on the face of it. And if the Sūtrakāra had held Śāṅkara's theory, he would never have called *jīva* an *āṁśa* of Brahman, leaving to the reader the task of supplying such an important word as ' *jīva*' .

The same conclusion is confirmed, if we examine the following *sūtras* of this *adhikarana*. After having stated that the ' *āṁśatva*' (i. e. the fact that the *jīva* is a part of Brahman) is supported by *śruti* as as well as *smṛti*, the *sūtrakāra* naturally proposed to answer the question how Brahman can escape being affected by the pleasure and pain of *jīva*, if the latter is only a part of the former. The *sūtra* in question (46) literally translated runs thus: and ' as light &c. (are not really affected), so the Highest Lord (is) not (affected)'. And Śāṅkara interprets it to mean that Brahman is not affected by pleasure and pain like the *jīva*; just as light etc., though apparently assuming different forms corresponding to the objects on which it shines, is not really affected by them at all. According to Śāṅkara, however, there is no reason why such a question should arise at all; because Brahman and *jīva* are absolutely one.

On the other hand, Nimbārka interprets in a natural way thus: Brahman is not affected by the faults of *jīva*, though he is an *āṁśa* of it, just as light (fire) is not affected by the attributes of its part, e. g., being connected with an improper place etc; or just as the *ākāśa* is not affected by the qualities of the different sounds, which are only so many *āṁśas* or *Śaktis* or capacities of the *ākāśa*.

Rāmānuja interprets thus: though the *jīva* is a part of Brahman, a part being only an attribute of the whole, and the *jīva* is only a *prakūra* or *vīśesana* of the Brahman, still the Brahman is not like *jīva*, but is distinct from it, just as fire (which has light as its attribute) is distinct from light. It must be admitted that the interpretations of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka are in any case more natural than that of Śaṅkara.

In sūtra 48, the question raised is, if all individual souls are alike the parts of Brahman, how can we account for the possibility of injunctions and prohibitions for the different *jīvas*. The answer is: this arises from the connection of the self with bodies. Just as though the sun's light is one and the same, still that part of it which shines on an unholy place is shunned, while that which falls on a holy place is resorted to, or just as fire, though alike everywhere, is accepted if it is from the house of a *Śrotriya*, but avoided if found in a cemetery, in the same way are to be explained the injunctions and the prohibitions.

In sūtra 49, the question proposed is how we can avoid a confusion of the results of actions of the different individual souls. It is answered by Śaṅkara thus: though the soul is one, still, the limiting adjuncts or 'upādhis' which distinguish the *jīva* from the *Brahman* are limited in character; so, on account of the non-extension of the individual soul, resulting from it, a confusion of the results of actions is not possible. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, explains thus: although the souls, as being parts of Brahman are essentially of the same character, still there is no confusion of the individual spheres of enjoyments and experiences, since they do not form a continuous series, i. e., because the souls, though alike, are actually separate, one from the other. Nimbārka exactly follows Rāmānuja.

Sūtra 50, 'आमात् एव च' is very interesting; literally translated, it would mean, 'it is just an appearance.' Now Śaṅkara interprets it to mean that the *jīva* is only a reflection, 'pratibīmśa' of Brahman. It is neither the same as Brahman nor a different entity from it. Thus it is that one soul is not affected by the acts of another soul, though they are all non-different from it; just as the reflections of one and the

same original object, in different media or reflecting substances, are different and are not confounded, one with the other. Vallabha also translates the sūtra in the same way, saying that the *jīva* is only a reflection of Brahman, and not quite the same; because, according to his doctrine, the quality of bliss, *ānanda* which is manifested in Brahman, is, however, obscured in *jīva*. Vallabha here warns the reader that the word ' *ābhāsa*' in the sūtra is not to be understood to mean ' something absolutely unreal ' as, for instance, in the doctrine of Śaṅkara, but ' an appearance ' i. e., ' something apparently the same as or having the appearance of something else, but not quite the same.'

Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, on the other hand, explain the word ' *ābhāsa*' to mean ' *hetvābhāsa* ' ' a fallacious argument.' The former directs this sūtra mainly against the school of Śaṅkara, saying that those who hold the view that the soul is only Brahman deluded cannot explain away the confusion of the individual spheres of enjoyments, on the ground of the difference of the limiting adjuncts presented by Nescience (and Śaṅkara actually uses this very mode of reasoning in the preceding sūtra); because to say so is nothing but a fallacy, in-as-much as the obscuring of the light of that which is nothing but light, means only the destruction of that light. Nimbārka who reads ' *ābhāsa eva* etc. ' (and Rāmānuja also proposes this as another reading), directs it in general against those who hold that the individual souls are many and at the same time all-pervading, saying that all their arguments for explaining away the confusion of individual spheres of enjoyment are fallacious.

The three remaining sūtras of the adhikarana are directed by Śaṅkara, Nimbārka and Vallabha against the doctrine of the individual souls being many and at the same time all-pervading. Rāmānuja interprets them as directed against those who hold that the individual soul is Brahman in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts; but the interpretation of the sūtras is not substantially different.

Coming over to Madhva, we find that he interprets sūtras 46-55 in an altogether different way. The *jīvas* are of two kinds, those which are ' *bhinnāṁśa* ' i. e., parts of Brahman and quite different from it; and those which are ' *abhinnāṁśa* ' or

‘svarūpāṁśa’ i. e., parts of Brahman, but substantially and potentially non-different. The former are the ordinary individual souls, which are of inferior capacities and possess only a little resemblance to the Highest Self; while the latter are such incarnations as the primeval Fish, the primeval Tortoise etc., which do not differ in the least from the Highest Self in point of power and nature. Now sūtra 46 states that the Paramātman (assuming the form of Matsya etc.) is not like jīva, just as, for instance, the fire of general destruction (pralayāgni) is not the same as the fire of the fire-fly, though both are parts of the element of fire alike, or just as the ocean and urine, though both parts of the element of water, are not for that reason alike. Sūtra 48 contains another reason why ordinary souls are different from the incarnation-souls. Ordinary souls are solely dependent on Paramātman, for their activity and cessation of activity, for their bondage and release, on account of their connection with the body; but such is not the case with the other class of souls. Similarly there is no confusion of the ordinary souls with the other proper class of souls, on account of ‘a-santati’ i. e. want of complete and unrestrained power (sūtra 49); for the ordinary souls are of inferior and restricted powers, while the others are not. And the ordinary souls are, after all, only the reflections or *pratibimbas* of the Paramātman; while the others are not. The former are technically called ‘pratibimbāṁśaka’ and have very little resemblance to the Paramātman; while the latter are called ‘prādurbhāva’ or full manifestations and so have complete resemblance to the Parmātmān (sūtra 50); and so, the two classes of individual souls cannot be confounded.

With sūtra 51, Madhva begins a new adhikarāna, proposing the same question as others, viz. how to account for the distinction of the individual souls, when all are alike the ‘pratibimbāṁśa’ or ‘bhinnāṁśa’ of the Highest Self. What regulates this distinction is the variety (‘a-niyama’) of the *adr̥ṣṭa* or the unseen result of merit and demerit; and the differences with regard to the will, thought, etc., are also themselves due to the differences of *adr̥ṣṭa*; nor can it be said that these individual distinctions of souls are due to the difference of place; (thus, for instance, the souls in heaven are gods, these on earth are men); for, even this variety of places or abodes is included in the variety of *adr̥ṣṭa*, the former being due to the latter (sūtras 52 and 53).

Now considering these several interpretations of the different sūtras of this adhikarana (excepting the first which we have already discussed above), we can at once dispose of the interpretation of Madhva as being uncalled for by the context and very sectarian. As for the rest, it is very difficult to decide which is better ; because all appear to be equally natural or far-fetched. Even the two ways of interpreting the word 'ābhāsa' in sūtra 50 are both equally justifiable. But the first sūtra of the adhikarana, i. e., sūtra 43, is decisive. The word 'amśāḥ' therein makes it impossible that there can be even the least ground for holding that the Sūtrakāra held Śaṅkara's doctrine. The individual soul may be a part of the Highest Self, because the statements of difference as well as non-difference between them can be asserted by him alone who holds that the individual souls are as real as the Highest Self, being at the same time not absolutely different from Him. Thus the doctrines of Śaṅkara and Madhva are out of the question, at least as far as this adhikarana is concerned.

ADHYĀYA II, PĀDA 4.

After having reconciled the several Upaniṣad passages referring to the creation of the elements and after having discussed some of the essential characteristics of the individual soul, the Sūtrakāra next, in the fourth pāda of the second adhyāya, proceeds to consider the passages referring to the *prāṇas* or the sense-organs which form the necessary accompaniment of the individual soul as long as it is in this worldly existence or *samsāra*.

The first adhikarana, consisting of the first four sūtras, asserts, according to all commentators except Vallabha, that the *prāṇas* are created from Brahman, just like the elements spoken of in the preceding pāda, though there are some differences in the interpretation of the individual sūtras. Thus, according to Śaṅkara, the adhikarana means : The *prāṇas* (i. e. the organs of sense, those of action and the internal organ or *manas*) are produced like ether and other elements (sūtra 1) ; their production in a metaphorical sense is impossible (sūtra 2), because otherwise the knowledge of all, resulting from the knowledge of the one Brahman, would not be possible ; and moreover the word meaning 'is produced' is the same both for the elements and for the *prāṇas*.

and if it is to be understood literally in the one case, it has to be understood also in the same way in the other case, (sūtra 3) ; and even in those passages, where the production of the *prāṇas* is not specifically mentioned, it is all the same implied ; because, *vāc* (speech), *prāṇa*, and *manas* are described as being preceded by light, water and food (i. e. earth) (sūtra 4) ; and the latter being themselves produced, it but follows that the former are produced.

Nimbārka exactly agrees with Śaṅkara, in the interpretation of these four sūtras.

Rāmānuja, however, reads sūtras 2 and 3 as one sūtra and interprets them to mean that the word ' *prāṇāḥ*' in the passage 'प्राणा वाच ऋत्यः ' (Śatapatha Brāh. 6, 1, 1.) cannot mean the ordinary *prāṇas* or sense-organs, but *Parāmātman* ; and the plural number of the word is only metaphorical (*gaunī*), owing to the impossibility of the plural sense in the circumstances (*a-saṁbhavāt*) ; and owing to the fact that it is the *Paramātman* that is spoken of as existing before the creation. Sūtra 4 also is interpreted by him differently. Since names or things having names are preceded by the creation of ether and other elements, there were no functions before the creation for the sense-organs at all and they could not have existed before the creation ; and so the word ' *prāṇāḥ*' in the passage above cannot mean the organs, but the *Paramātman*. Thus we see that the phrase ' *gaunyasaṁbhavāt*' is taken as a genitive tatpurusa compound by Śaṅkara, but as two words ' *gaunī*' (nominative singular) and ' *asambhavāt*' by Rāmānuja ; so also the pronouns ' *tat*' in the next two phrases are interpreted differently. Though, on account of the very nature of the sūtra style, it is difficult to decide which interpretation is better, still one cannot help remarking that Rāmānuja's interpretation seems rather forced and farfetched ; and one thing can be said in favour of Śaṅkara, that there is another commentator who entirely agrees with him.

Madhva has three adhikaranas instead of one and reads one more sūtra ' प्राणास्तु गीताच्च ' between sūtras 2 and 3. The passages referring to the beginninglessness of *prāṇas* are only metaphorical (*gaunī*) for him, because beginninglessness in the literal sense is impossible (sūtra 2). Sūtra 3, which is, according to Madhva, directed

against those who hold that *manas* is unborn, though the rest of the organs are produced, asserts that even *manas* cannot be said to be unborn, because it is mentioned even before the other organs (e. g. in 'मनःपूर्वंनिद्रायाणि च' Mundaka. 2, 1, 3.). Sūtra 4 refers to the organ of speech in particular and asserts that it cannot be unborn, because it is preceded by *manas*; and as the latter is produced, the former must be also produced. (cf. नस्मान्मन एव पूर्वस्यं वायुद्वन्नरूपम् ' Aitareya Āraṇ. 3,1, 1.).

Vallabha entirely differs from the others, in coming to the conclusion that the prāṇas are just as unborn as the individual souls. The word *tathā* in the first sūtra 'तथा प्राणः' means according to Vallabha 'यथा जीवाः तथा' in contradiction with the others, according to whom it means 'यथा वियद्वात्रः तथा.' Thus the prāṇas, according to Vallabha, possess all the attributes of the individual souls, except that the intelligence (*cid-āṁśa*) is obscured in them, while it is manifested in the individual souls. And the passage referring to the going up (*ut-krānti*) of the prāṇas cannot be metaphorical, because it is construed literally with the individual soul in the same context (sūtra 2). The Prāṇas also are spoken of as existing before the creation (in the passage referred to above, as denoting Paramātman according to Rāmānuja); so the prāṇas also are as unborn as the individual souls, which both spring alike from the Brahman (*udgati* and not *utpatti*), but are not substantially created (sūtra 3). And the speech is preceded by *manas*; and if the speech (i. e., the scriptures) is not produced, how can *manas* which precedes it be produced ?

It is very interesting, indeed, to see two absolutely different conclusions arrived at from the same sūtras: that the prāṇas are born and that they are unborn. It must be admitted that Vallabha's interpretation is quite natural, and the way in which he understands the word ' *tathā* ' is even more natural than that of the other commentators, in-as-much it refers to something discussed just in the immediately preceding sūtras; whereas the others refer it to ether and other elements discussed in the first half of the preceding pāda. For this reason, it is difficult to reject Vallabha's interpretation, though it must be said that all the rest are at one in holding an opinion opposed to his, i. e. that the prāṇas are born.

The second adhikarana (sūtras 5 and 6) asserts that these *prāṇas* are eleven in number (i. e. the five organs of sense, five organs of action and the internal organ or intelligence). The word ' *gati* ' in sūtra 5 is interpreted in two ways, either as ' going up ' (*ut-krāni*) or ' being understood ' (*avagamyamānatva*). As regards sūtra 6, Śaṅkara, Nimbārka and Vallabha agree in translating it thus : ' But (there are also in addition to the seven *prāṇas*) the hands and so on ; this being a settled matter, therefore, we must not conclude thus (i. e. that there are seven *prāṇas* only) '. But Rāmānuja interprets thus : ' But the hands and so on also (assist the soul) abiding (in the body), hence it is not so (that the *prāṇas* cannot be seven, but that they must be eleven). '—It appears that Rāmānuja proposes this explanation of the word ' *sthite* ' for the reason that, otherwise, according to Śaṅkara's interpretation, the two words ' *sthite* ' and ' *ataḥ* ' would mean one and the same thing.

Madhva, as usual, has a fanciful interpretation. The *prāṇas* are spoken of as seven, out of regard for the organs of sense (गते = ज्ञानेन्द्रियप्रयोगः). The hands etc., on the other hand, refer to action, and so they are not mentioned along with the seven organs of sense (स्थिते = कर्मणि विषये). This way of understanding the words ' *gatiḥ* ' and ' *sthitam* ' as meaning ' *jñāna* ' or knowledge and ' *karman* ' or action is, indeed, very curious and unwarranted, though Madhva quotes a passage* in support from some unknown work.

After having said that the *prāṇas* are created and that they are eleven in number, the Sūtrakāra, in the next sūtra (7), says that they are *āṇu* or minute also. This minuteness here does not mean being of the size of an atom, but being subtle (i. e. difficult to be perceived) and limited in size. All agree as regards this sūtra.

In the next sūtra (8), all the attributes of the *prāṇas*, so far mentioned, are transferred (*atidesa*) to the chief vital air (*mukhya-prāṇa*). Śaṅkara, Nimbārka and Vallabha regard these two sūtras as two separate adhikaranas, while Rāmānuja

* संतागस्थितिहेतुत्वात् चित्रं कर्म विदो विदुः ।
तस्माद्द्रव्यतिरेहेतुत्वाज्ञाने गतिरहितेच्चते ॥

regards them, without sufficient reason, as forming one adhikarana. Madhva, on the other hand, regards sūtra 7 as forming an adhikarana by itself, but connects sūtra 8 with the following one ; and this is more reasonable, as both these refer to the same subject, i. e. the chief vital air.

The next adhikarana (sūtras 9-12) deals with the nature and character of the chief vital air. It is neither the element, air, nor the activities of senses, but a separate entity, on account of its being mentioned separately. It is at the same time subordinate to the individual soul like the eye and other organs ; and it should not be objected that in this case there will have to be admitted another sense-object or function as peculiar to this prāṇa, because it is not a regular instrument like the other sense-organs. (Here Rāmānuja explains, and aptly too, that the objection is invalid, because the scripture actually speaks of its special function, viz., the supporting of the body and the senses ; e. g. 'यस्मिन्नुक्तान्ते इदं शरीरं पापिष्ठतरमिव दृश्यते स एव व्रेष्टः' Chāndogya Upa. 5, 1, 7, 'that is the chief prāṇa on whose going away this body appears as if most sinful or morbid.') The chief prāṇa besides is designated as having five functions like the mind.

All the commentators interpret this adhikarana in the same way (but for the slight difference in Rāmānuja just noted above), except of course Madhva, who, as usual, has very different explanations, especially of sūtras 9 and 11. In sūtra 9, he says that although the word prāṇa is used to denote the chief prāṇa, the element air, and the activities or external movements, still the passage, speaking of its creation, must refer to the chief vital air only and not to either the elemental air or the activities, owing to a special and separate mention of the creation of the chief vital air as opposed to the other two. Madhva regards, as stated above, sūtras 8 and 9 as forming an adhikarana by themselves ; while sūtras 10 and 11 form another adhikarana asserting that the chief vital air also is subject to Paramātman like the eye etc. with the difference, however, that the chief vital air is not an instrument, while the eye etc. are, and this is the meaning of the passages speaking of the independence of the chief vital air. Sūtra 12 also forms an independent adhikarana, meaning very much the same as in the

other commentaries. Sūtra 13. asserting that the chief vital air also is *apu*, i. e. subtle and limited in size, forms an independent *adhikarana* according to all commentators without exception.

One cannot help remarking here that the division into *adhikaranas*, followed by all the commentators except Madhva, is rather arbitrary. Either all these sūtras from 8 to 13, all alike referring to the chief vital air, should form one *adhikarana* or we should have four *adhikaranas* predicing four characteristics of the chief vital air. That, as a matter of fact, is the division adopted in Madhva's commentary.

The next three sūtras (14-16) form one *adhikarana* according to all. It is interpreted by Śaṅkara thus: The *prāṇas* perform their functions as presided over by their respective deities and not independently, as is declared in the scriptures (न द्वा प्राणनात्) Nor can it be objected that in that case the deities would be the enjoyers and not the souls; for the *prāṇas* are connected with the individual soul (= *prāṇavat*), as we know from scriptures; and because the individual soul abides permanently in the body as the enjoyer; but not so the deities, who cannot possibly abide as enjoyers in the earthly bodies, so full of imperfections.

Nimbarka follows Śaṅkara except in the third sūtra, which he explains as meaning that the connection of the *prāṇas* with the individual soul (as opposed to their connection with the deities presiding over them) is eternal.

Rāmānuja, though agreeing with the above in the verbal translation of the sūtras, refers them to a different topic. He reads sūtras 14 and 15 as one and explains that the rule over the *prāṇas* on the part of Fire and the other deities, together with the individual soul, is owing to the thinking of the Highest Self (*tad-āma-nāt*), * and is not independent, as we have scriptural statements to that effect. And this conclusion follows also from the eternity of this quality of being ruled by the Paramātman, who has entered all things. To my mind, the interpretation seems rather farfetched.

* The word ' *āmanana* ' is very rarely met with; we do not find it given even in the St. Petersburg Lexicon; all the same, the meaning, attributed to it by Śaṅkara, is no doubt the more natural one (cf. sūtra I. 2. 32).

Madhva, as usual, offers a different interpretation. Though the prāṇas are subject to and instruments of the individual soul, still it is the Brahman which abides in Fire etc. and which causes the prāṇas to perform their functions. Brahman, again, does all this through the individual souls and so there is no objection to the statement that the prāṇas are the instruments of the individual soul; and this follows moreover from the fact that the relation between the individual soul and the prāṇas is eternal. The point made out here is very much the same as that of Rāmānuja.

Vallabha's interpretation is almost obscure and far from satisfactory.

The next adhikarāṇa (sūtras 17-19), which is interpreted exactly alike by all, asserts that the prāṇas are the senses, i. e., independent principles, and not mere modifications of the chief vital air, on account of the designation being applicable to them with the exception of the best, i. e., the chief vital air, and on account of the scriptural statement of difference and also on account of the difference in their characteristics. Rāmānuja reads sūtras 18 and 19 as one and Nimbārka follows him.

The next and last adhikarāṇa (sūtras 20-22) is also interpreted alike by all and it asserts that the fashioning of the names and forms belongs to the Paramātman and not to the individual soul; and that it is on account of the preponderance of a particular element that there are distinctive names, such as, earth, water etc., though really speaking everything contains all the elements. Madhva regards sūtra 20 as forming one adhikarāṇa and the next two sūtras as forming another adhikarāṇa. Thus this last adhikarāṇa discusses the question as to whether the activity of creation * belongs to the Paramātman or to the individual soul; whereas the preceding adhikarāṇas of this pāda and some of the preceding pādas dealt with the production itself of the products.

ADHYĀYA III, PĀDA I.

The third and the fourth adhyāyas essentially differ from the first two adhyāyas as regards the contents. The main object of the first two adhyāyas may be briefly described as being to set

* उत्पत्तिस्ताद्वेति व्यापाग्वृत्पयमानोत्पादकगतौ सिद्धौ । तत्र जगदुत्पत्तिशुत्तिविरोधोऽनीतेन संदर्भेण निरस्तः । स्मृपत्युत्पादनाविषयशुत्तिविरोधो निरस्यते ।

forth the essential nature of the Brahman. Every thing in them may be said to contribute to the same end : the attempt made in the first adhyāya to show that the various doubtful passages of the Upanisads have for their purport nothing but the Brahman, the refutation of the objections against the doctrine of the Brahman, whether based on smṛti or on reasoning, the proof of the invalidity of other doctrines than that of the Brahman even from the merely speculative point of view, and the reconciliation of the apparently divergent Upanisad passages referring to the creation of the elements, the nature of the individual self, and the nature and origination of the accompaniments of the individual self. Now the sūtrakāra proceeds to enquire, in the third and fourth adhyāyas respectively, into the nature of the means of attaining the Brahman and the nature of that attainment. And first, in the first pāda of the third adhyāya, he goes on to describe the imperfections of the individual soul and its course from one birth to another, with a view to produce *vairāgya* or aversion to worldly pleasures, a most necessary antecedent condition without which one cannot even so much as enter upon the path to Mokṣa or final beatitude.

To begin with, the first adhikarana (sūtras 1-7) deals with the question whether the individual soul, in obtaining a different body, goes enveloped by the subtle material element or not. The answer to it is in the affirmative, because these (subtle material elements) are quite necessary as an abode to the *prāṇas* which are always attached to the soul and which also depart with the soul. All commentators agree in the general interpretation of the adhikarana, except for a few differences here and there, which are not important. Thus, for instance, in sūtra 6, the question raised according to Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka is : how do we know that it is the souls that are accompanied by water, though water alone is mentioned and not the souls, in Brāhmaṇa Upaniṣad V. 3. 3 ? And the answer is that the performers of sacrifices are understood there, being mentioned in Br. U. V. 3. 10. According to Vallabha, however, the question is : is it all kinds of souls that are so invested with the subtle elements, no particular kinds of souls being mentioned ? And the answer is, it is only the performers of sacrifices that go thus, and not all. Madhva has a separate adhikarana for each sūtra ; and in sūtra 4,

he translates the word 'bhāktatvat' by 'partially' (bhāgataḥ) and explains the sūtra to mean that the speech etc. only go partially into their respective deities, Agni etc., but that the parts that remain accompany the individual soul. And if it be objected that the going of the elements with the individual soul is not directly mentioned, just as, for instance, the going of speech etc. into Fire etc. is actually mentioned, the reply is that it is also mentioned in connection with the performers of sacrifices in some passages, whose source is, as usual, unknown (sūtras 6). The immortality, again, spoken of in 'अपाम सोमसूता अमृतम्' (Rgveda VIII. 48. 3) 'we drank the soma juice and have become immortal' is only metaphorical; because the real immortality can belong only to an ātma-vid, the possessor of the knowledge of the soul; and the performer of sacrifices etc. is in no sense an ātma-vid.

The second adhikarana (sūtras 8-11) says that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth, in order to undergo a new embodiment, they return with some remainder (aṁśa) of their former deeds cleaving to them, the remainder of deeds which cannot bear their fruit in the moon, but which must be enjoyed in this world only, and which thus determines the nature of the new embodiment. All agree in the interpretation of this adhikarana, except that Madhva splits sūtra 8 into two, 'कृतात्ये अनुशयात् वृत्स्मृतिभ्याम्' and 'येतं अनेव च', and has two adhikaranas for these two sūtras and has a third adhikarana for the remaining three sūtras.

The third adhikarana (sūtras 12-21) discusses the question regarding the fate of those whose good deeds are not sufficient to take them to the moon, and establishes the conclusion that it is those only who have knowledge (vidyā) and who perform sacrifices etc. (karman), that ascend to the moon for the enjoyment of their good deeds; while for the rest, there is the third place, the world of Yama; and they cannot go to the moon at all.

Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara, while agreeing in the purport of the adhikarana as stated above, differ from each other in that Rāmānuja regards sūtras 12-16 as stating the pūrvapakṣa or the prima facie view and the rest as Siddhānta, while according to Śaṅkara sūtra 12 alone states the prima facie view,

the siddhānta beginning with sūtra 13. This sūtra, when literally translated, would run thus:—‘but of the others, having experienced (the fruits of their actions in Samyamana, i. e. the world of Yama), there is an ascent and a descent, as such a course is declared.’ Śaṅkara remarks that the particle ‘tu’ (but) in the sūtra refutes the pūrvapakṣa. But the difficulty is as regards the word ‘āroha’ (ascent) in the sūtra. The sūtra distinctly says that there are both ascent and descent; and this can apparently mean the ascent to the moon and the descent from it to this world. Śaṅkara has to understand the descent to Yama’s world and ascent therefrom to this world, which seems a bit far-fetched, especially when the question is regarding the ascent to and descent from the moon; whereas according to Rāmānuja, the sūtra is only a qualification of the preceding sūtra, which asserts in an unqualified manner that even those who do not perform sacrifices ascend to the moon. This sūtra says that they have, however, to experience sufferings in the world of Yama. Thus the words āroha and avaroha can be explained in the most natural way. And again the particle ‘tu’ (but) in sūtra 17, ‘ but, of knowledge and work, those two being under discussion ’, can be construed well with Rāmānuja as marking the refutation of the pūrvapakṣa; but it is apparently purposeless according to Śaṅkara, and he has to remark that the word ‘tu’ is meant to preclude the idea, arising from the passage of another Śākhā, that all departed go to the moon—which is, in any case, less natural than Rāmānuja’s explanation.

Nimbārka exactly follows Rāmānuja here.

Vallabha regards sūtras 12–16 as forming one adhikarāṇa, and interprets sūtra 13 just like Śaṅkara, to mean that those who do not perform sacrifices etc. go to the world of Yama to suffer the fruits of their bad deeds. But with sūtra 17 in his opinion begins another adhikarāṇa just to confirm what has been established in the preceding adhikarāṇa.

Madhva regards sūtras 12–14 as forming one adhikarāṇa, establishing that even the performers of bad deeds have to go up and down, with the difference, however, that they have to pass through Naraka. Sūtra 15 forms another adhikarāṇa, asserting that there are seven Narakas; sūtra 16 forms another adhikarāṇa,

asserting that even in Naraka, it is the Paramēśvara who commands and directs. Sūtra 17, also forming a separate adhikarana, asserts that the individual souls are not independent in their courses upwards and downwards; but they depend upon Vidyā and Karman for the path of gods (Devayāna) and the path of the fathers (Pitryāna) respectively. The remaining four sūtras (18-21) form one adhikarana saying that in the Naraka, the world of great darkness, there is only misery (duhkha) and no sukha at all. Sūtra 21 is interpreted by Madhva in quite a different way from the rest, to mean that the word ' Śabda ', used in connection with the third place (i. e. the Naraka), involves (avarodha) Mūrcchā or faintness arising from extreme sufferings; whereas all the rest interpret it to mean that 'the third term,' i. e. *Udbhijja* (that which springs from a germ) comprises that which springs from heat (i. e. *svedaja*, i. e. the fourth class of the embodied beings). Madhva also reads an additional sūtra ' *smaraṇācca* ' ' on account of its being found in the smṛtis, ' with which he ends the adhikarana.

The next adhikarana (sūtra 22) asserts that the subtle bodies of the souls, descending from the moon, through the ether, air etc., do not become identical with them, but only resemble them. Śaṅkara and Vallabha read ' sābhāvyāpattih ' ; while Rāmānuja, Madhva and Nimbārka reads ' tat-svābhāvyāpattih ', but both the words mean alike.

The next sūtra (23) forms an adhikarana stating that the entire descent of the soul occupies a very short time only. The last adhikarana (sūtras 24-27) lays down that when the souls finally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them. Madhva has three adhikaranas (24-25, 26, 27) instead of one. There are no differences of interpretation worth noting.

ADHYĀYA III, PĀDA 2.

After having described the Samsāra-gati or the course from one birth to another of the individual soul, in the first pāda of the third adhyāya, the Sūtrakāra next proceeds to discuss the nature of the dreaming and sleeping conditions of the soul. The first adhikarana (sūtras 1-6) treats of the individual soul in the dreaming state. This adhikarana is very important for our purpose, because inter-

pretations, quite opposed to each other and involving a difference of opinion as regards essential points, have been put upon it by the different commentators; hence we are quite justified in examining in detail the meaning of the individual sūtras.

According to Śaṅkara, the question raised in the first three sūtras is whether the creation in a dream is as real as the creation by which the waking soul is surrounded. The first two sūtras state the pūrvapakṣa: the creation in a dream (is real), for so say the scriptures (sūtra 1) and some (state that the Highest Self is) the creator (of the things seen in a dream), sons and so on, (being the beloved things, 'kāmāḥ', which He shapes) (sūtra 2). Sūtra 3 states the siddhānta: 'but it (viz. the dream world) is mere illusion, 'māyā-mātram', on account of its nature not manifesting itself with the totality (of the attributes of reality such as place, time, etc.,). So far there is nothing to object to this interpretation, except perhaps the meaning of the word 'māyā' (the word nowhere occurring again in the sūtras). But when we go to the next sūtra, the difficulty is how to connect it logically with the one that precedes. Sūtra 4 literally translated would run thus: 'For the dream is also indicative according to Śruti; the experts also declare this.' If at all, this may be an argument to support the reality of dreams. But Śaṅkara connects it with the preceding sūtra in a very unsatisfactory way. Having asserted in the previous sūtra that the dream world is mere illusion, he further adds: but it is not altogether so, i. e. unreal and illusory, for dreams are prophetic of good and bad fortunes to come; so it follows that there is some reality in dreams. To guard against such a notion, Śaṅkara comes forth with his qualifying remark to the effect that though in all these cases the thing indicated may be real, still the indicating dream remains as unreal as ever, refuted as it is by the waking state. Thus the doctrine that the dream itself is mere illusion remains uncontradicted. This very necessity of offering an explanation is a proof of the unsatisfactory character of the interpretation. The want of connection becomes still more glaring when we come to the next two sūtras which run thus: 'but by the meditation on the highest, that which is hidden (i. e., the quality of the Lord and the individual soul) (becomes manifest); for, from him (i. e. the Lord) are its

(i. e. the soul's) bondage and its opposite (i. e. release) (sūtra 5); or that (viz. the concealment of the soul's powers,) springs from its connection with the body' (sūtra 6). Naturally Śaṅkara commences his comments on these sūtras with the question, why should the dream-world be not the creation by the individual soul, if both the Lord and the Soul, one being a part of the other, have in common the powers of knowledge and rulership, just as for instance fire and the spark, which is its part, have in common the powers of burning and giving light. We do not see how this question arises here at all, when the three preceding sūtras deal with the unreal character of the dream-world. Thus this adhikarana, if we follow Śaṅkara's interpretation, seems to be made up of two groups, apparently without any direct logical connection.

According to Rāmānuja, on the other hand, the question raised in the first three sūtras is whether the creation in a dream is the work of the individual soul or of the Highest Self. The first two sūtras state the pūrvapakṣa that the creation is effected by the individual soul, and that some describe the individual soul to be the shaper of the things seen in a dream. The third sūtra states the siddhānta and is translated thus, in an altogether different way from Śaṅkara: 'But (the creation in a dream is) pure Māyā ; on account of the true nature (of the individual soul) not being fully manifested.' The term 'Māyā' he explains as meaning 'the wonderful power of the divine being'. And thus he argues that the creation in a dream must be the work of the Supreme Soul ; as the māyā can belong to none but the Supreme Soul, who can immediately realize all his wishes. A further reason why it cannot be the work of the individual soul is that although the individual soul is fundamentally possessed of that power, still he is incapable of accomplishing such wonderful creations, being as he is in the Saṁsāra state where his true nature is not fully manifested. The question naturally arises, why is it not fully manifested, if it is fundamentally possessed by the individual soul ? And the answer is : 'But owing to the wish of the Highest Self, it is hidden ; for, from that (i. e. the wish of the Supreme Self) are its bondage and the opposite.' (Here it is to be noted that Rāmānuja changes the order of the sūtras a little. Sūtra 4 according to Śaṅkara is read by him last in the

adhikarana). ' Or that (results) also from his connection with the body. . And the things seen in the dreams are not created by the wish of the individual soul for this reason also that (the dream) is suggestive (i. e. prophetic of future good or ill fortune) according to scripture. '

Well, according to this interpretation, the mutual relation between the first three sūtras and the last three sūtras is very naturally explained ; but the translation of the word 'māyā-mātram' in sūtra 3, is unusual, though quite justifiable. That the meaning of the word 'māyā-mātram', as given by Śaṅkara, is more usual than that given by Rāmānuja is evident; and the same follows from the fact that Vallabha and Bhāskarācārya* interpret the word in the same way. It is very curious that the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha of Nimbārka and the Bhāṣya of Bhāskara which on the whole quite agree with each other, (Mr. Eggeling † is inclined to believe that Bhāskarācārya is only another name for Nimbārka), differ in the present case.‡ The former entirely follows the interpretation in the Śribhāṣya, though keeping the order of the sūtras as found in Śaṅkara's commentary; while the latter has a new interpretation, which, on the whole seems to me better, as it apparently is free from the objections, raised above, against the interpretations as given by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Bhāskara is in entire agreement with Śaṅkara, as regards the translation of the first three sūtras ; but in the third sūtra, he further adds that as the creation in a dream is mere illusion, so it must belong to the individual soul and not to the Supreme Soul, whose creation, like that of ether, air etc., is bound to be absolutely real. Another reason why the dream is a creation of the individual soul is that it is indicative of good or ill fortune ; and no such good or ill fortune is possible in the case of the Supreme Soul. Then the question naturally arises, why the creation by the individual soul should be illusory ; the reply is,

* The author of a commentary on Brahma-sūtras, (see Chaukhāmbā Sanskrit series Nos. 70, 185, 209).

† Catalogue of MSS of the India Office, Part IV, pp. 802, 803.

‡ A detailed examination of the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha and the commentary of Bhāskarācārya, leads us to hold that Nimbārka and Bhāskarācārya are two different persons, representing two different schools.

the full nature of the individual soul is concealed, but it becomes manifest through meditation on the Highest Self, (just the same as the translation given by Śaṅkara). I think this way of interpretation as given by Bhāskara to be better.

It is necessary to note here how three different views are held regarding the subject in question. According to Śaṅkara, the creation in dreams is illusory ; the whole world, the so-called real creation, even the creation by which the individual soul is surrounded in its waking state is also illusory ; but the difference is that the latter, the world consisting of ether, etc., remains fixed and distinct up to the moment when the soul cognizes that the Brahman is the self of all ; the former, the world of dreams, on the other hand, is daily sublated by the waking state. According to Rāmānuja, the world of ether, etc., and the world of dreams, are both equally real and not at all illusory, both being alike creations of the Supreme Soul. According to Bhāskara, the world of ether, etc. is of course absolutely real, being creations of the Supreme Soul, while the world in dreams is unreal and illusory, being the creation of the individual soul. The three views may be described as idealistic, realistic and idealistico-realistic respectively.

Vallabha also practically follows the third view and interprets just in the same way as Bhāskara does, with the difference that he interprets sūtra 5 just as Rāmānuja does it, the word 'parā-bhidhyānāt' being translated as 'owing to the will of the Supreme Self ' instead of as ' through meditation on the Supreme Soul. '

Madhva takes the first four sūtras only to form one adhikarana, and interprets them to mean that the creation in a dream does exist, i. e., is real and that it is the work of the Supreme Self; but it is caused by His will alone, being otherwise without any material cause, like the ordinary world in the waking state. Thus māyā-mātram means 'स्वेच्छामात्रं प्रदर्शयन्ति.' He shows it only by his own free will and the reality of the creation is further proved by the fact that it is suggestive of future good or ill fortune. Sūtra 5 forms another adhikarana, stating that the world of dreams is made to disappear also through the will of the Supreme Being ; i. e., He is both the creator and the destroyer of the dream-world. Sūtra 6, again, forms another adhikarana asserting

that even the world in the waking state or the waking state itself ('वेहयोगेन वासः' literally means 'abiding in connection with the body'), and not only dream and sleep, proceed from Him. As usual Madhva quotes passages in support from obscure sources. One may remark here that in sūtra 3, the svarūpa should naturally refer to the creation in a dream, since it is this dream-world which is described as māyā-mātrām; and that in sūtra 5, the translation of the word, parābhidhyāna, as given by Rāmānuja, i. e., 'the willing by the Supreme Self' is supported by sūtra II. 3. 13, where तद्भिद्यानात् means owing to the willing or reflecting by the Brahman.' Thus the three sūtras (3, 4 and 5) may be rendered thus: 'The creation in the dream is exclusively māyā, i. e., absolutely outside the normal order of things (whether it be superior or inferior to the normal order), because its nature is entirely non-manifested (i. e., it does not in any way possess, the characteristics of the normal creation.) Moreover, the creation in the dream-state supplies indications (about the future), because the great part (of reality) remains concealed in the dream, on account of the will of the Supreme Being.¹'

The second adhikarana (sūtras 7 and 8) teaches that in the state of deep, dreamless sleep, according to all commentators, the individual soul abides in the Brahman within the heart.

The third adhikarana (sūtra 9) expounds that the soul awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep, because, otherwise, the reassuming of the action left incomplete before going to sleep, the remembering of past experiences and the injunctions about sacrifices etc. leading to definite results, would not be possible. Madhva explains this sūtra to mean that the same Pāramātman is the shaper of the different conditions for all the individual souls and not for some only.

The fourth adhikarana (sūtra 10) explains the nature of the condition of swoon, that it is neither of the three known conditions of being awake, sleeping and dreaming; but it is mid-way between sleep and death.

The next adhikarana is full of difficulties inasmuch as it has been interpreted in various ways; and at the same time it is next

¹ We owe this interpretation to M. Sylvain Lévi.

to impossible to decide which of the interpretations is more natural than the rest. According to Śaṅkara, its purport is to determine, on a scriptural basis, the nature of that Brahman in which the individual soul is absorbed in the state of deep sleep, as described in the immediately preceding adhikaranas. The question is whether the Brahman is *nirviśeṣa* (absolutely void of attributes) or *saviśeṣa* (qualified by attributes); for there are passages in the śruti which lend support to both these views. The Brahman cannot be both *saviśeṣa* and *nirviśeṣa*, begins the adhikarana, even through the limiting adjuncts (स्थानतः पृथिव्याद्युपाधियगात्); for, everywhere the Brahman is described as being *nirviśeṣa* (sūtra 11). If it be said that this is not reasonable owing to the different descriptions of Brahman in different passages, we reply, 'no'; for in every such passage describing the adjuncts of the Brahman, it is described as being itself free from all diversity (sūtra 12); and some directly speak of *abheda* (absence of diversity), at the same time condemning all *bheda* (diversity) (sūtra 13). And the Brahman must be regarded as void of all diversity ; for passages describing the Brahman as *nirviśeṣa* have the Brahman for their principal subject (*tat-pradhāna*) (while passages describing the Brahman as *saviśeṣa* are not so, but they aim at *upāsanā* or meditation ; and when there is an opposition between passages which have the Brahman as their chief subject (*tat-pradhāna*) and those which have it not, the former must naturally be accepted and the latter rejected, in determining the nature of the Brahman (sūtra 14). And in order that the *saviśeṣa* passages should not be devoid of significance, the Brahman must be regarded as being like light (which seems to assume as it were different forms, but which does not really possess the forms (sūtra 15). The Scripture, moreover, declares the Brahman to consist of that only (i. e., intelligence) and thus to be absolutely *nirviśeṣa* (sūtra 16). The same is stated also in the śruti and smṛti (sūtra 17). For this very reason there are comparisons with reflections of the sun in water etc. (which aim at nothing but showing the unreal character of the apparent manifestations of the Brahman, due to the limiting adjuncts) (sūtra 18). (But it may be objected that) there is no parallelism (of the two things compared), since (in the case of the Brahman)

there is not apprehended (any separate substance) comparable to the water (sūtra 19). (The objection, however, does not hold good ; for, what the comparison means is that) the Brahman participates (as it were) in the increase and decrease of the limiting adjuncts, since it is implied in them¹ ; and owing to the appropriateness of the two things compared ; it is thus (i. e., the comparison holds good). (The meaning is that as the reflected images of the sun participate in the changes which the water undergoes, while the sun himself remains unaffected thereby so the true self is not affected by the attributes of the upādhis) (sūtra 20). The Scripture also declares (that the Brahman itself enters into the upādhis) (sūtra 21).

It is to be noted here that the explanation of the word 'sthānatāh' in sūtra 11, is not satisfactory, also that Śaṅkara uses the word 'as it were' (jva) in the interpretation of sūtras 15 and 20, to which nothing in the sūtras corresponds, and that the words 'darśayati ca' in sūtra 17 are superfluous.

Rāmānuja, however, connects this adhikarana with what precedes, quite in a different way, i. e. by asking the question whether the imperfections of the individual soul, whose conditions have been so far discussed, affect also the Brahman or not. Not even owing to its abiding (in such places as the earth, the individual soul etc. is there any imperfection) attaching to the Highest Self ; for everywhere, it is described as having twofold characteristics (i. e. being, on the one hand, free from all evils, and, on the other hand, being endowed with all auspicious qualities) (sūtra 11). (If it be said that the antaryāmin, the ruler within, also is affected by imperfections) owing to the variety (of bodies within which it abides, just as, for instance, the individual soul, although essentially free from evil, is yet liable to imperfections owing to its connection with a variety of bodies), we reply, 'no ; because in every section (of the chapter referring to the antaryāmin in the Brh. Upa. 317) he is expressly called the 'opposite of that,' (i. e., free from the short-comings of the individual soul) (sūtra 12). And some moreover expressly assert that,

1 Thus the ether (to which the Brahman is compared) has more or less volume according to the greater or smaller dimensions of the recipient (the upādhī or condition) which contains it.

though the Lord and the soul are within one body, the soul only is important, but not the Lord) (sūtra 13). Another proof of it lies in fact that the Brahman in itself is devoid of form (i. e. not subject to imperfections due to the connection with the bodies) (...क्षराहिततुल्य-मेव जीववच्छुरीस्त्वानिवन्नन् कर्मवश्यत्वमस्य न विद्यत इत्यर्थः), it being the principal element in the bringing about of names and forms (sūtra 14). Again, just as we must admit that the Brahman is of the nature of light and intelligence (in order not to deprive passages like ' satyam jñānam etc. ' of their significance), in the same way, not to deprive such passages as assert satya-saṅkalpatva etc. of their significance (we must admit that the Brahman is possessed of the double character, i. e. being free from the faults and being the abode of all auspicious qualities) (sūtra 15). (Moreover, the Taitti. Upa. passage (2. 1) ' satyam jñānam etc. ' only asserts so much (i. e. the prakāśa-svarūpatva of the Brahman, but does not at the same time deny other qualities such as ' satya-saṅkalpatva ' etc. known from other passages) (sūtra 16). (And this two-fold character of the Brahman) is asserted in many passages of the śruti and the smṛti (sūtra 17). It is, because (the Brahman, although abiding in many places, is not touched by their imperfections) that the similes of the reflected sun of the ether limited by a jar etc. are applicable to it (sūtra 18). If it be objected that the simile is not applicable because the sun is apprehended in the water erroneously (bhrāntyā), while the antaryāmin really (paramārthatah) abides in the earth etc., and so he must share in their changes and defects (sūtra 19), we reply that what is negatived by the simile is that the Brahman should participate in the increase and decrease of the many places in which it inheres ; on this view both similes (that of the sun and of the ether) are appropriate (sūtra 20). And we observe analogous similes (i. e. to be understood only in some particular aspects) employed in ordinary life, e. g. when we compare Mānavaka to a lion (sūtra 21).

It must be confessed here that the meaning of ' tan-mātram ' in sūtra 16 is rather unfamiliar, the meaning given by Śaṅkara being no doubt the more usual one. On the other hand, sūtra 17 is construed much better, and has not the appearance of superfluousness. It is very curious how the very same simile in sūtra 18 can lead to two diverse views regarding the nature of the

Brahman. In sūtra 20, Rāmānuja has not to supply 'iva' of his own invention, which Sāmkara is compelled to do.

Nimbārka agrees with Rāmānuja as regards the general purport of these sūtras, but differs from him in the interpretation of some individual sūtras. Thus according to him, sūtra 15 means that the Brahman must be regarded as prakāśavat (the source of light) and at the same time as प्रकाशयदेवापासृष्ट (not touched by the defects of the object to be illumined) in order to give the following sentence its full significance : 'तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वम् । आदिन्यवर्णं तमसः परतात् ।' This sentence, by itself confirms the twofold character of the Brahman. Sūtra 16 also is explained differently to mean that a sentence can have its full significance only when it signifies all that it expresses, without leaving out anything.

Madhva divides the sūtras (11-21) into five adhikaraṇas. The purport of the adhikaraṇas (sūtras 11-13) is that the Highest Self does not inherently possess difference of forms and that when it is described as having infinite forms, it is out of regard for its greatness or aīsvarya. The next adhikaraṇa (sūtras 14-17) shows that when the Brahman is spoken of as being without form, it means that it is without forms of the material world (prākṛta-rūpa-hīna); at the same time the passages describing the rūpa of the Brahman have their full significance in that they describe the vilāksana or extraordinary form of the Brahman. The next adhikaraṇa (sūtra 18) says that though the jīva is similar in nature to the Brahman, still it cannot be void of all difference like it, because the jīva is only its reflection (pratibimba); and so it is absolutely different from, dependent upon and similar to the Brahman, just as a sun's reflection is different from, dependent upon and similar to the sun. The next adhikaraṇa (sūtra 19) states that this similarity of nature of jīva is not manifested without bhakti (devotion) (अन्तुवद्ग्रहणात् = अन्तुवत् स्वेहैन ग्रहण ज्ञाने भास्ति चिना) and that this bhakti has different degrees, (वृद्धि-द्वास-भास्त्वम्) some higher and some lower is stated in the next adhikaraṇa (sūtras 20-21).

The way in which Madhva interprets the words अन्तुवत् and अन्तुवद्ग्रहणात् is fantastic and not less curious is the way in which he explains the simile of the sun's reflection so as to support the duality of the Brahman and the jīva.

According to Vallabha, all these sūtras (11-21) form one ad-

hikarāṇa ; but the question proposed is whether the attributes of the individual souls and of the material world, sometimes affirmed of the Brahman and sometimes denied, belong to him or not. Sūtra 15 says that just as the light of the sun is both capable of being pointed out (vyavahāra) and otherwise, in the same way the Brahman is both object of definite description vyavahāravisa-ya and transcending all predication (vyavahārātīta), in order that the mutually opposed passages in the scriptures should retain their significance. Sūtras 16-18 state the *prima facie* view saying that the Brahman is only tan-mātra (i. e., intelligence pure and simple), and that the simile of the sun's reflection indicates that the attributes of cit and acit are only metaphorically predicated of the Brahman, while their total absence is its real nature. Sūtras 19-21 state the siddhānta, to the effect that the Brahman both has and has not the attributes of cit and acit and that it is the abode of all sorts of attributes opposed to each other ; and that there is no real contradiction between the several texts of the scriptures.

Sūtras 22-30 form a new adhikarana according to Śaṅkara, the subject-matter of which is the passage from the Brh. Upa. (2. 3. 6), ' अयान अदेश नेति नेति न होतस्मादिनि नेत्यन्यत्परेति ' (now then the teaching, by ' not so, not so ' : there is nothing higher than this, hence ' not so ' ; there is Another over and above '). The question is : whether these negations negative the Brahman also or only the two forms of the Brahman, corporeal and incorporeal, mentioned in the preceding sentence. Sūtra 22 replies that the passage negatives only the two limited forms ; while that which is beyond these forms negated is the Brahman, and it is non-manifest (sūtra 23). The yogins realise this Brahman, void of all distinctive attributes, at the time of the saṁrādhana (devotion, meditation etc.) (sūtra 24). The Brahman is devoid of all distinctive attributes as light, which appears to be different as it comes in contact with different objects (which are the upādhis or adjuncts, the karman), but which is itself unchanged. And the non-difference of the Brahman and the jīva is repeatedly mentioned (sūtra 25). Hence is the jīva spoken of as becoming one with the prājña or the Highest Self, which is possible only if the distinctions are unreal (sūtra 26).¹

The question proposed in the remaining four sūtras of this

adhibarana is how to reconcile passages speaking of the difference between the jīva and the Prājña (e. g. Mund. Up. 3. 1. 8; 3. 2. 8 &c.) and those speaking of their non-difference (e. g. Chānd. Up. 6. 8. 7; Brāhad. Upa. 1. 4. 10 etc.) One view is that the relation between the prajña and the jīva is like that between a serpent and its coils, which are non-different in as much they are both serpent, at the same time different, from the point of view of the coils, the hood, the length etc. (sūtra 27). Another view is that the relation is like that between light and its source, which are not absolutely different, both being alike tejas, but which at the same time are different and have different names (sūtra 28). But the siddhānta is the one stated in sūtra 25 above that all difference is unreal and that the Brahman is the only reality (sūtra 29). This follows from the denial of any other intelligent being than the Highest Self (e. g., in Br. u.3. 7. 23, न अप्येति द्रष्टा 'there is no other seer than this').

It has to be noted here that the meaning of the word 'karmani' in sūtra 25 is anything but satisfactory.

According to Rāmānuja, however, sūtras 22-26 form a continuation of the preceding adhibarana. The question being, how the twofold character of the Brahman, as understood above, can be possible, when the clause 'नेति नेति' denies the forms of the Brahman described before. The reply is that this clause denies only the limited nature of the Brahman, i. e., it denies that the Brahman is possessed of only these attributes and no more; and this is corroborated by the fact that more attributes are later on spoken of as belonging to the Brahman (sūtra 22). Here Rāmānuja criticises Śaṅkara's interpretation thus: it would be ridiculous to hold that the attributes are described first just in accordance with the popular conception (anuvāda) to be only denied afterwards; because in the first place it is futile; and secondly, such a course would be justifiable only if these attributes of the Brahman can be known from ordinary experience; but, as a matter of fact they can be known from scripture alone. And scripture as a matter of fact declares the Brahman to be non-manifest, i. e., not accessible to any other proofs but scripture (sūtra 23). The realisation of this Brahman ensues only from contemplation which has taken the form of bhakti or devotion, or from its being propitiated by the worshipper's

devotion 'saṁrādhana' (sūtra 24). The interpretation given above of 'नेति नेति' is confirmed by the fact that the quality of being differentiated by the corporeal and incorporeal world (मूर्त्तिमूर्त्तिपञ्चाविशिष्टता) of the Brahman is realised just in the same way as the luminousness, intelligence etc. are and these latter are realised only through repeated practice in the act of Saṁrādhana (कर्मण्यभानात्) (sūtra 25). For all these reasons, the Brahman possesses an infinite number of attributes; for thus the twofold indications (linga) met with in the Scriptures are justified (sūtra 26).

The remaining four sūtras (27-30) form a new adhikarana, proposing to discuss the relation in particular between the Brahman and the acid-vastu or non-sentient matter ; for there are passages referring to the non-difference of the two (e. g. 'ब्रह्मेवै सर्वम्' Nṛsiṃha Up. 5) as well as to their difference (e. g. हन्ताहसिमास्तिनो देवता अदेत जित्विनात्मनानुप्रविश्य Chān. Up. 27. 6. 3. 2). The relation, says sūtra 27, is like that between a serpent and its coils, i. e., the non-sentient matter is only a special arrangement (sainsthāna-viśeṣa) of the Brahman. But this view has to be rejected, remarks Rāmānuja, because it goes against the passages referring to the difference between the Brahman and the non-sentient matter as well as those which describe the Brahman as being incapable of transformation (pariṇāma). Or the relation in question is like that between light and its abode, which, though really different, are at the same time non-different, since both alike are tejas (sūtra 28). The Siddhānta, however, is that the relation is just as it was decided before (pūrvavat) in sūtra II. 3. 43, i. e. non-sentient matter is only a part of the Brahman and hence its attribute, incapable of existing independently of it (sūtra 29). And the same follows from the denial of the attributes of non-sentient matter as belonging to the Brahman (sūtra 30).

It must be admitted, that the explanation of 'कर्मण्यमासात्' in sūtra 25 is decidedly superior to that given by Śaṅkara. At the same time the meaning of 'anantena' in sūtra 26, though justified by the context, is rather unusual.

Nimbārka, like Śaṅkara, begins a new adhikarāna with sūtra 22 and continues it upto sūtra 30. As regards sūtras 22-24, he generally agrees with Rāmānuja; but he interprets sūtras 25 and

26 a little differently. Just as sūrya etc. are manifested to certain persons only, after the repeated practice of certain mantras etc., though they are otherwise common to all, in the same way the Brahman, though present everywhere, is realised only by some after the repeated practice of Saṁrādhana or contemplation assuming the form of devotion. And from this realisation of the Brahman (atāḥ), the jīva becomes similar to or united with the Brahman. Thus Nimbārka explains the words कर्मण्यम्यासात् like Rāmānuja, but anantena like Śāmkara.

As for the remaining four sūtras, Nimbārka has a different purport altogether, although their literal meaning may not appear different. That the passage नेति नेति does not negative the mūrtā and amūrtā forms of the Brahman but only its limited character follows from the fact that the world stands to the Brahman in the relation of bhedābheda, i. e. both difference and non-difference, just like that between a serpent and its coils in conformity with both kinds of mention, i. e. of difference as well as non-difference, found in the Scriptures. This is the siddhānta according to Nimbārka as regards the relation between the Brahman and the inanimate world; and not a mere *prima facie* view, as for instance, Śāmkara and Rāmānuja suppose it to be. So also sūtra 28 states the siddhānta regarding the relation between the Brahman and the jīva or cit, which is also bhedābheda, just like the one existing between light and its abode. If then, one might object, the world is only a special arrangement of the Brahman, as follows from the metaphor of a serpent and its coil, the Brahman is capable of transformation: then either the whole of it must be transformed, partless as it is; or it should cease to be partless, so that a part of it only is transformed. According to sūtra 29, which negatives the objection, these objections are to be answered as above (pūrvavat) in sūtra II. 1. 27, which says that the nature of the Brahman is to be solely determined from the śruti and not merely by ordinary reasoning. Moreover, the conclusion that the Brahman is not affected by any defects or impurities is reached from such express negations as न लिप्यने लोक-दुर्बले, 'he is not touched by ordinary worldly misery.'

This interpretation, although very satisfactory, has, however, a defect and it is that if it is admitted, the particle *vā* (or) in the two sūtras, 28 and 29, loses all significance.

According to Madhva, sūtra 22 forms an adhikarana, saying that the śruti denies the Brahman being only the creator and destroyer; for it asserts something more, i. e. that it is also the protector. Sūtras 23-26 form another adhikarana, saying that the Brahman is by itself non-manifest; that it can become manifest only by repeated practice of śravana, manana etc. (कर्मणि विषयभूते तास्मिन् अज्ञाणे प्रकाशः क्षात्कारो भवति ।) 'there results the realisation, 'prakāśa', of the Brahmaṇ which is the object, 'karman'; and that it becomes so only through the favour of the Brahman itself, of infinite and wonderful powers (अनन्तेनापरिमितसामर्थ्येनावित्तस्य तस्य प्रसादात्) and not through the unaided efforts of the jīva. The subject of sūtras (27-30) is, 'how can the Brahman be both bliss and the possessor of bliss (ānanda and ānandin)'. The Brahman can be both, says sūtra 27, just as a serpent can be both a coil and one having a coil; for we have both kinds of mention in the texts. Thus for instance, in Tattiriya Up. II. 4. आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् 'knowing the bliss of Brahman', the Brahman is spoken of as ānandin; and in अथैष एव परम आनन्दः, Brhad. Up. 6. 3. 33, 'this itself is the great bliss', the Brahman is spoken of as ānanda. Exactly in the same manner the sun is both light and the abode of light (sūtra 28) and time is the measurer (avacchedaka, as when we used a word like pūrva 'former' : पूर्ववद्वा), as well as the measured one (sūtra 29). That the Brahman is both the quality and the qualified follows from such negations as 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' or 'नेह नानास्ति किंचन'. Madhva's explanations of sūtras 22 and 29 are unnatural on the face of them.

Vallabha divides sūtras 22-30 into four adhikaranas. Sūtra 22, forming the first adhikarana, says that the negation of attributes with regard to the Brahman only refers to ordinary worldly attributes and that it only means that the Brahman is extraordinary (jagad-vilaksana). The next adhikarana (sūtras 23-24) rejects the view according to which only those passages which deny all attributes about the Brahman represent the truth, whereas those that predicate attributes are to be understood only metaphorically; and it establishes that the Brahman is in reality both possessed of attributes and void of attributes : लौकिकालौकिक-प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वादुभयवाक्यार्थस्यमपि ब्रह्म । 'being the subject of ordinary and extra-ordinary perception, the Brahman has its nature denoted

by both kinds of sentences'. The next adhikarana (sūtras 25-27) deals with the same question. The pūrvapakṣa runs thus : just as tejas, 'light', is of one nature and possesses only one touch, i. e. hot, although under different circumstances different kinds of touch may be experienced (e. g. cool touch in the moon ; but that does not mean that the cool touch belongs really to tejas) ; in the same way, though the Brahman may be manifested in the act of contemplation (karmanī) as possessed of an infinite variety of forms (anantena) according to the inclination of the devotee, still it is really only (nirviṣeṣa) void of any attributes. But, no, says the siddhānta ; the Brahman is both void of qualities, and possessed of infinite qualities, just as a serpent can be both straight and crooked. Sūtras 28-30 discuss the relation between the Brahman and its attributes (dharma), which is like that between light and its abode. Thus the Brahman either exists always as possessed of its dharmas, which we can never conceive as being separated from it, or the truth may be as represented above (pūrvavat) in sūtras 14-18, i. e. the Brahman is void of attributes (nir-dharmaka). Just as to reconcile certain passages we admit that the Brahman is possessed of a twofold character (ubhaya-rūpa), in the same way to reconcile passages like ' satyam ', ' ekam eva advitīyam ' we must admit that the Brahman is nir-dharmaka. Here Vallabha remarks that both these views are favoured by the Sūtrakāra (उभयमपि सूत्रकारस्य संमतमिति).

Thus from a consideration of the several interpretations of sūtras 11-30, two points are quite clear. In the first place there is not the least reference to the māyā ; for, we see how Śaṅkara has to put in the word ' iva ' several times. In the second place, the Sūtrakāra's attempt to reconcile passages of a radically opposed character, regarding the nature of the Brahman and its relation to the jīva and the non-sentient matter, has not led to any decisive result ; in other words, instead of laying down any hard and fast theory, as for instance, that the jīva is a transformation (parināma) of the Brahman or an illusory aspect (vivarta), he only illustrates the relation by various examples (cf. especially sūtras 27-29 and the particle ' vā ' used there). Or perhaps he is prepared to believe that both distinction (bheda) and non-distinction (abheda), absence of attributes (nir-dharmatva)

and the possession of infinite attributes (ananta-dharmatva) are possible in the Brahman, since it is only to be known from the Scriptures. If however we want to see some definite system in the sūtras, the most probable one, as far as these particular sūtras go, would be the doctrine of Bhedābheda, which sees both bheda and abheda, without involving any third principle to reconcile them and to which especially the illustrations of the serpent and its coil or of light and its abode are suitable.

The next adhikarana (sūtras 31-37) discusses certain terms applied to the Brahman, terms which, if literally understood, would imply the idea of limitation, but which are to be understood only in a metaphorical sense as far as the Brahman is concerned, without in any way affecting its unlimited character.

The last adhikarana of this pāda (sūtras 38-41) decides that the fruit of actions is given by the Highest Self ; and that mere karman, whether through adrsta (the unseen) or without it, is incapable of producing it, if it is not aided by Him. It is to be noted that here Bādarāyana and Jaimini are mentioned as the advocates of Īśvara and karman respectively.

ADHYĀYA III, PĀDA 3.

The first and second pādas, though belonging to the Sādhanādhyāya or the chapter dealing with the means of attaining Mokṣa, really dealt with the nature and attributes of the Brahman and the nature of transmigration. It is with the third pāda that the consideration of the meditations or cognitions leading to the attainment of the Brahman really begins.

We know, that in the different Upaniṣads, belonging to the different Vedas or belonging to the different Śākhās of the same Veda, meditations or cognitions (vidyā) of the Brahman are described, sometimes under the same name, but with some differences of detail. Thus, for instance, the so-called Śāndilya-vidyā, which is met with in Chān. III. 14, is found again in an abridged form in Brhad. V. 6 and again in Satapatha Brāhmaṇa X. 6. 3. All these three passages enjoin a meditation on the Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as for instance, manomayatva, bhārūpatva, &c.) while others are peculiar to each separate pas-

sage, prāṇasariratva and satya-saṅkalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chānd. and Śatapatha Brāh., but not in the Br̥had., which, on its part, specifies sarvavaśitva, not referred to in the two other texts. Now the question is whether all these meditations are one and the same or whether they are different. In the case of ritual or of the sacrifices, the different descriptions of a sacrifice bearing one name, found in different passages, do not present any such difficulty; for acts may be performed in different fashions, according to circumstances; since they are all sādhya (to be accomplished), and each one may follow the practice taught in his own Sākhā to the exclusion of the rest. But with cognitions, the case is quite different. The object of these cognitions is the Brahman, which is one, eternal, and unchangeable in character; it is something siddha (accomplished) as opposed to karman which is sādhya; and so the cognitions also must be one without difference. If, however, there are different cognitions, only one of them can be true, because it is faithful to its object; while the rest should be false, it being impossible that one and the same object can be cognised in more than one way. It is this question then with which this entire pāda deals: whether the cognitions of the Brahman, which form the subject of the different Vedānta texts, are separate cognitions or not. The question, though appearing rather trivial and of no philosophic importance to us, is, however, very important for the practical follower of the Vedānta doctrine; in-as-much as, if the cognitions are separate, he will have to practise so many different meditations, whereas if they are all one, only one meditation would suffice.

The question is answered in a general way, in the first adhikarana (sūtras 1-4) thus: The cognitions or meditations of the Brahman, taught by all the Vedānta-texts, are identical on account of the non-difference of injunctions &c.; to wit, because the special activities enjoined by different verbal roots, such as 'upāsita' 'he should meditate', 'vidyāt' 'he should know' etc. in connection with the different vidyās are non-different. And adhikarana 2 (sūtra 5) further adds as a corollary of this that in the case of a devout meditation on the Brahman, common to several sākhās, the particulars mentioned in each sākhā have to

undergo a combination (upasamhāra), since there is no difference of essential matter. Thus, in the instance given above, the Śāndilya-vidyā in the three passages is one and the same and the variant details have to be all combined, though they differ in the different passages. Or, to take another instance, the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, or the meditation on the Brahman under the aspect of Vaiśvānara, found in Chānd. V. 12-2 and Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10-6-1-11, is identical, because we meet with one and the same injunction (viz. वैश्वानरमुपासीत, 'he should meditate on Vaiśvānara'); the form (rūpa) of the meditations is also the same, for the form of a cognition solely depends on its object ; and the object is in both cases the same, viz. Vaiśvānara ; and both these vidyās are declared to have the same result, viz. attaining the Brahman. All these reasons establish the identity of the vidyās even in different Śākhās, which in its turn involves the combination of the 'gunas' or details mentioned in the different passages. This conclusion is confirmed by the Scriptures also in so many words: e. g. Katha I. 2. 15-'that word which all the Vedas record ' or Aitereya Āranyaka III. 2. 3. 12, 'Him only the Bahvycas consider in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the Chandogas in the Mahāvrata ceremony.'

All the commentators agree in a general way in holding that such is the subject matter of this pāda. Vallabha more particularly connects the question with different forms of the Bhagavat, i. e. His incarnations (avatāras), and asks whether the particulars connected with the incarnation of the fish, for instance, are to be combined with those of the Dwarf-incarnation and so on; and decides that the different forms may be combined according to the Avatāra, which a devotee worships in particular. Madhva also is of accord with the rest, but he translates the word 'vedānta' in the first sūtra as 'veda-vinirnaya' or 'the decision of the Vedas', not accepting the usual meaning 'Upanisads' and insisting on the point that the saṃhitās also are as important for his doctrine as the Upanisads.

But taking our stand more particularly on the doctrine of Śāṅkara, we may ask, how the question attempted to be answered in this pāda arises at all. For, according to Śāṅkara, the Brahman is free from all distinctions whatsoever and is one and of absolutely

uniform nature like a lump of salt (*saindhavaghana iva*). Hence there appears to be no reason for even raising the question whether the cognitions of the Brahman are separate cognitions or constitute only one cognition, not the least shadow of plurality being possible in connection with the Brahman. Much more out of place is the question of the combination of details, since no idea of details is possible in Śaṅkara's Brahman. Śaṅkara himself is aware of this difficulty, and hastens, at the very commencement of the pāda, to explain that no objection can be raised against a discussion of the question proposed, since it refers only to the qualified Brahman. For, says he, devout meditations on the qualified Brahman may, like acts, be either identical or different and may have various results, e. g., release by successive steps (*kramamukti*) &c.

No such difficulty, however, can arise for the other commentators: for, according to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, the Brahman is possessed of an infinite number of auspicious attributes; and according to Vallabha, the Brahman, owing to its marvellous and mysterious powers, can possess any forms whatsoever, even mutually opposed. Now coming to the Sūtrakara's point of view, we cannot easily explain why he should take pains and devote one entire pāda to the treatment of something connected with the *saguṇa* Brahman, which is not after all to him the highest verity.

So far we have discussed the *vidyās* which have for their object the Brahman under one aspect or another or possessing these or other qualities; but there are other cognitions or meditations which refer to the constituents of a sacrifice; e. g., the *Udgitha-vidyās* in Chānd. 1. 1. 3 and in Brhad. I. 3. Now the question is whether these two form but one *vidyā* or two separate *vidyās*. The reply is given by the third adhikarana (sūtras 6-8) to the effect that though both these passages glorify the chief vital air, they cannot be one *vidyā*, owing to the difference of the subject-matter; because the subject of the Chāndogya *vidyā* is not the whole *udgitha* but only the sacred syllable *om*; while the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad represents the whole *udgitha* as the object of meditation.

Another question which naturally arises from the point settled in adhikarana 2 is whether in all the meditations on the Brahman, all its qualities are to be included or only these mentioned in each special *vidyā*. The reply is given in adhikarana 6 (sūtras 11-13). The essential and unalterable attributes of the Brahman, such as bliss (ānanda) and knowledge (jñāna), are to be taken into account everywhere; while those which admit of a greater or less degree (e. g., the attribute of having joy for its head, in *Taittiriya* 2. 5) are to be confined to special meditations; or rather, as Rāmānuja would have it, such attributes are not to be viewed as qualities of the Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation; for, if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be introduced into the nature of the Brahman.

What we have said so far is quite sufficient to give a general idea of the subject-matter of this pāda. As the majority of the adhikaranas treat of nothing but special cases to which the decisions given above are to be applied, and as they are of no importance for the question before us, it is not necessary to review their contents in detail, as we have done with the preceding pādas. We shall content ourselves with noticing only those adhikaranas which are of interest directly for our purpose.

Sūtras 27-31 deserve notice, because Śāmkara finds in them a reference to the twofold distinction of the Brahman and its knowledge. Sūtra 27 says that the freeing himself from the good and evil deeds, affirmed of the sage possessed of knowledge, (for instance in *Chānd* 8. 13. 1, *Kausitaki* 1. 3. 4 etc.) takes place not on the road to the world of the Brahman, but just at the moment of the soul's departure from the body; for there exists nothing to be reached by him on the way through his good and evil works. And moreover, (on this supposition,) there is no contradiction to both (his making an effort to free himself from his deeds and his actually freeing himself) according to his liking; (but if he be supposed to free himself from his deeds on the way, after having departed from the body, he cannot accomplish the effort to free himself, an effort which consists in self-restraint and pursuit of knowledge and which necessarily requires the body) (sūtra 28). Rāmānuja and Nimbārka agree with Śāmkara, as far as the general idea is concerned, though the word 'ubhayāvirodhāt' in sūtra 28, is explain-

ed by each in his own way. According to Rāmānuja, the sūtra means: ('the several words of the passages must be construed) as it is desired, i. e. so as not to contradict both (viz. the declaration of the Scripture and the reason of the thing'). According to Nimbārka, it means: '(a friend or a foe receives the merit or demerit of the knowing sage) of his own free will (i. e. a friend, because he thinks sympathetically of the vidvat, receives his merit; while a foe, because he thinks ill of him, receives his demerit). Thus both (the giving up (hāna) and the receiving (upāyana) of the merit and demerit) are without any contradiction.'

It is with sūtra 29 that the interpretations differ materially. The sūtra गतेर्थवत्त्वपुभयाऽन्यथा हि विरोधः may be literally translated thus : " the going (on the path of gods) has a purpose in a two-fold manner, for otherwise there would be a contradiction." According to Śaṅkara it means that the giving has a sense in certain cases, i. e. with him who knows only the saguna Brahman ; while in other cases, it has no sense, i. e. with him who knows the nirguna Brahman ; for, otherwise, i. e. if men, in all cases—whether knowing the saguna Brahman or the nirguna Brahman,—proceeded on that path, a going will have to be understood, even where it is not mentioned, e. g. in Mund. III. 1. 3. Sūtra 30 further adds that this twofold distinction (i. e. that the going has a sense in some cases, and in others, not) is justified, for we observe the purpose of going (e. g. in sagunopāsanā, but not in samyag-darśana or the highest knowledge); as for instance in ordinary life, the actual motion is necessary for attaining to a village, but not in attaining to good health.

According to Rāmānuja, however, sūtra 29, which raises an objection against the statement made in sūtra 27, means : ' The soul's going on the path of the gods has a sense only on the twofold hypothesis (i. e. if the soul's freeing himself from his works takes place in both ways (ubhayathā), i. e. partly at the moment of death and partly on the road;) for otherwise, (if this freeing himself from works takes place entirely at the moment of death, the subtle body also would be destroyed and the soul's going in the absence of a subtle body) is impossible'. Thus the hypothesis in sūtra 27 cannot be maintained. Sūtra 30 answers this objection by saying: '(the complete shaking off of the

works at the moment of death) is possible, since we observe (in the Scriptures) matters of this nature (i. e., there can be a connection with the subtle body even after the soul has divested itself of all his works and become manifest in its true nature); and that this subtle body can persist, even when the works which originate it have passed away, owing to the power of knowledge.

Nimbärka explains sūtra 29 to mean that the going on the path of gods has a sense only when both the evil and good works are shaken off (ubhayathā) and not only the evil works; for if the good works still persist, the going and the absence of return (anāvṛtti) would be contradicted. For, the soul will have to return after the enjoyment of the fruits of the good works. The Kaustubha strictly follows Nimbärka, but the Prabhā follows Rāmānuja. And sūtra 30 adds that this going is possible even when both the evil and good works are alike shaken off, without leaving behind the good works.

Thus we see how the word 'ubhayathā' in sūtra 29 is capable of being explained. All the three interpretations are alike natural and in conformity with the wording of the sūtras. All the same, one cannot help remarking that Śamkara's way of understanding it is forced; for how can 'having a double sense' mean 'having a sense in some cases and not having a sense in others'. Besides nothing in the sūtras has a semblance of suggesting the distinction between saguna and nirguna Brahman; but we shall have to return to this point later on in the fourth adhyāya. Śamkara himself remarks at the end of his commentary on sūtra 30, भूयश्चैव विभग्नं चतुर्याध्याये निषुणतरपृष्ठादमिष्यामः.

Sūtra 31 also presents a similar difference of interpretation. According to Śamkara it means that this going on the path of gods is followed not only in the case of those vidyās where it is specially mentioned, but in the case of all saguna-vidyās (सर्वसाम् = सगुणविद्यानाम्). Rāmānuja, who reads this sūtra as number 32 and reads सर्वसाम् instead of सर्वसाम्, explains it to mean that there is no restriction, since all knowing sages have to go on that path, and does not suggest in the least the distinction of saguna and nirguna vidyās. Nimbärka, who reads the sūtra in the same order as

Śaṅkara and who has 'सर्वेषाम्', explains it just like Rāmānuja. Here also we have to make the same remark as above, i. e. that the wording of the sūtra offers no ground for the distinction of saguṇa and nirguṇa Brahman which Śaṅkara sees in it.

Vallabha, according to whom these sūtras (27-31) refer to the bhakta and the jñānin, establishing the superiority of the former, explains sūtra 29 thus : Sometimes devotion alone is said to lead to Mokṣa, sometimes devotion accompanied by knowledge, sometimes knowledge only, and sometimes mokṣa is said to be attained even without devotion or knowledge ; thus there is a contradiction. No, replies the sūtra ; the knowledge (gati) produces its fruit or has its utility in both the ways (ubhayathā), i. e. it is useful in the Maryādā-mārga, but not so, in the Puṣṭi-mārga. Thus Vallabha refers to his usual distinction between the path of discipline and the path of grace and his way of explaining the word 'ubhayathā', analogous to that of Śaṅkara, is alike open to the same objection.

Madhva interprets this sūtra (29) to mean that Mokṣa (gati) is desired as the goal, because a Mukta can remain either way (ubhayathā), i. e. he may either do works or not, according to his will. As regards his explanation of the rest of the sūtras, nothing is noteworthy for our purpose.

The distinction of saguṇa and nirguṇa Brahman is again referred to by Śaṅkara, in his commentary on sūtra 39. Literally translated it means :—'having true wishes and other qualities have to be combined there and here, on account of the abode and so on'—a wording which no doubt points to the unity of vidyās. The passages in question are Chānd. VIII. 1, "that is the Self free from sin.....whose desires are true....." and Brhad. IV. 22 "he is that great unborn Self.....the ether within the heart etc.". And the sūtra asserts that both these constitute one vidyā, since there is no difference of character ; both the texts referring to the Brahman as having the same abode, i. e. the heart, as being a bridge and so on. Śaṅkara explains the sūtra thus at first, but at the end adds that, inspite of these common points, a difference has to be made between the two ; for the Chāndogya vidyā has for its object the qualified Brahman, while in the Vājasaneyaka,

the highest Brahman, devoid of all qualities, forms the object of instruction, the chapter winding up with the passage IV. 5. 15 : 'The Self is to be described by 'No, no''. Now not only is there nothing in the sūtra which warrants this; but this is directly against the wording of the sūtra. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, however, are content with giving the straightforward explanation.

The last nine sūtras of the pāda (58-66) lay down some general principles regarding the combining of meditations and hence we notice them briefly, though they have nothing to do with the question before us. Sūtra 58 teaches that those meditations which refer to the same subject but are distinguished by different meditations, for instance the Dahara-vidyā, Śāndilya-vidyā etc., ought to be regarded as separate. Sūtra 59 says that those meditations on the Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no reason for their being cumulated. Sūtra 60, on the other hand, decides that those meditations which refer to special wishes may be cumulated or optionally employed according to choice. Sūtras 61-66, forming the last adhikarana of the pāda, extends this conclusion to the meditations, connected with constituent elements of action, such as the Udgitha etc.

ADHYAYA III, PĀDA 4.

The fourth and last pāda of the third adhyāya deals with miscellaneous questions regarding Brahma-vidyā and its auxiliaries, for instance the following : that the knowledge of the Brahman is not subordinate to action, but independent; that hence for the pravṛajins, only vidyā is prescribed, though the actions enjoined by the Scriptures such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds etc. are conducive to the rise of vidyā in the mind; that the duties proper for the different stages of life (Āśrama-karmāṇi) are obligatory on him also who does not strive after mukti; that bālyā 'the child-like innocent state of mind,' pāṇḍitya 'learning' and mauna 'the condition of a muni', whose characteristic mark is pre-eminence, of knowledge, are three conditions enjoined for the saṁnyāsin etc. We do not think it necessary to notice the contents of all the adhikarana in detail. We shall content ourselves with noticing the last two sūtras (51, 52), which are interesting because Sam-

kara finds in them a reference, though very remote, to the distinction of the saguna and nirguna *vidyās*.

Sūtras 51 and 52 run thus : ऐहिकमप्यप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तदशर्नात् and एवं मुक्तिकलानियमस्तदवस्थावद्यते :. The question is regarding the origination of *vidyā* or knowledge, whose means or *sādhanas* have been so far discussed in this pāda. According to Śaṅkara sūtra 51 means: ' *vidyā*-janman, the origination of knowledge takes place even in this world, but only when there is no obstacle in the way ; (otherwise in the case of such an obstacle existing, the knowledge may originate in any of the subsequent births) ' . Sūtra 52 means '(But) there is no such rule regarding the fruit of the *vidyā*, i. e. mukti, since its nature is fixed and uniform.' What Śaṅkara means is that though there may be a difference as regards the *vidyā*, sometimes originating in this very life and sometimes not, still there is no such variation regarding mukti, which is nothing but the self. Śaṅkara further adds that it is only with regard to saguna *vidyās*, which refer to more or less attributes of the Brahman, that their fruits may differ accordingly. Now this interpretation is open to two objections ; firstly, ' *aniyamah*', meaning ' absence of a definite rule ', should apply alike to both the *vidyā*-janman and the mukti-phala. Śaṅkara takes the origination of the *vidyā*, sometimes taking place here and sometimes not, as involving a *niyama* (which is quite contrary to nature) and says that no such *niyama* is possible with regard to mukti. Secondly, the word ' *evam* ' implies a similarity of circumstances in the two cases ; if there had been intended an opposition, we should expect ' *tu* ' (but), which Śaṅkara is obliged to add inspite of its not being present in the sūtra. And further, his reference to the saguna-*vidyā* has nothing to warrant it in the sūtras.

Rāmānuja takes ' *aihikam* ' as the subject and construes it as ' ऐहिकाभ्युदयफलभूपासनम् ' . Thus, those *vidyās* which have some worldly objects as their goal may originate immediately or may not, according as there are obstacles or not. In the same way, adds sūtra 52, there is absence of a definite rule regarding those *vidyās* which have mukti as their fruit ; i. e., they also originate after a long or short time. Rāmānuja's way of explaining ' *aihikam* ' is not

satisfactory ; for the sūtrakāra should have mentioned aihika-phala corresponding to mukti-phala.

Nimbārka, explaining sūtra 51 just like Śaṅkara, explains sūtra 52 to mean ' in the same way, the fruit of vidyā, i. e. mukti, originates immediately after the fall of this body or after the fall of many more bodies ; thus it is also equally without any fixed rule (niyama)'. To me, this appears to be the most natural and straightforward way of construing the sūtra, not open to any of the objections suggested above. It is very natural that the Sūtrakāra, after having discussed at length the nature of the vidyās and their auxiliaries, should wind up the adhyāya with a brief reference to the question as regards the origination of vidyā in general and that of its fruit or mukti. In any case, the reference to the saguṇa aad nirguṇa vidyā is without any ground. We are further confirmed in this by the fact—and it is no doubt least expected—that Madhva explains these two sūtras exactly in the same way as Nimbārka.

ADHYĀYA IV. PĀDA 1.

Adhyāya 4, as its name ' phalādhyaśa ' indicates, deals with the fruit or the nature of the mokṣa. The first pāda, however, devotes a few of its adhikaraṇas to the consideration of the sādhanas or the meditations etc., leading to the mokṣa. Adhikarana 1 (sūtras 1-2), according to all, teaches that the meditation on the Ātman, enjoined by the Scriptures, is to be repeated again and again until the realisation of the fruit takes place. Vallabha first gives this explanation, and then, remarking that it refers to sādhana, whereas it should refer to phala, proposes another : The fruit of the path of action (karma-mārga) as opposed to jñāna-mārga and bhakti-mārga, i. e. transmigration (āvṛtti) is repeated indefinitely, (āvṛtti), i. e. the path of action can only help the path of knowledge and devotion, but cannot by itself bring about freedom from births and deaths. This explanation is no doubt not satisfactory ; and, besides, the word ' āvṛtti ' has to be repeated twice.

Adhikarana 2 (sūtra 3) says that the Brahman on which the devotee meditates should be viewed as his very self. This means, according to Śaṅkara, that the devotee should see absolute identi-

ty between the Brahman and himself. According to Rāmānuja, however, it means that the Brahman to be meditated on (upāsya), (of which the cit and acit form the body), would be viewed as the soul of the jīva (the meditating one, upāsaka), just as this latter, being the soul of his body, thinks that he is a god or a man. (It is only in this sense that the Brahman is jīva.) Nimbārka explains the same by saying that the Brahman is to be viewed in meditation as the ātman of the jīva, (which is a part of the Brahman and which is individually different from it), just as, for instance, a tree is the soul of the leaf or the sun is the soul of his ray. Madhva sees in this sūtra a meditation on Viṣṇu as the Lord of all or as the self of all. Vallabha remarks that this sūtra describes the fruit of the path of knowledge (while the last adhikarana referred to the path of action) and explains it to mean that those who follow the path of knowledge look up to the Lord as their self and thus become one with him (उप=समिष्टे, गच्छन्ति प्रविशन्ति). He also proposes another interpretation saying that even the followers of the path of action enter into the Lord, because he is the self of all and so favours all. Here it is to be noted that the word ' upagamana ' more usually means ' attending upon, ' ' adoring ' ' contemplating ' than ' entering into ' or ' being one with '.

Adhikarana 3 (sutra 4) says that in the pratikopāsanās, or meditations on the Brahman under a symbol, the symbol is not to be considered as constituting the devotee's own self. This is according to Śāmkara and Rāmānuja. Madhva, however, explains it differently: one is not in the meditation to regard that symbol itself as the Brahman, but that the Brahman abides in the symbol (प्रतिके न ब्रह्मदृष्टिः कार्यं किंतु तत्त्वानेनैवोपासनं कार्यम्). Vallabha, who reads ' pratikena ' as one word instead of ' pratike na ', explains that the mokṣa cannot result from the meditation on a symbol. Adhikarana 4 (sutra 5) further adds that in such pratikopāsanās, the symbol is to be looked upon as one with the Brahman, but not vice versa. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, explaining the sūtra in the same way as Śāmkara, however, interpret it as containing an argument for the statement in the preceding sūtra and thus take sūtras 4 and 5 as forming one adhikarana. Madhva takes this sūtra as an independent adhikarana and makes it to mean that it is Viṣṇu and Viṣṇu alone who is to be meditated upon as the Brahman;

for the word Brahman, which denotes 'greatness', is applicable to Visnu alone. Vallabha, taking the sūtra to form part of the preceding adhikarāna, means by it that the contemplation on the Brahman is produced in a devotee of the highest qualification without there being any Śruti text conferring this privilege on him.

Adhikarāna 5 (sūtra 6) says, according to Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, that in meditations connected with constituent parts of the sacrifice (aṅgopāsanās), the part which serves as an object of meditation is to be looked upon as the divinity and not vice versa. Thus, for instance, in the meditation enjoined in य एवासौ तपति तद्वरीयमुपासीत (Chānd. I. 3. 1), it is the udgītha which is to be viewed as Āditya and not Āditya as the udgītha. Vallabha explains the sūtra to mean that in such meditations as the one enjoined in य एतमेव विद्वानादित्यं ब्रह्मेत्युपासते it is the sākāra (possessed of form) Brahman whose idea is to be transferred to Āditya and meditation on whose constituent part, whatever it may be, brings about the same fruit. He also remarks that the singular ('aṅg' in the sūtra implies that all the members of the sākāra Brahman really constitute a unity, being nothing but the Bhagavat-svarūpa (the form of the Lord). Madhva says that in such passages as चक्षोः सूर्यो अजायत (Rgveda X. 90. 13), the sun and other deities should meditate on the eye of Visnu etc. as being their abode and support. The two last explanations are evidently not natural, though all alike refer to what may be called ' aṅgopāsanās '.

Adhikarāna 6 (sūtras 7-10) according to Śaṅkara asserts that the devotee should have a sitting posture while carrying on his meditations. Adhikarāna 7 (sūtra 11) adds that there is no rule regarding time and place; for the meditation may be carried on at any time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind. Adhikarāna 8 (sūtra 12) further says that the meditations are to be continued until death. Śaṅkara refers all these statements to only one particular kind of upāsanās, viz. the abhyudaya-phalopāsanās, 'meditations intended to bring about some reward in the form of good fortune etc.', as opposed to karmāṅgopāsanās, 'meditations referring to constituents of sacrificial actions', which naturally depend upon the nature of actions and for which consequently no special rules regarding the posture etc.

can be laid down, and the samyagdarsana-phalopāsanās, 'meditations with a view to have right knowledge or the realisation of the Brahman,' which may be practised in any posture and only till the hour of realisation. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka and Madhva, interpreting the sūtras much in the same way, however, refer them all to the meditations leading to the realisation of the Brahman,—which are specially excluded by Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara reads in sūtra 12 'ā prāyanāt', while Rāmānuja and Nimbārka read 'ā prayānāt'. In both cases, the meaning of the words, however, is nearly the same. Madhva, reading 'ā prāyanāt', explains it as meaning 'till the mokṣa or final beatitude takes place' and not only until death; but this meaning of the word 'prāyanā' is without doubt unusual. Vallabha's explanation is quite phantastic and sectarian in character, referring to two kinds of devotees, having the Bhagavat manifested externally or internally in the heart. He also takes the word 'prāyanā' to mean 'परमं पारत्तैकिकं फलम्', 'the highest reward belonging to heaven.'

So far, the sūtras dealt with the meditations and things relating thereto as means of mokṣa, thus forming a sort of supplement to the preceding adhyāya. Now commences a discussion of the phala or the nature of the fruit proper. Adhikarana 9 (sūtra 13) says that when the devotee has, by means of these meditations, attained to the knowledge of the Brahman, he (the vidvat, the possessor of knowledge,) is no longer affected by the consequences of either his past or future evil deeds. Adhikarana 10 (sūtra 14) says that the same is the case with good deeds, which also lose their efficiency. Both good and evil deeds having thus ceased to affect the vidvat, the mukti or final beatitude takes place just after the fall of the present body. This is how Śaṅkara and Nimbārka explain 'pāte tu' in the sūtra. Rāmānuja, however, connects it with the remaining words of the sūtra more directly and explains that the cessation of the efficacy of the good deeds takes place not immediately, like that of the evil deeds, but only on the death of the vidvat,—an explanation which is distinctly more natural, from the point of view of the wording of the sūtras and of the antithesis between the words pāte and tadadhigame. Madhva explains the sūtra to mean that just as the evil deeds of

the devotee of Visnu perish, so also the good deeds of the enemy of Visnu perish, when he is about to fall into tamas or the abyss of darkness. Thus, 'itarasya' refers to both the brahma-dveśin as opposed to the brahma-bhakta and to good deeds as opposed to evil deeds. The explanation is fantastic. Vallabha explains 'pāte tu' to mean that when there is again a fall from the condition of being one with Bhagavat (e. g. as with Bharata, etc.) owing to the attachment to worldly objects, there results only the cessation of the efficacy of evil deeds, but not that of good deeds. He also criticises the interpretation of Śāṅkara by saying that there is no such word as 'mukti' in the sūtra and that it would give the same idea as contained later on in sūtra 19.

Adhikarana 11 (sūtra 15) adds that the non-operation of works good or evil, spoken of so far, refers only to the 'anārabdhakārya' works, i. e. those which have not yet begun to produce their effects; while it does not apply to the 'ārabdhakārya' works, which have already begun and produced their effects, and on which, in fact, the present existence of the devotee depends. Adhikarana 12 (sūtra 16-17) says that those good works which are enjoined permanently (nitya as opposed to kāmya and nai-mittika), such as the 'Agnihotra' etc., form an exception to the statement made in sūtra 14, inasmuch as they, inspite of their being works, promote the origination of knowledge. Adhikarana 13 (sūtra 18) says that the origination of knowledge is promoted not only by such sacrificial works as are accomplished by the knowledge of the upāsanās, referring to the different constituent parts of those sacrifices, but also by those that have not this accompanying knowledge.

Adhikarana 14 (sūtra 19) concludes by saying that the vidvat becomes united with the Brahman, only when the ārabdhakārya works have been worked out fully by the fruition of their efforts. According to Śāṅkara, this working out of the ārabdhakārya works can be completed only in the present existence; so that, immediately after death, the vidvat becomes mukta, all the nescience which would otherwise lead to future births and deaths, having been completely destroyed by knowledge. According to Rāmānuja, however, the vidvat may have to pass through several embodied existences before the ārabdhakārya works will have

their effects completely exhausted. Nimbārka's Pārijātasaurabha is not explicit on this point; but the Kaustabha and the Prabhā distinctly follow the Śrī-bhasya.

ADHYĀYA IV, PĀDA 2.

The second and the remaining two pādas of the fourth adhyāya describe the condition and the path of the vidvat (the possessor of the knowledge of the Brahman) after death. It is to be noted, however, that Śaṅkara all through makes a distinction between the superior vidvat and the inferior vidvat, i. e. between one who possesses the knowledge of the higher Brahman (parā vidyā and para Brahman) and realises that he is one with it and one who knows only the lower Brahman (aparā vidyā and apara Brahman) and for whom the distinction of the upāsya and the upāsaka (the object meditated upon and the person who meditates) is not completely extinguished. According to Rāmānuja and the other commentators, however, no such distinction seems to be made, the vidvat being one and the same throughout the three pādas. We shall see in the course of a detailed examination whether the sūtras themselves justify such a distinction.

The first six sūtras, according to Śaṅkara, describe the fate after death, of the inferior vidvat and form three adhikaranas (1-2, 3, and 4-6) affirming that the senses of the lower vidvat are merged in the manas, the manas is merged in the vital air, the vital air, in the jīva and the jīva with all these is merged in the subtle elements. This merging of one into another does not take place materially (svarūpēna) but only functionally (vr̥tyā); that is to say, it is not the sense of speech that is absorbed in the mind, the mind not being the material cause (prakṛti) of the organ of speech, but it is only the function of the mind that is so absorbed in that of speech, since the former is lost, while yet the latter continues to be present. Thus, the verbal statement in Chānd. Upa. VI. 8. 6, अस्य सोऽप्य पुरुषस्य प्रयत्ने वाऽमनसि संपद्यते &c., 'of this person passing away, the speech is merged in the mind', has to be understood metaphorically; the word for the functioning sense being used in the sense of the function itself. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, however, according to whom these sūtras forming four adhikaranas (1-2, 3, 4 and 5-6) refer to the fate of the vidvat in

general, this laya or sampatti means, not a mere functional absorption, not a complete material absorption, but a samyoga, a conjunction. Madhva, as fantastic as usual, refers these sūtras to the mokṣa (liberation) and utkrānti (passage after death) of the several divinities, such as Rudra, Agni, etc., taking the words vāk, manas, prāṇa, etc. in the sūtras to denote the respective deities presiding over them. Vallabha interprets sūtras 1-4 as referring to the Puṣṭi-bhakta (the devotee who possesses the special grace of the Lord) who directly becomes one with the Bhagavat, all his senses, prāṇas, etc. being absorbed in Bhagavat, who manifests Himself either externally or internally in the heart of the devotee in question. Sūtra 5, on the other hand refers to the Maryādā-bhakta (the devotee who by the practice of disciplinary acts seeks for Mukti) whose senses etc. are all merged in the elements and not directly in the Bhagavat. Sūtra 6 says that the disciplinary rules apply both to the possessor of knowledge (jñānin) and the possessor of devotion (bhakta) alike. The very sectarian character of this interpretation deprives it of importance for our present investigation.

The remaining sūtras of this pāda are somewhat important for our purpose, because most of them have been interpreted differently by the different commentators and because Śaṅkara and Vallabha see in them a reference to the two-fold distinction of knowledge and devotion respectively.

According to Śaṅkara, adhikarana 4 (sūtra 7) says that the departure from the body, so far described, is common to the possessor of the lower knowledge (aparā vidyā) and to the ordinary person without knowledge (a-vidvat) and that the distinction commences only at the beginning of the path, that is to say, the path followed by the soul after passing out of the body through a particular vein; and that the immortality spoken of in connection with the lower vidvat is only relative, since he has not absolutely burnt ignorance and the consequent bonds of Samsāra. After this departure, however, there is a difference, viz. the a-vidvat goes to receive a new embodiment; while, the vidvat resorts to the vein (called suṣumnā or the mokṣa-nādi, the vein of deliverance); but up to that point, both are alike accompanied

by the subtle elements, forming what is called the sūksma-śarīra (the subtle body).

According to Rāmānuja, however, (whom Nimbārka follows all through the remaining part of this pāda), the mechanism of the departure is common to both the vidvat and the a-vidvat. His interpretation of the texts also is different from that of Śāmkara. If it be objected that in Brhad. IV. 4. 7, यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः । अथ मत्यैऽसृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते ॥ 'when all the desires that stick in his heart are abandoned, then the mortal becomes immortal, then he attains the Brahman', the vidvat is described as obtaining amṛtatva (immortality) all at once (i. e. without any departure etc.), we reply, 'no'; for this immortality is only metaphorical, not implying a complete extinction of the union of the soul with the senses and the subtle body. It means only the non-operativeness of good and evil acts, described in the preceding pāda, while the reaching of the Brahman is only the intuition of the Brahman at the time of a devout meditation.

Sūtras 8-11 form a separate adhikarana according to Śāmkara. Even in the case of the inferior vidvat (i. e. the possessor of the lower knowledge), the subtle elements which are described as being combined with the highest Deity (तेजः परमादेवतायाम् &c. Chānd. VI. 8. 6) are not completely merged, but remain distinct upto the time when the final emancipation is reached (सत्त्वशोषलयसिद्धिः). These subtle elements (the sūksmaśarīra) are those that pass out of the body (the sthūla-śarīra) of the dying person and take away with them the heat. Hence, the sūksmaśarīra is not destroyed by the destruction of the gross body.

According to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, these sūtras (8-11) form a continuation of the preceding adhikarana. The immortality (amṛtatva), spoken of above (in Brhad. IV. 4. 7), does not imply a complete destruction of the connection between the body and the soul, and therefore, of bondage; for the Scriptures declare that the samsāra exists until the Brahman is reached. That the subtle body continues to accompany the soul is another proof of it. (It is to be noted in passing that sūtra 10 becomes, according to this interpretation, only a repetition of sūtra 7 and therefore superfluous). To this subtle body belongs the warmth which we per-

ceive in some part of the gross body of the dying person (even though he be a *vidvat*). This warmth cannot belong to the gross body itself ; for in that case we should find it in all parts of the gross body. Thus, we have another confirmation of the metaphorical character of the immortality, spoken of above in *sūtra* 7.

Sūtra 12-14 form, according to Śaṅkara, a separate *adhikarana* (the sixth), referring to the fate of the possessor of the higher knowledge (*parā vidyā*), in whose case no such departure of the subtle elements from the gross body takes place. *Sūtra* 12 states a *pūrvapakṣa* and may be literally translated thus : ' If it be said (that the departure does not take place in the case of the higher *vidvat*) on account of its denial (in *Bṛhad.* IV. 4. 6 ' न तस्य प्राणा उत्कामन्ति । ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माण्येति), no, (is the reply ; for the word ' *tasya* ' in the passage means) *śārīrāt*, (from the individual soul and not *śārīrāt*, from the body). Thus the *pūrvapakṣin* maintains that the subtle elements depart from the body even of the higher *vidvat*. *Sūtra* 13 states the *siddhānta* : ' for, (a denial of the departure of the subtle elements from the body is) distinctly made in the texts of some schools, (e. g. in *Bṛhad.* III. 2. 11 ' यत्यं पुरुषो व्रियत उद्स्माप्नाणः क्वामन्त्याहो नेति । ... नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः । ' ' when a man dies, do his vital airs pass outside or not ? ' ' No ' says *Yajñavalkya* '). And even in *Bṛhad.* IV. 4. 6, it must be understood that this departure of the subtle elements from the body is denied in the case of the higher *vidvat* as opposed to the lower *vidvat*, in order to justify the antithesis implied in the two phrases in the same passage, इति तु कामयमानः and अथ कामयमानः.

According to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, who regard *sūtras* 12-13 as one *sūtra*, these *sūtras* (12-14) form a continuation of the same *adhikarana*, referring to the *vidvat* in general. " If it be objected (that no such departure is possible for a *Vidvat*), owing to its denial (in *Bṛhad.* IV. 4. 6), we reply, no, (for the ' *tasya* ' in that passage means) *śārīrāt* (from the soul) and (not ' *śārīrāt* ' from the body) and (this allusion to *śārīra* is) clear according to the *Mādhyandinas* (who read ' *tasmāt* ' instead of ' *tasya* ' in the same passage.) " So that ultimately what is denied is the departure from the soul and not the departure from the body. With regard to *Bṛhad.* III. 2. 11, the expression अयं पुरुषः does not mean the *vidvat*, but an ordinary person. Thus we see that what is

pūrvapakṣa according to Śaṅkara is the siddhānta itself according to Rāmānuja.

Now to compare these two ways of interpreting sūtras 12-14, it must be remarked in the first place that we have nothing in sūtra 12 which would justify us in thinking that a new topic is connected with it, much less that another kind of vidvat is the subject of the sūtra. The form of the sūtra goes against the hypothesis of a new adhikarana having commenced. This would appear from the case of a very large number of sūtras exactly similar in form (cf. I. 1. 13, I. 1. 25, I. 2. 8, II. 1. 17 and many more; it must be confessed that this cannot be laid down as a rule). Secondly, the ' hi ' in sūtra 13 would naturally support what is affirmed beforehand in the preceding sūtra ; (cf. I. 2. 11, I. 2. 20, II. 1. 34 etc.); and thirdly, if sūtra 13 were a refutation of sūtra 12, as Śaṅkara understands it, we should have ' tu ' as is generally the case with sūtras combatting something affirmed before (cf. I. 3. 33, II. 1. 22, II. 1. 33 etc.). And fourthly the word ' ekeśām ' should refer to some other group than the one mentioned before, i. e. the Mādhyandinas as opposed to the Kāṇvas, who read ' tasya ' in the passage in question. But Śaṅkara refers to another passage of the same Śākhā, i. e. the Kāṇvas; while Rāmānuja refers to the same passage as read by the Mādhyandinas, with the reading ' yasmāt ' in place of ' tasya '.

Sūtras 15 and 16 form two adhikaranas (7 and 8) according to Śaṅkara, who refers these also to the higher vidvat. In the case of this latter, the subtle elements with the senses and the vital airs, instead of departing from the gross body of the dying person (as is the case with the lower vidvat and the a-vidvat), are immediately merged in the Brahman so as to be no longer distinct from it in any way (a-vibhāga). Rāmānuja and Nimbārka explain them in much the same way, but as referring to the vidvat in general, in whose case the elements, senses, etc., after departure from the gross body, are finally merged in the Brahman. It is to be noted here that Rāmānuja explains the word 'अविभगः' as 'अपृयम्भावः' or पृयम्भवहारानहः संसर्गः, 'a connection such that the things connected cannot be spoken of as being separate' or 'absolute non-separation'; the same as exists between vāk

and manas etc., but not laya or complete absorption, as that of an effected substance into its cause. Nimbārka, on the other hand, explains 'avibhāga' as 'tādātmyāpatti' i. e. being absolutely reduced to the condition of another thing; and Kaustubha, if we can trust him to represent correctly Nimbārka, makes the meaning clear by saying that it is not 'samyoga', a mere conjunction, as exists in the case of vāk and manas; but a complete merging, as when a river falls into the sea. I think this is more consistent than Rāmānuja's explanation, who confounds the 'samyoga' between vāk and manas with the avibhāga between the elements and the Brahman; or perhaps Rāmānuja wants to emphasise the individual distinction between the two, which never completely disappears. In any case, the word 'avibhāga' is not specially favourable to the doctrine of Śaṅkara, at least much less than the word 'laya' or 'sāpatti'.

Adhikarana 9 (sūtra 17) says that the jīva of the dying man passes into the heart and thence departs out of the body, that of the vidvat through the hundred and first vein called susumna which passes through the head, while that of the a-vidvat, through some other vein. Śaṅkara refers this of course to the lower vidvat, while Rāmānuja and Nimbārka to the vidvat in general. Adhikarana 10 (sūras 81-19) says that the departing soul passes up to the sun by means of a ray of light, which exists at night as well as by day. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, regarding sūtra 19 as a separate adhikarana, explain it to mean that even death during night would lead the vidvat to the Brahman; for the connection of the vidvat with karman lasts only upto the last body and so, there being no longer any cause of bondage, the vidvat can go to the Brahman even when dying at night. The last adhikarana of the pāda (sūtras 20-21) says that the vidvat may die during the daksināyana and still he may reach the Brahman, the vidvat being of course the lower vidvat according to Śaṅkara, but the vidvat in general, according to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka.

Madhva interprets these sūtras (7-16) quite in a different way, having nothing to do with the fate of the vidvat, which should be the natural topic in the present adhyāya (the phalādhyāya), and we notice the interpretation here, not because it is of any importance for our purpose, but simply as a sample of

the fantastic explanation of which the sūtras are capable by their very nature. He combines Sūtras 7-14 so as to form one adhikarana dealing with the question whether Prakṛti or Lakṣmi, like other gods mentioned in the immediately preceding sūtras, is merged in Viṣṇu or not; and discusses, en passant, the relative natures of Viṣṇu and Lakṣmi. Prakṛti or Lakṣmi (Madhva reads ' samānā ' instead of ' samānā ' explaining ' sama-nā ' as ' one equal, sama, to Viṣṇu, nā ') is not merged in Viṣṇu, but always remains separate from him; for hers is the immortality not obtained by meditation (anuposya=anupāsya=svata eva) but belonging to her as part of her true nature. That the two are ever distinct in their natures follows from the fact that being merged in Prakṛti is termed samsāra or bondage, while being merged in Viṣṇu is termed mukti or emancipation. And the Brahman is superior to Prakṛti, because it is more subtle and has greater knowledge, bliss, power etc. The Brahman and Prakṛti are also similar, but without affecting or destroying their points of distinction. Thus, for instance, one point of difference is constituted by the fact that the Brahman is possessed of lustre, while Prakṛti is not. This denial of similarity with the Brahman really refers to the individual soul and not to Prakṛti; and so it cannot be said that there is no similarity of nature at all between the Brahman and Prakṛti. And, moreover, this discussion about similarity and difference between the Brahman and Prakṛti is clearly enunciated in some vedic passages; and the smṛti also says the same, viz. when it says that Prakṛti is both similar and dissimilar to the Brahman. Sūtras 15 and 16 form two adhikaranas saying that all deities, besides those mentioned above, are merged in the Paramātman through Viriñci, the deity presiding over the vital air, and that these deities and other emancipated souls are necessarily dependent on the Paramātman, the terms satyakāmatva etc. (lit. having all one's desires realised) spoken of in their case meaning nothing but that their desires have the same object as those of the Paramātman. Thus, the term अविभगः (cf. above) is to be interpreted as परमेश्वरकामायविभगः ' non-separateness from the desires of the Paramātman. ' The last five sūtras (17-21) of the pāda are only sūtras dealing with the fate of the soul possessed of knowledge, the subject of the adhyāya, and are interpreted

much in the same way as Śaṅkara, except that they are made to refer to the vidvat in general, without implying any distinction of a lower and higher vidvat.

Vallabha interprets sūtras 7-16 as describing the condition of mukti attained by the Puṣṭi-mārga or the path of Grace of the Lord (which is superior to the other, i. e. the Maryādā-mārga or the path of knowledge and meditation). In the Puṣṭi-mārga, the immortality is attained without having gone through vows etc. (अनुपोद्य = व्रतमकृत्वा). The mukti attained by the maryādā-mārga is named samsāra, as contrasted with the mukti attained by the Puṣṭi-mārga ; because in the former the experience of the joy of adoring Purusottama, which can be had only in the latter, is absent. The real nature of the Puṣṭi-mārga is really very subtle and incomprehensible ; and the condition of mukti attained thereby is incapable of description, because all things are then obscured, whether it be the condition of separation (virahi-daśā) with its unbearable pangs or the condition of union (priyasaṁgama-daśā) with its unsurpassed joy. Those pangs (uṣman) of separation from Purusottama can belong to such a bhakta only, because they are really of the nature of joy, in that they are sure to be followed by the joy of union with Him. The denial of all suffering in the case of such a bhakta only refers to the sufferings due to the body and the bondage of actions ; but not to the pangs of separation referred to above. The manifestation of the Bhagavat, whose essence is love, the sentiment of separation from him and the resulting pangs, then the intensity of love for Him and the experience of the joy of reaching the full form of Purusottama, all these, not elsewhere known, exist in Gokula, which is superior even to Vaikuntha. And the devotee following this path of grace, when he once enters into this Gokula and becomes united with Purusottama, is never again separated from Him.

Sūtras 17-21 are interpreted by Vallabha much in the same way as by Śaṅkara, but as referring to the devotee following the Maryādā-mārga or the path of knowledge and meditation. It is to be noted here that the sūtras which refer to the higher knowledge according to Śaṅkara refer to the Puṣṭimārga according to Vallabha ; while sūtras 17-21, which refer to the lower knowledge according to Śaṅkara, refer to the Maryādā-mārga accord-

ing to Vallabha. So a twofold distinction of muktis and the paths leading to them, very much analogous to that held by Śāmkara, is established in the system of Vallabha also.

ADHYĀYA IV, PĀDA 3.

After having described in the second pāda the departure of the soul with its subtle body from the gross body of the dying devotee, the Sūtrakāra, in the third pāda, proceeds to describe the path along which the soul goes up to the Brahman and the nature of the Brahman attained thereby. Sūtras 1-3, forming three adhikaranas, try to reconcile the different accounts, given in the Upanisads (e. g. Chānd. V. 10. 1 and 2; Kauśi. I. 3; Brhad. VI. 2. 15 etc.) as to the stations of this path and establish the path (Deva-yāna or the path of gods, followed by the vidvat, as opposed to the Pitṛ-yāna or the path of the men, followed by the performers of sacrifices, etc.). The stages are Agni, the day, the bright half of the month, the uttarāyana, the year, Vāyu, Āditya Candramas, lightning, Varuna, Indra, Prajāpati and the Brahman. Adhikarana 4 (sūtras 4-6) teaches that these stations along the path of the vidvat mean, not the places or subdivisions of the path, but the corresponding divine beings that lead the soul on. Śāmkara, of course, refers all these sūtras to the lower vidvat, who is destined for the krama-mukti or emancipation coming gradually (as opposed to the sadyo-mukti or emancipation, direct and immediate); but Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Madhva refer them to the vidvat in general. Vallabha explains the sūtras much the same way ; but refers them to the devotees of the Maryādā-mārga only (very much analogous to the lower vidvat of Śāmkara). One sūtra, however, उमयव्यामोहात् तत्सिद्धः (IV. 3. 5) is interpreted by him differently : 'This deva-yāna path is followed because the Lord himself causes an infatuation in his devotees for the jñāna-mārga or the maryādā-mārga, who, therefore, feel a desire to follow it.' Vallabha after this refutes the explanation of Śāmkara, which is as follows : 'there are the guides on the way, because the individual souls as well as the non-intelligent stations are bewildered (unconscious and so incapable of leading them).' For Rāmānuja and Nimbārka this sūtra does not exist at all. Vallabha has also one additional sūtra वरुणचार्यी-द्रूपजापती, 'Indra and Prajāpati after Varuna', between sūtras 3 and 4.

Sūtras 7-14 form an adhikarana (the fifth) according to Śāmkara and discuss the question as to what kind of Brahman it is to which the devotee (i. e. the lower *vidvat*) is guided along the path described so far. Sūtras 7-11 state the *Siddhānta*, the view held by Bādari, that (the soul is guided to the lower Brahman, because the act of going is) possible only in its case (and not in the case of the higher Brahman) (sūtra 7); and because (the goal to be reached) is specified (by the word 'brahmalokān' in *Bṛhad.* VI. 2. 15, and this can apply only to the lower Brahman) (sūtra 8). This goal is, however, mentioned as 'Brahman' (e. g. in *Chānd.* IV. 15. 6,) a word which can literally signify the higher Brahman, owing to its proximity to it (sūtra 9). (If it be objected how one can speak of *anāvṛtti*, 'absence of return' from this lower Brahman, the reply is that the possessors of the lower knowledge,) after the destruction of the *Brahmaloka* along with *Hiranyagarbha*, go to the higher Brahman, from which there is no return (sūtra 10). Sūtras 12-14 state the view of Jaimini, which is the *pūrva-pakṣa*, to the effect that (the soul is guided) to the higher Brahman, for the word 'Brahman' in *Chānd.* IV. 15. 6 can directly denote the higher Brahman (sūtra 12). Sūtras 15-16 form the last adhikarana (the sixth) of the pāda, and assert that according to Bādarāyana, even this lower Brahman can be reached by only those who do not worship it under a symbolic form (pratika). And this twofold distinction (*ubhayathā*) of some being led to the lower Brahman and some not is without fault (a-dosāt); for it depends on what one meditates upon (sūtra 15); and the Scriptures declare a difference of fruit between one meditation on a symbol and another (sūtra 16).

Rāmānuja, on the other hand, takes all these ¹sūtras (7-16) as one adhikarana, the question being what worshippers are led to the Brahman by the path described so far. The views of Bādari (sūtras 7-11) and Jaimini (sūtras 12-14) are two *pūrva-pakṣas* and the view of Bādarāyana (sūtras 15-16) is the final *siddhānta*. Bādari holds that 'the guardians lead to the Brahman those who worship the Brahman which is an effect, i. e. *Hiranyagarbha*, for movement is possible in the case of such a worshipper only (sūtra 7). The text (*Chānd.* IV. 15. 6) reads

स एतान् ब्रह्म गमयति instead स एतान् ब्रह्माण् गमयति on account of the nearness of Hiranyagarbha to the Brahman, i. e. on account of his being the first born from the Brahman (sūtra 9). Jaimini holds that it is those worshippers who meditate on the higher Brahman only that are led to it. Bādarāyana's view, the siddhānta, is however, that the guardians lead to the Brahman all those who do not worship the Brahman under a symbolic form (pratika), i. e. those who worship the highest Brahman and those who meditate on the individual self as dissociated from prakṛti and having the Brahman for its self. For, both the views above (ubhayathā) are faulty (dosāt). The kārya-brahma view contradicts such passages as Chānd. VIII. 3. 4, VIII. 12. 3, and the para-brahma view, such passages as that in the Pañcāgnividya in Chānd. V. 10. 1.

When we compare these two interpretations, we must confess that Śaṅkara's way is open to the objection that it is rather unusual to have the siddhānta stated first and the pūrvapakṣa afterwards; and Śaṅkara also shows himself conscious of this and so gives himself great pains, while commenting on sūtra 14, to establish his point. At the same time it must be granted that his translation of the sūtras is more natural as far as their wording goes; while Rāmānuja's translation is altogether far-fetched. For in sūtra 7, after the word 'kāryam', Rāmānuja has to understand the word 'upāśinān', while according to Śaṅkara the sūtra can be construed well as it stands. So also 'asya' should naturally refer to kāryam, the word near it; but Rāmānuja takes it to mean 'kāryam upāśinasya'. Moreover, in the following sūtra (8), what is specified (viśeṣita) by the word brahma-lokān in the passage, 'a person, not human, leads them to the worlds of the Brahman (Brhad. VI. 2. 15)', is the goal to be reached (gantavya),—(for the word is 'gamayati')—and not the object to be meditated upon (upāsyā). Again, sūtra 10 contains a reply to the objection how one, going to the effected Brahman, can be said to return never. We are, therefore, concerned here with something to be gone to (gantavya) and not with something to be worshipped (upāsyā). Sūtra 13 supports the same opinion, because it refers to a passage (Chānd. VIIII. 12. 3) in which the highest light

is spoken of as having been reached and not as having been worshipped. If Rāmanuja has been led to refer sūtras 13-14 to the worshippers of the effected or the higher Brahman, it is only because of sūtra 15, which speaks of those who practise meditations other than those of a symbolic form (pratika). But this is in no way a sufficient justification for the procedure he has followed.

It is very probable that sūtras 7-14 form one adhikarana and that sūtras 15-16 form another adhikarana, as Śaṅkara has actually understood them. The first adhikarana, in accordance with the wording of the sūtras, must deal with the question regarding the 'gantavya,' the goal to be attained, or the kind of Brahman to which the soul is led along the path described above. So far only we are one with Śaṅkara. According to the Sūtrakāra, the view of Bādari, first stated, is the pūrvapakṣa, while that of Jaimini which follows represents his siddhānta. The Sūtrakāra intends to refute those according to whom only the lower Brahman can be attained by the path described above; he asserts that nothing but the higher Brahman is the goal, implying thus that to his mind there existed no such distinction as that between the lower and the higher Brahman. The objection, supposed to be answered by Bādari in sūtra 10, has, I think, special reference to the sūtra अनावृतिः शद्वात्, which the Sūtrakāra has in view in this place. That there existed, even before the time of Śaṅkara, some one who held this view (viz. that Jaimini's view, being the siddhānta, followed Bādari's view, although it is the pūrva-pakṣa) is clear from the remarks which Śaṅkara makes in commenting on sūtra 14*; and from the great pains which he gives himself to refute this way of interpreting the sūtras.

After having treated of the question of the Brahman to be attained to, the Sūtrakāra in sūtras 15-16, forming a new adhikarana, tells us which particular worshippers are thus guided along the path to the Brahman. Thus, the pāda in question falls into

* केचित्पुनः पूर्वाणि पूर्वपक्षस्त्राणि भवन्त्युत्तराणि सिद्धान्तस्त्राणीति व्यवस्थामनुष्ठयमानाः परविद्यः एव गतिश्चात्मनिः प्रतिष्ठापयन्ति तदनुपपत्तेः । 'On the other hand, there are persons who, assuming the preceding sūtras to represent the pūrva-pakṣa and the following, the siddhānta, maintain that the scriptural passages relating to (the) gati (of the soul) can only refer to the higher Brahman; this is not a reasonable view'.

three divisions ; sūtras 1- 6 dealing with the movement along the path, ' gati ' ; sūtras 7-14, dealing with the Brahman to be reached, ' gantavya ' ; and sūtras 15-16 dealing with the worshipper, ' gantr '.

Our conjecture that the above way of understanding the order of topics in the present pāda is the right one and the one intended by the Sūtrakāra is confirmed by the commentary of Vallabha, who also takes sūtras 7-14 as forming one adhikarāṇa and referring to the question of the gantavya and sūtras 15-16 as another adhikarāṇa referring to the question about the gantr. He also holds that Bādari's view represents the pūrvā-pakṣa and Jaimini's, the siddhānta. The alternatives according to him are the world of Brahman (m.) and the higher Brahman. He argues very cogently that in the passage, Kaus. I. 3, स प्रजापतिलोकं ब्रह्मलोकं &c., the word ' brahma-loka ' must mean the higher Brahman and not merely ' the world of Brahman or Hiranyagarbha ' ; for ' prajā-pati-loka ' is separately mentioned just before it and means nothing but ' the world of Brahman (m.) '. He also tries to refute Śaṅkara's view about the higher Brahman being incapable of attainment. Sūtra 15 mentions the kind of worshippers that go to the higher Brahman. Only those who understand all things to be really nothing but the pure Brahman and meditate thus on them are led to the Brahman ; while those who first regard things as different from the pure Brahman and then meditate on them as being identical with the Brahman, i. e. those who are worshippers of a pratiķa (pratikālambana), are not led to the Brahman ; for this involves a twofold error (ubhayathā dosat) : (i) to mistake things which are really the pure Brahman for something else, and (ii) to meditate on things which are not the pure Brahman in one's opinion as such. So far for the jñānin, the follower of the path of knowledge. The bhaktas, the followers of the path of devotion, however, are taken to Puruṣottama direct as soon as he has a wish for it (tatkratu). Sūtra 16 says that thus there is a difference (viśeṣa) between the followers of the path of knowledge and the follower of the path of devotion, the former going to the Brahman and the latter to Puruṣottama.

Nimbārka translates sūtras 7-14 just like Śaṅkara, referring them to a Brahman which is to be reached, but makes the following

remark, to me incomprehensible, on sūtra 15, which he explains just like Rāmānuja : 'इति सिद्धान्तो भगवान् चादरायणो मन्यते,' 'this is the siddhānta, and such is the opinion of the venerable Bādarāyaṇa'. Srinivāsa everywhere follows Rāmānuja exactly; it is Keśavākāśmirin, however, who, explaining sūtras 7-14 after Śaṅkara, remarks on sūtra 14 to the effect that Jaimini's view is the siddhānta, and that those who hold that the saguṇa or apara Brahman alone can be reached and that no movement is possible with regard to the nirguna or para Brahman are in the wrong. This only supports our conjecture above. Similarly, on sūtra 15 he says : तातुभयविदान् परब्रह्म नयति, 'he leads both kinds of men to the higher Brahman', in conformity with the above. After all this he remarks in the beginning of his commentary on sūtra 15 एवं प्रभद्वयं दर्शयित्वा स्वमतेन निर्णयमाह। 'having thus indicated the two views, he gives the conclusion according to his own view,' which is difficult to understand.

Madhva regards all these sūtras (7-16) as forming one adhikarana. He interprets sūtras 7-14 just like Śaṅkara. But regards the views of Bādari and Jaimini as being only two pūrvapakṣas, while the siddhānta is represented by the view of Bādarāyaṇa to the effect that a devotee goes to the effected Brahman or the higher Brahman, according to his adhikāra (qualification). By प्रतिकालभ्याः in sūtra 15 he means स्वदेहे त्रहृदृशः (those who see the Brahman in their own body) and these only go to the kārya Brahman; while others who see Viṣṇu everywhere (व्यापत्तिष्ठृदर्शानाः) go to the higher Brahman in Vaikunṭha.

Thus, the diversity of interpretation as seen here is very interesting; and although we cannot be sure about the meaning intended to be conveyed in these sūtras by the Sūtrakāra, we have sufficient reason to believe at least this much—that the twofold distinction in the Brahman, in its knowers and its knowledge, did not form part of his doctrine; and that the path described leads the soul of the vidvat not necessarily to the lower Brahman, but to the higher Brahman also.

ADHYĀYA IV, PĀDA 4.

The last pāda of the fourth adhyāya deals with the nature and attributes of the released soul and its relation to the

Highest Self. Here also Śaṅkara has his twofold distinction of the higher and the lower vidvat, devoting sūtras 1-7 to the former and the rest to the latter; whereas Rāmānuja and Nimbārka see in them none but the vidvat in general.

Adhikarāṇa 1 (sūtras 1-3), according to Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, says that the soul when released only returns to its own nature and does not acquire any new characteristics. Adhikarāṇa 2 (sūtra 4) discusses according to Śaṅkara the relation between the released jīva and the Brahman and says that it is ' avibhāga ' or absolute identity. According to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, however, the question is whether the released soul views itself as separate from the Lord (because we have passages which speak of the jīva as being in the company of the Lord, e. g. Taitt. II. 1, सोऽस्तुते सर्वात् कामात् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता, or as non-separate from the Lord, being his mode or body, e. g. in passages like तत्त्वमसि, Chānd. 8. 7, etc.). The conclusion is that the jīva views itself as non-separate from the Lord (tat-prakāratayā tadavibhaktam). Nimbārka remarks:—' भाविष्येदिभगेन जीव आत्मानमनुभवति, ' ' the jīva experiences himself as being in the relation of non-separateness which is not opposed to separateness, or as being both different and non-different at the same time, from the Lord, (cf. Kaustubha : विभग-सहित्याविभगेन). Here again it is to be remarked that the word ' avibhāgena, ' used by the Sūtrakāra, to express the relation between the Brahman and the released jīva, is, by its nature, susceptible of all these three explanations; and that the sūtrakāra employs a word negative in form like (non-division) instead of using a positive term like, ' identity ' (tādātmya) or the like (cf. the use of ' ananyatva, ' a similar word, to express the relation between cause and effect in sūtra II. 1. 14),—a circumstance confirming the conjecture that the Sūtrakāra was either not prepared to specify the idea too strictly or that he thought of reconciling the two ideas of difference and non-difference, of separateness and identity, by regarding both of them as true at one and the same time.

Adhikarāṇa 3 (sūtras 5-7) states three views regarding the nature of the released soul. Jaimini says that it is possessed of all sorts of attributes like ' satya-saṅkalpatva ' (having all its desires realised) etc. Audulomi holds that it is nothing but intelligence pure and simple. Finally Bādarāyaṇa, whose view

represents the siddhānta, asserts that it is both intelligence pure and simple and characterised by several attributes. Here again the manner of reconciling both these conceptions is different with the different commentators. According to Śaṅkara, the released soul is intelligence pure and simple from the point of view of reality (paramārthataḥ), but it possesses attributes only from the phenomenal point of view (vyavahārāpeksayā). According to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, however, both these conceptions are equally real, i. e., the released jīva is as really intelligence pure and simple as possessed of ' satya-saṅkalpatva etc., ' just as, for instance, a mango-fruit has one flavour (ekarasa) and at the same time has various flavours (rasa-bheda) with reference to its different parts, the skin, the pulp etc.; or just as the same mango may be described as ' rasa-ghana eva ', ' only a mass of flavour, ' but is not at the same time prevented from having colour, touch etc., which are actually cognised by other means of knowledge. In other words, Śaṅkara reconciles unity and plurality, by regarding the former only as real and the latter as illusory; while Rāmānuja and Nimbārka do the same by regarding both as real in their own spheres.

So far, the higher knowledge (parā vidyā) was the subject matter of the pāda according to Śaṅkara; while the rest of the pāda down to the end is concerned with the lower knowledge (aparā vidyā). Adhikarana 4 (sūtras 8-9) says that the vidvat effects all his desires by mere saṅkalpa, i. e., will. Adhikarana 5 (sūtras 10-14) states three views on the question whether the released soul is embodied; or not. According to Bādari, the released soul is not embodied; according to Jaimini, it is embodied; but according to Bādarāyaṇa, whose view, of course, represents the siddhānta, it is embodied or not embodied according to its free will; when embodied it enjoys pleasures as in the condition of waking; when not embodied, it does so as in the condition of dream.

Adhikarana 6 (sūtras 15-16) raises the question how the soul which is described as having more than one body, e. g. in स एकथा नवानि त्रिथा भवनि पञ्चथा महाथा नवथा । (Chānd. VII. 26. 2), it can have the sensation of joy through all these simultaneously and decides that it can animate the several bodies at the same time, just as

one and the same lamp can shed its light through several wicks. Now how can such a question arise at all according to Śaṅkara who holds that the soul is all-pervading ? According to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, however, the question is most natural : how can the jīva which is atomic in size, as proved in II. 3. 19-22, ¹ be the soul animating several bodies at the same time ? Yes, the answer is, it can do so by virtue of its intelligence, just as a lamp can illumine several places by virtue of its light ; and the same is the process when, for instance, the atomic jīva, in the saṃsāra state, experiences pleasure and pain throughout its one body, the difference between them being only one of degree. Sūtra 16 says that the absence of specific cognition, declared as belonging to the jīva in passages like Brhad. IV. 5. 15 and IV. 3. 30 etc., should not be any objection to the released soul's cognising through several bodies; for, this absence of cognition refers only to the condition of svāpyaya, ' deep sleep, ' or of sampatti, which means kaivalya or absolute release according to Śaṅkara, or ' death ' or ' departure from the gross body ' (utkrānti) according to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka. ¹

The last adhikaraṇa (sūtras 17-22) declares that the released soul participates in all the perfections and powers of the Lord, except the power of creating and sustaining the world, the last sūtra proclaiming that the released soul never returns to new forms of embodied existence.

Before proceeding to the interpretation of this pāda as given by Madhva and Vaiṭalabha, we may ask ourselves the question, if there is any justification for the two-fold character of the vidvat as conceived by Śaṅkara. In the fourth adhyāya, taken as a whole, there are only two groups of sūtras which according to

1 It is very difficult to decide which meaning of the word ' sampatti ' is the more correct one ; for it is one of those words which are frequently used, but whose meaning is never clearly defined. The root-meaning is ' being one with ' and hence the word may mean ' entering into ' or ' approaching ' according to the explanation of sūtra IV. 4. 1 by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, or ' imaginative identification ' according to their explanation of sūtra I. 2. 31,—the other two places where the word occurs. Śaṅkara has the credit of being consistent with himself, inasmuch as sūtra IV. 4. 1, according to him, refers to the higher knowledge, just as the word here refers to absolute release,

Śaṅkara refer to the parā vidyā, viz., IV. 2. 12-16 and IV. 4. 1-7. We have already dealt with the first, pointing out the objections against Śaṅkara's way of interpretation. As for the second, it may be pointed out that there is nothing distinctive in these sūtras which would lead us to regard them as detached from the rest and as referring to a different topic. But this in itself is merely a negative, and therefore, indecisive argument. Sūtra 7, however, furnishes a more decisive argument. That sūtra states the view of Bādarāyaṇa as siddhānta, according to which the released soul is both intelligence pure and simple and, at the same time, possessed of a number of attributes. Now, if this refers to the released soul of the higher vidvat, how can it possess the various attributes? And if it can possess them, what difference is there between the higher and the lower vidvat? Śaṅkara's attempt to reconcile the two aspects by saying that one refers to reality (paramārtha) and the other to the phenomenal world (vyavahāra) is ridiculous; for how can vyavahāra have anything to do with the higher vidvat? And if there is vyavahāra also for him, how is he to be distinguished from the lower vidvat?

What is, however, most decisive against Śaṅkara is the fact that, according to his interpretations, the work of Bādarāyaṇa would end with a section, dealing with only the lower vidvat, the fate of the higher vidvat having been disposed of only in a few sūtras; and that the last sūtra, 'from thence, there is no return', would refer only to the lower vidvat. If the Sūtrakāra really had in view this twofold distinction, was it not natural that he should wind up with a discussion of the fate of the higher vidvat? For, as compared with the latter, the lower vidvat, howsoever exalted he may be over the ordinary beings, is after all in a secondary position, and is only on the way to the absolute release, a condition which the higher vidvat has already made his own.

Madhva sees in this pāda a description of the enjoyment which is the lot of the released soul. After having reached the Brahman, the released soul enjoys the same pleasures as, the Brahman ('a-vibhāgena', sūtra 4). The released souls experience joy through the body of the Brahman ('brāhmaṇa' in sūtra 5) being themselves bodiless; or through their proper bodies consisting only of intelligence (sūtra 6); or in both the ways (sūtra 7),

i. e., with the body of intelligence and without the body, this absence of body referring only to material bodies. Sūtras 10 to 14 are explained just in the manner of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. The released soul, though entering a body, only experiences joy and pleasure and never suffers pain, just as a light placed in a lamp, only swallows up the oil, the wick etc., but not its black colour (sūtra 15). And passages like सर्वं लोके न मयं किञ्चनास्मि । (Katha. I. 12) refer to the states of deep sleep and mokṣa, but not to svarga (?) (sūtra 16). As regards the remaining sūtras also there are differences of interpretation and differences regarding the division into adhikaranas ; but they are not worth noting, being of no importance for our purpose.

According to Vallabha, the pāda refers to the condition of the released soul who has followed the path of grace (puṣṭimārga). Such a released devotee, even after having attained to the Brahman (sampadya), has again a body or a kind of birth (āvirbhāva), not of the ordinary character, in order to be able to enjoy pleasures (sūtra 1). The word (āvirbhāva) in sūtra 4 is explained in a curious way. In the passages ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् or सोऽश्रुते सर्वान् कामान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिन, the same nirguna Brahman is meant, because both the passages are recited together, without a cessation of continuity (avibhāgena). Sūtras (5-7) state the three views regarding the nature of the body of this released soul. He enjoys, says Jaimini, pleasures through the extraordinary body provided by the Brahman (brāhmaṇa) as opposed to a prākṛta (ordinary or material) body ; according to Audulomi, he enjoys pleasures only in the form of intelligence (tanmātrenā), because he has to enjoy in the company of the Brahman which is pure intelligence (चिन्ति = चिदूपे ब्रह्मणि) ; but Bādarāyana holds (and this is the siddhānta) that the devotee has a body which is extraordinary and eternal, fit for his enjoying in the company of the Brahman. Sūtra 8 says that he alone can reach Bhagavat whom He wills (samkalpādeva). Sūtras 10-12 are explained just like Śaṅkara, but are referred to the devotee following the path of grace. The illustration of the light in sūtra 15 is curiously explained thus : Bhagavat enters into the devotee, who thus becoming like Bhagavat is enabled to enjoy pleasures in His company ; just as a light enters into the wick and makes it capable of the

same function as itself, and becomes at the same time स्वेहाधीनस्थिति (depending on oil or the love of the devotee). The word 'sampaatti' in sūtra 16 is explained to mean "the higher release obtained by the path of grace," (pustimārgīya-mokṣa). This agrees with the explanation of Śaṅkara. The whole sūtra means that the absence of enjoyment spoken of in a passage like 'न तदश्चाति कश्चन' refers to the condition of profound sleep ; whereas the enjoyment spoken of in texts like सह ब्रह्मणा अस्तुते refers to the higher release. Sūtra 17 is explained in this peculiar manner : the enjoyment in the company of the Brahman is not accompanied by the ordinary operations (jagad-vyāpāra) of the body, speech and mind. The absence of return proclaimed in the last sūtra refers to both the jñānin (the follower of the path of knowledge, who occupies an inferior rank) and the devotee, the follower of the path of grace, though it is to this latter only that the rest of the pāda applies. Thus, Vallabha who maintains a twofold distinction of release and of devotees, somewhat analogous to that held by Śaṅkara, has however, the merit of seeing only the higher kind of release and of devotee (i. e. the follower of the path of grace) in the last pāda of the last adhyāya

CHAPTER III.

CONCLUSION.

After having made a detailed analysis of the five commentaries on the Brahma-sūtras, we shall now proceed to consider what conclusions we are justified in arriving at. As we have compared and criticised the diverse interpretations and hinted at the possible inferences already in the course of analysis, it remains for us now only to bring together and classify the different points suggested and to state the conclusions in definite form, positive or negative.

To begin with, the commentary of Madhva is evidently inferior in character and is a performance of little or no merit. His interpretations differ from those of the rest very widely and in a very large number of cases; but the reader has seen that in a majority of instances, his explanations are far-fetched, fantastic and too sectarian in character; the scriptural passages he refers to for discussion more often belong to the Saṁhitās than to the Upaniṣads, a procedure which can be easily explained by the fact that it is very difficult for him to find in the Upaniṣads a support for his own doctrine. It is interesting on this point to note his explanation of the word 'vedānta' in III. 3. 1, which means, according to him 'vedavinirṇaya,' or the decisions of the 'Vedās' and not of the Upaniṣads, and he insists on the point that the saṁhitās also are as important for his doctrine as the Upaniṣads. As instances of how considerably his interpretations differ from the rest and are unsatisfactory and groundless, the following places may be pointed out : I. 1. 5, where his explanation is not supported by the remaining sūtras of the adhikaranas; I. 3. 8, where the absence of the particle 'ca' goes against him; II. 1. 13, where the word 'bhoktrāpatteḥ' is not satisfactorily explained and where moreover he himself feels the necessity of giving an explanation how a sūtra, referring to the released condition of the soul and therefore fit for the fourth adhyāya, occurs in the second adhyāya; II. 1. 14, where his explanation is quite irrelevant to the topic; II. 3. 46-53, where his explanation is quite uncalled

for and very sectarian in character ; III. 2. 11-21, where his explanations of the words अस्तपत्, अस्तुवद्वप्त्वात् and वृद्धिदासभाकृत्वम् are very fantastic ; and equally curious is his way of understanding the simile of the sun's reflection in support of his doctrine of duality ; III. 2. 29, where his explanation is most unnatural ; IV. 1. 12, where he explains the word 'prāyana' as meaning 'mokṣa', which is unusual ; IV. 1. 14, where his explanations of the words 'itarasya' and 'pāte' are a bit fantastic ; the whole of IV. 2, which according to him refers to the 'mokṣa' and 'utkrānti' of divinities like Rudra, Agni, Laksミ, etc.

We can add many more instances, but those already given are quite sufficient. To do justice to Madhva, however, it must be admitted that there are cases, though few, where his explanations though different from those of Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja cannot be said to be absolutely unnatural or inconsistent. Thus, for instance, the whole of I. 4 is interpreted by him to show that words like 'avyakta', 'prakṛti' etc., all ultimately denote Viṣṇu and that every word may esoterically denote Viṣṇu and at the same time exoterically, other objects of the world : a procedure which, though many times fantastic as regards the translation of individual sūtras, has the merit of being consistent with the subject-matter of the first adhyāya, which is samanvaya. As regards II. 2. 42-45, he follows Nimbārka in referring the adhikarāṇa to the sakti-doctrine, which is intended to be refuted by it. In II. 3. 19-31 he accepts the atomic measure of the jīva (āṇutva) as the siddhānta and explains sūtra 29 to mean that the statements of non-difference between jīva and the Brahman are only due to the fact that the attributes of the Brahman such as knowledge, bliss etc. form the essence or nature of the jīva : a procedure to which we cannot object. In II. 4. 8-13 Madhva shows himself more reasonable than all the other commentators in connecting sūtra 8 with the following adhikarāṇa, referring to the chief vital air ; and his division of the sūtras into four adhikarāṇas is natural, whereas all the other commentators follow an arbitrary division. His interpretation of III. 2. 27-30, dealing with the question "how the Brahman can be both quality and the qualified, both ānanda and ānandin, also are unexceptionable. His explanation of III. 4. 51-52 as referring to the origination of vidyā and of its fruit,

i. e. mukti, in which he and Nimbārka stand alone, is the best and most natural.

In spite of all this, we cannot help having the impression that his commentary is far from being the right interpretation of the sūtras taken as a whole and that nothing can be further from truth than that his doctrine of absolute duality is the doctrine of the Sūtrakāra. Madhva's denial of the Brahman being the material cause of the universe (see his curious explanation of sūtra I. 4. 23) is especially against the spirit of the sūtras ; and when we consider the fact that the sūtras represent an attempt to reconcile the different passages of the Upaniṣads like तत्त्वमसि on the one hand and द्वा सुपर्णं सयुजा सत्याया on the other, it is impossible to believe that the doctrine of absolute duality, not having anything to do with unity or non-difference, can be the teaching of the sūtras.

Thus, having disposed of Madhva, when we pass on to the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vallabha, we have to observe at the outset that the doctrine of Śaṅkara stands in flagrant contrast to those of the other three. Though all the four alike attempt to reconcile unity and plurality, the way in which Śaṅkara does it stands by itself. He thinks that both unity and plurality cannot be true at the same time ; one alone can be real and that must be unity ; while plurality is unreal, illusory, the result of Māyā. Māyā, once accepted, leads to the two-fold distinction of the real and the phenomenal world, the higher or unqualified and the lower or qualified Brahman, the superior and the inferior knowledge, the superior and the inferior vidvat ; so also to the absolute and eternal identity of the Brahman and the jīva. The relation between cause and effect is according to him vivarta (superimposition or illusory manifestation) as opposed to 'paripāma' (transformation). Naturally the jīva, as it is identical with the Brahman, is like it omnipresent (vibhu), without activity (a-kartṛ), and is completely merged into it and only regains its own nature when it is released, i. e. when the nescience is extinguished. The Brahman is nothing but sat, cit, ānanda, and all the descriptions of attributes belonging to it represent only the popular notion, the phenomenal Brahman.

Now let us consider if the sūtras lend support to any of these dogmas. First, as regards the relation between the Brahman and the jīva, there is a very large number of sūtras which distinctly affirm the difference (Bheda) between the Brahman and the jīva. Thus for instance, we may point to sūtras 16, 17, 19, 21 of I. 1 ; sūtras 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 20, 22, of I. 2 ; sūtrās 2, 5, 7, 19 of I. 3. Śaṅkara himself, conscious of the difficulty of finding his view in the sūtras, thinks it necessary to add an explanation in several cases (e. g. I. 1. 17 ; I. 2. 6, 20 ; I. 3. 19) to the effect that all such sūtras refer to the difference between the Brahman and the jīva, which is only due to Māyā, being phenomenal or ' vyāvahārika ' as opposed to real or ' pāramārthika ' and that the Sūtrakāra in such cases has regard only to the popular conception, which is mentioned only to be refuted. On sūtra I. 2. 12, Śaṅkara himself has to say that one of the two souls, the jīva, is ' gantṛ ' and the other (Brahman) is ' gantayya. ' But if there is left any doubt on the point, we refer the reader to sūtras II. 1. 22 and II. 3. 43, the former proclaiming that the Brahman is something over and above (adhika) the jīva and that the jīva is a part (aṁśa) of the Brahman. So also sūtras III. 2. 27-30, giving various examples to illustrate the relation between the Brahman and the jīva, though not sufficiently definite, do not in any case support the doctrine of absolute unity.

From the relation between the Brahman and the jīva we now pass on to the nature and attributes of jīva, which specially forms the subject matter of II. 3. 19-53. As already shown in the analysis above, sūtras 19-32 establish the siddhānta that the jīva is atomic (aṇu), sūtra 18, that the jīva is knower (jñā), and sūtras 33-40, that the jīva is an active agent (kartr̄). Śaṅkara stands alone in arriving at exactly the opposite conclusions by putting on the sūtras an interpretation which has been shown above to be obviously forced and open to several objections (see especially II. 3. 29 and II. 3. 40).

Thus the sūtras lend no support to the two main points in Śaṅkara's doctrine, viz. (1) the relation between the Brahman and the jīva which is according to him absolute unity and (2) the nature of jīva which is omni-present, which is of the nature of knowledge (and not knower) and which is without activity.

(*kartr̥tva*). We arrive at the same conclusion on the point of the two-fold distinction of the higher and lower Brahman. As shown above none of the sūtras where Śaṅkara refers to this distinction lends support to it; e. g. III. 3. 29, where Śaṅkara's way of understanding the word 'ubhayathā' is altogether unnatural; III. 3. 31, 39; III. 4. 51, 52; and the last three pādas of the 4th adhyāya, where sūtras IV. 12-16 and IV. 4. 1-7 refer to the higher vidvat, while all the remaining sūtras including the last IV. 4-22 refer to the lower vidvat. So also at the commencement of his commentary on I. 1. 12 Śaṅkara remarks that the question in the following adhikarāṇas is to decide between the higher and the lower Brahman; but he himself only very rarely refers to it afterwards. He does so, for instance, in the second interpretation he proposes of the adhikarāṇa dealing with the ānandamaya (I. 1. 12-I9), which is unnatural on the face of it and has been also criticised severely by Vallabha, and in commenting on sūtra I. 3. 13 where according to him the higher person to be meditated on by the syllable 'om' is the highest Brahman and not the lower one, though according to Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vallabha the choice is between the Brahman (n.) and Brahman (m.). The only section where there is an appearance of an indirect implication of the twofold character of the Brahman is III. 2. 11-21, but even this may be regarded as nothing more than a mere attempt to reconcile the two kinds of passages, i. e. those which deny all attributes of the Brahman and those which predicate the same of it, there being nothing in the sūtras of this adhikarāṇa directly leading to the establishment of a distinction between the sāviśeṣa and the nirviśeṣa Brahman. Moreover, Rāmānuja and others have interpreted the 'ubhaya-lingatva' differently from Śaṅkara and these interpretations, especially that of Rāmānuja, are at least as natural as that of Śaṅkara, if not more. That this two-fold distinction is, however, quite against the general spirit of the sūtras follows more positively from the manner in which the Sutrakāra defines the Brahman in I. 1. 2 and from the fact that even according to Śaṅkara only an insignificantly small number of sūtras in the fourth adhyāya refers to the higher Brahman; above all from the fact that the last sūtra of the work, अनात्मनः शद्वात्, refers to the inferior vidvat only, not to mention the circumstance

that the sūtras have been interpreted by other commentathrs without being obliged to refer to this distinction and that withal their interpretations are not unnatural, perhaps less so than those of Śaṅkara.

The distinction between the higher and lower the Brahman not finding any support in the sūtras, it naturally follows that the idea of Māyā in the sense in which Śaṅkara understands it cannot have any place in the doctrine of the Sūtrakāra. Those who hold that Śaṅkara's doctrine, in which of course the notion of Māyā plays a very important part, is that of the Sūtrakāra, how can they explain the circumstance that it is only once (in III. 2. 3) in the sūtras that the word 'Māyā' expressly occurs ? And there it is used in connection with the creation of the dream-state and not with that of the waking-state ; and even in this connection, the meaning which Śaṅkara puts upon the word, has been shown to be objectionable from the point of view of the context, as it ignores the logical connection between the two questions raised by Śaṅkara in that adhikarana : is the creation of the dream-state real or not and how is it that the natural powers of the jīva are obscured ? Bhāskara, who also understands the word as meaning 'illusion' (and whose interpretation of the adhikarana as a whole seems to be on the whole the most satisfactory), restricts it, however, only to the dream-creation as opposed to the waking creation, which is real according to him. If, however, the word means only 'the wonderful marvellous power of the Lord', as Rāmānuja has it (and according to his interpretation all the sūtras of the adhikarana can be very well connected, at least more satisfactorily than to Śaṅkara's), there need not be the least objection against it. No doubt, both these ways of explaining Māyā, whether as meaning 'illusion' or 'wonderful power', alike imply the idea that the world as it stands is inexplicable by the ordinary means of knowledge. But what a gulf between the developments undergone by these two conceptions ! According to one, the world, as we perceive it, is unreal, only an appearance superimposed through nescience on the real entity, i. e. Brahman, just like that of serpent superimposed on a rope. According to the other, the world, though inexplicable, is however, as real as the Brahman.

Another sūtra which would appear to suggest the idea of illusion is II. 1. 14, where the Sūtrakāra expressly refers to the word 'ārambhāṇa' and therefore implicitly to the passage वाचारम्भण विकारो नाम धेयम् etc. We have already seen how Śaṅkara's way of explaining vācārambhāṇa so as to deduce the doctrine of 'vivarta' from it is open to objection and how it is not confirmed by the illustrations in the following sūtras (II. 1. 19 and 20), not to mention the fact that Rāmānuja's interpretation is very reasonable and that Vallabha severely criticises Śaṅkara's explanation.

The only other sūtra bearing on the point is II. 3. 50, where the word 'ābhāsa' occurs and is interpreted by Śaṅkara to mean 'a reflection which has no existence in reality in the sense in which the original exists'; but we have shown above that Vallabha's way of explaining the word as meaning 'an appearance', i. e. 'something apparently the same, but not quite the same' is as good (notice the warning which Vallabha gives here against the word being understood to mean something absolutely unreal), and it may be mentioned further that the meaning of 'fallacious argument' given to the word by Rāmānuja and Nimbārka has nothing objectionable in it.

Coming in particular to the relation between the cause and the effect, we have sufficient reasons to believe that the Sūtrakāra held the doctrine of 'parināma' as opposed to 'vivarta'. For in the first place, we have the word 'parināma' expressly mentioned in sūtra I. 4. 26 and secondly, in replying to the objection against the intelligent Brahman being the cause of the non-intelligent universe, an objection based on the dissimilarity between cause and effect (cf. II. 1. 4 ff), the Sūtrakāra never says nor even suggests that this is possible owing to the superimposition of the effect upon the cause, as for instance, that of silver on a mother-of-pearl. On the other hand, he refuses to admit that the effect is non-existent in the cause, before its production (cf. II. 1. 7), which would be the case if the vivarta view be accepted. We may add to this that the instances of dissimilar causes and effects given in the commentary on sūtra II. 1. 6 according to all commentators, including even Śaṅkara, are such as lend support to the notion of parināma.

Thus we are quite justified in arriving at the conclusion that Śaṅkara's doctrine is out of court so far as the sūtras are concerned, whatever be its value as a philosophical system, and whatever be its merit as an attempt to draw a system from the Upaniṣads.

As long as Śaṅkara's commentary on the sūtras was the only one to be known and widely read (it being very difficult or almost impossible to understand sūtras without the help of a commentary), such a conclusion would have appeared absurd; but when we have other commentaries which equally deserve our consideration and which widely diverge from Śaṅkara's commentary, one must think twice before labelling this judgment as heterodox. Now if we bring together all those cases where Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja differ from each other in the explanation of the sūtras, we shall find that there is a large number where it is difficult to decide who is better, both being equally natural or farfetched; but there is also an equally large number where Rāmānuja is decidedly more acceptable than Śaṅkara and vice versa. Thus, for instance, in the explanations of I. 2. 7, 8; I. 4. 8-10; II. 2. 42-45; II. 3. 19-32 (at least as regards the general purport of the adhikarāṇa, sūtra 29 being explained in a much less satisfactory manner by Śaṅkara than by Rāmānuja); II. 3. 38; II. 3. 50; III. 2. 11-21, 22-30 (as regards the general purport of the adhikarāṇa); III. 4. 51-52; IV. 1. 19; IV. 2. 7-16, it is difficult to decide whether Śaṅkara is better or Rāmānuja is better. As regards I. 2. 9-10, 11-12, 19-20; I. 3. 13; II. 1. 2; II. 3. 14; II. 3. 16, 37; II. 4. 1-4, 14; III. 2. 26 Śaṅkara's explanations are decidedly more satisfactory than those of Rāmānuja; but on the other hand, Rāmānuja's explanations are more natural and decidedly to be preferred to those of Śaṅkara in the case of I. 1. 18; I. 3. 19; I. 3. 14-21 and 22-23 (which form two adhikarāṇas according to Śaṅkara, but, only one according to Rāmānuja); I. 3. 41 and 42-43 (a similar case exactly); I. 4. 14-27 (which Rāmānuja connects with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya, while Śaṅkara with the samanyava in

general); II. 1. 13¹, 14; II. 2. 11; II. 3. 18; II. 3. 40²; II. 3. 43, 46; II. 4. 6; III. I. 12-21; III. 2. 1-6, 25, 26; III. 3. 29; IV. 1. 14 (where Śaṅkara supplies the word 'mukti,—a procedure criticised by Vallabha); IV. 2. 12-14.

Coming to the commentary of Vallabha, we find that there are instances where he stands apart, differing from all the rest, in the interpretation of certain sūtras. Thus, for instance, we can point to I. 1. 2 and 3 which he reads as one sūtra, with some justification too, in that the position of the word 'janmādi' in sūtra 2, inspite of the upaniṣad passage running as यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते &c., would look natural if 'śāstriyonitvāt' be read along with sūtra 2); I. 1. 4 (where, the 'tu' cannot be construed well, the sūtra itself being superfluous); II. 4. 1-4 (where he comes to the conclusion that the prāṇas are as unborn as the individual souls and where he has the merit of interpreting the word tathā in sūtra I, more naturally than the other commentators); III. 2. 11-21; III. 2. 22-30 (where he deals with the question how the Brahman can be both possessed of attributes and be without attributes,—which thus amounts to only a repetition of the preceding adhikarāṇa); IV. 1. 1-6, 12, 14; the second and fourth pādas of the fourth adhyāya, where he all through makes out a distinction between the pustimārga and the maryādā-mārga, peculiar to his doctrine. But we see that in many of these cases, Vallabha's explanations are far from satisfactory, besides being sometimes too sectarian. It is interesting to note that sometimes Vallabha follows Śaṅkara in the interpretation of certain sūtras, where Śaṅkara differs from the others; e. g. in I. 1. 18 (where Śaṅkara's explanation is no doubt far less natural than that of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka); I. 1. 31 (where Vallabha follows, of the two interpretations proposed by Śaṅkara, the one which is less natural); II. 1. 13; II. 2. 42-45; II. 3. 16, 37 (in both cases Śaṅkara's explanation is more satisfactory than that of Rāmānuja). In other cases Vallabha follows Śaṅkara as far as the literal translation of the sūtra

1 Rāmānuja makes some remarks showing the unreasonable character of Śaṅkara's interpretation.

2 Śaṅkara himself, conscious of the unsatisfactory character of his interpretation, remarks that the example is to be understood only in a limited sense.

goes, but differs from him as regards the general idea of the adhikarana or arrives at altogether different conclusions. Thus, Vallabha explains sūtra II. 3. 18 just like Śaṅkara, understanding jñā to mean jñāna; but he regards it as a pūrvapakṣa sūtra, while it represents the siddhānta according to Śaṅkara; and he criticises the latter view, remarking that the Māyāvādin is only an avatāra of the Mādhyamika Baudhā. In II. 3. 29-32 also Vallabha, accepting the aṇutva of the individual soul and explaining the last four sūtras of the adhikarana differently from Śaṅkara, censures the Māyāvādin for misunderstanding passages like 'tat tvam asi' so as to deduce the doctrine of māyā from them. In II. 3. 50 Vallabha explains the word 'ābhāsa' to mean 'a reflection,' but arrives at a different conclusion from Śaṅkara and warns the reader against Śaṅkara's doctrine of the unreal character of the jīva. There is one case where Vallabha's interpretation, differing from the rest, is, at the same time, the only one which is most natural and reasonable, i. e. IV. 3. 7-16, the whole pāda dealing with the three questions of the gati (the going along the path), gantavya (the goal to be reached) and the gātrī (the worshipper who goes).

It is very difficult to assert dogmatically whether Vallabha's doctrine receives or does not receive any support from the sūtras; but so much may be said that his commentary strikes us many times not as a very creditable performance, being in places very sectarian or unsatisfactory, although one can point out instances where he is brilliant or reasonable and where he offers very interesting criticisms of the views of others. It is to be observed, however, that his special references to Gokula, the puṣṭimārga and the maryādā-mārga, and his manner of reconciling the mutually contradictory passages in the Upaniṣads by postulating the miraculous and incomprehensible greatness (aīśvarya) of the Brahman, and his assertion of pure monism without any reference to plurality make it far from possible that his doctrine could have been the one propounded by the Sūtrakāra.

Now, there remain for consideration Rāmānuja and Niṁhārka. Their doctrines are very similar to each other, though technically they are quite different and represent two schools going by the

names of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Bhedābheda. The main point of distinction between them is that plurality according to Rāmānuja is an attribute of unity, or in other words, the intelligent and non-intelligent world forms the body and the distinguishing attribute (viśesana) of the Brahman ; whereas the school of Nimbārka refuses to admit this idea of viśesana, there being nothing from which the Brahman can be distinguished. Unity and plurality are both true and are on an equal level without any idea of subordination of plurality to unity, an idea implied in the doctrine of Rāmānuja. Apart from this, there is little or no difference as far as the metaphysical part is concerned. Naturally the commentary of Nimbārka, which is, it must be remembered, very brief, almost a kind of literal interpretation of the sūtras (just like the commentaries of Mallinātha on the works of Kālidāsa), but which is at the same time sufficiently clear as far as the doctrine it infends to convey is concerned, is generally seen to follow that of Rāmānuja. Notwithstanding this, Nimbārka's work shows many traces of originality and his manner of reconciling the mutually contradictory passages of the Upaniṣads has something to recommend it. Thus, for instance, there are many cases where Nimbārka differs from Rāmānuja and is more natural, many times following Śaṅkara at the same time. Thus with regard to I. 2. 9-10 and 11-12, Nimbārka, following Śaṅkara, has two adhikaranas, a procedure decidedly more natural than that followed by Rāmānuja who has one adhikarana only. The same may be said with regard to I. 2. 19 and 20 where Nimbārka follows Śaṅkara and differs from Rāmānuja, who stands apart from the others. The same is true of II. 3. 16, 29-32, 46 ; II. 4. 1-4, 14 ; III. 2. 25 and 26 (where Nimbārka explains the word ' karmanī ' like Rāmānuja, but ' anantena ' like Śaṅkara) ; IV. 2. 16 (where Nimbārka explains ' avibhāga ' differently from but more satisfactorily than Rāmānuja). But what is even more important is that there are instances in which Nimbārka follows neither Śaṅkara nor Rāmānuja, but has interpretations of his own which are far from being unsatisfactory under the circumstances. Thus as regards the last adhikarana of the second pāda of the second adhyāya (sūtras 42-45), Nimbārka sees in it a refutation of the doctrine according to

which the world can be produced from the śakti alone without the puruṣa. So also in the case of sūtras III. 2. 27-28, Nimbārka's interpretation of the two examples: (1) the serpent and its coil and (2) light and its substrate, which differs from those of both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, is most natural and quite fits in with his doctrine of bhedābheda. Nor can we object to his answering in the following sūtra (III. 2. 29) the objection how the Brahman can be void of parts and at the same time capable of partial transformation, an interpretation in which he stands alone. His explanation of III. 3. 28, accounting for the fact that the merits and demerits of the sage are shared by his friends and foes respectively, is quite welcome; and his interpretation is the best and most natural of all as regards sūtras III. 4. 51-52, where the question of the origination of the vidyā and of its fruit (mukti) is dealt with. We cannot be equally sure with regard to his interpretation of IV. 3. 7-16: but the commentary of Keśava-kāśmirin leads us to think that here too Nimbārka has the credit of giving the only satisfactory explanation, which, besides himself, has been given by no other commentator but Vallabha.

As for the cases in which Rāmānuja's interpretations differ from those of Śaṅkara and are more satisfactory, we have only to refer to the cases already noticed.

Now we may ask ourselves: is it the doctrine of Rāmānuja or that of Nimbārka which the sūtras profess to teach?

Any one who has followed us in the analysis given above would agree with us in holding that the following points very probably formed part of the Sūtrakāra's doctrine:

(1) The jīva is atomic in size as compared with the Brahman which is all-pervading (II. 3. 19-32; IV. 4. 15-16; I. 2. 7).

(2) The jīva is not quite identical with the Brahman but has an individual difference of nature. At the most it can be said to be not entirely different (I. 1. 16, 17, 19, 21; I. 2. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 20, 22; I. 3. 2, 5, 7, 19; II. 1. 23; III. 2. 27-30).

(3) The jīva is a part of the Brahman (II. 3. 43).

(4) The jīva is of the nature of intelligence, at the same time it is a knower or has knowledge as its attribute (II. 3. 18).

(5) The jīva is an active agent; but its activity is derived from the Brahman (II. 3. 33-40).

(6) The Brahman is the cause of the origination, sustenance and destruction of the universe (I. 1. 2).

(7) The Brahman, which is intelligent, is the cause of both the intelligent and the non-intelligent world (II. 1. 4-11).

(8) The Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe (I. 4. 23).

(9) The meditation on the Brahman leads to knowledge, which in its turn leads to a beatitude from which there is no return. (III. 4. 51-53).

(10) The Brahman is only one without any distinction of higher or lower; and consequently there is no such distinction as a higher or a lower stage or a gradual or an immediate release (see the analysis of IV. 2 and IV. 4).

(11) The effect is a modification of the cause (II. 1. 6, 14; I. 4. 26).

(12) Scripture is the chief means of arriving at the knowledge of the Brahman (I. 1. 3; II. 1. 27).

(13) Tarka or reasoning has its proper domain; but on supersensuous and purely metaphysical subjects like the Brahman, it is not sufficient by itself and so as to confirm itself to the Śruti (II. 1. 11).

Now all these points no doubt are found to have a place in the doctrines of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka; but it is equally true that they belong more or less to all the schools in question, except of course that of Śaṅkara. What distinguishes these four Viṣṇuitic schools from each other is in the first place the theological part of their doctrines. Thus the Highest Self is called Vāsudeva by Rāmānuja, Kṛṣṇa by Nimbarka and Vallabha, and Viṣṇu by Madhva. But the sūtras provide us with no indications

whatsoever on this and other allied points ; for the sūtras represent a stage where the Aupaniṣada doctrine had not yet lost its essentially metaphysical character, which was latter to be supplemented and metamorphosed by theological and sectarian elaborations. And if, as we have shown above, the probability of the system of Vāllabha or of Madhvā being identical with that of the Sūtrakāra is very small, we have also to say that the system of Rāmānuja, or in other terms the Bhāgavata system which Rāmānuja upholds in II. 2. 42-45, is far from being the system of the sūtras : there being no indications in them that they support the essential dogmas of the Bhāgavata system and the very words like Vāsudeva, Vyūha, etc. being absent from them.

In the second place, these four systems are distinguished from each other in their metaphysical portions. Thus according to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, the creation of the world from the Brahman is nothing more than that the cit and acit, which existed before in a subtle condition, are afterwards developed into gross forms. According to Vallabha the creation possible through the Aiśvarya of the Brahman. This is the case also as regards the reconciliation of the passages which predicate attributes of the Brahman with those which deny them all : the former, according to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka, tend to establish that the Brahman is possessed of all auspicious qualities, while the latter, that it is void of all faults. According to Madhvā, the Brahman is really sāvīśa, ' possessed of attributes ' ; whereas what is meant by 'nirvīśa' is 'arūpa' i. e. 'prakṛitirūparahita', 'not possessing the form of the material world.' According to Vallabha, on the other hand, the Brahman is both 'vyavahāravīśaya' and 'vyavahārarahita' (both capable and incapable of description by ordinary words) and it has and has not the attributes of the intelligent and the non-intelligent world, owing to its marvellous greatness, 'aiśvarya' which makes all sorts of opposites possible.

Unfortunately, on these points the Sūtrakāra provides us with indication of a very vague character, so that it is very difficult to dogmatise that the Sūtrakāra favours one particular view out of these. This is the case with the question, raised in I. 4. 19, how it is that the jīva, which is discussed in Brhad.

IV. 5. 6 is immediately in the subsequent passage spoken of as the Brahman. The Siddhānta view is given by the sūtra I. 4. 22, 'अवस्थितेऽपि काशकृत्स्तः'. As shown above the word avasthiti is very vague and can be with equal reason interpreted by each one so as to fit in with his own view. So also in II. 1. 14, the word 'ananyatva', used to express the relation between cause and effect, is negative in character and so perfectly vague in its connotation. The word 'amśa' in II. 3. 43, though it clearly makes Śāṅkara's doctrine out of question, is not however sufficiently explicit to decide in favour of any one out of the remaining systems. The word 'māyā' in III. 2. 3 is equally vague in that it may mean 'illusion' or 'wonderful power' or 'free will' or 'something not ordinary', as we have already suggested above. Sūtra III. 2. 29 (pūrvavad vā), referring to the question of the relation between the Brahman and the jīva or the Brahman and the non-intelligent world, is very vague and, as we have seen above, the various interpretations put upon it may be all equally just or unjust. Moreover the phraseology of sūtras III. 2. 27-28 leaves on our mind an impression of uncertainty as to the Sūtrakāra's opinion on the point. The same impression is confirmed by the use of the negative word 'a-vibhāga' in sūtras IV. 2. 16 and IV. 4. 4 (the latter referring to the relation between the released soul and the Brahman). In the same direction point the sūtras IV. 4. 7 and 12, where an attempt to reconcile opposite views on the question of the nature of the released soul, whether it is pure intelligence or possessing various attributes and whether it is embodied or not, is attributed to Bādarāyaṇa, the use of the words 'avirodha' 'absence of contradiction' and 'ubhayavidha' 'both ways' being characteristic. This last word reminds us of the other instances where the word 'ubhaya' is used in the sūtra, to be interpreted according to the whim and necessity of him who explains it. We may in particular also notice 'ubhayathā' in II. 3. 40, 'ubhayalingam' in III. 2. 11, 'ubhaya-virodhāt' in III. 3. 28, 'ubhaya-vyapadesāt' in III. 2. 27, 'ubhayathā' in III. 2. 29.

All these instances of the employment by the Sūtrakāra of vague and general words, not capable of being explicitly defined, lead us to believe that the sūtras, though they were in the first instance intended to formulate a system from the Upaniṣads, reconciling the

contradictions which meet us at every step, represent a stage of transition from the freedom and absolute want of system of the Upanisads to the cut and dry systematisation of the commentaries. There was the so called Aupanisada doctrine in the limited sense of the word as distinguished from the other orthodox doctrines (like Saṃkhya, Nyāya etc.) as well as the heterodox ones like Buddhism and Jainism; but that is all. The further formulation of the particular dogmas found in the later Vedānta is absolutely unknown to the sūtras.

Or, if at all we insist on seeing in the sūtras one of the five systems under discussion, it can be at the most the 'bhedābheda' system of Nimbārka, according to which both bheda and abheda are equally real, without the idea of any subordination of one to the other. (See in this connection especially sūtras III. 2. 27-29, which fit in with the doctrine of Nimbārka better than with any other; also sūtras IV. 4. 7 and 12, which represent a clumsy combination of both the views contained in the immediately preceding sūtras.) For if we classify the five schools in question from the point of view of the formation of a system based on the reconciliation of the passages teaching difference and non-difference, or plurality and unity, the school of Nimbārka (leaving out of consideration the later theological and sectarian encumbrances) represents the first and, in a sense, elementary and rather clumsy stage; and the very title bhedābheda bears testimony to this fact. Next in grade would stand the school of Rāmānuja which claims the title of Viśiṣṭādvaita, thus giving prominence to advaita or Monism, at the same time admitting dvaita or plurality, but only as qualifying (and thus subordinate to) the Monism. A further grade in the progress of the elimination of contradiction is represented by the school of Madhva on the one hand, which is entitled Dvaita (explaining away all passages referring to advaita in a most fantastic way,—a retrograde step from the philosophic point of view), and on the other hand by the schools of Vallabha and Śaṅkara, respectively called Suddhādvaita and Kevalādvaita (representing a certain progress from the philosophic point of view), which affirm monism pure and monism absolute, thus explaining

away all plurality by means of unity, the former through the medium of the marvellous greatness (*aiśvarya*) of the supreme spirit, the other by means of illusion of nescience (*Māyā* or *avidyā*), both the principles, however, being equally inexplicable and incomprehensible (*a-vān-manasa-gocara*). It needs hardly to be remarked that the more advanced a system is in the degree of systematisation and the elimination of contradiction, the farther removed it is from the system of the sūtras, whatever that be. In any case the sūtras are absolutely unaware of the particular dogmas enunciated by each of the different Vedānta schools of the later times.